and staff officers at all levels. The influx of information into our combat operations and fire support coordination centers is growing at a rate faster than our ability to process it. Thus far advances in information technology have increased, not diminished, the burden on our officers to make the hard calls. “Marines must rapidly distinguish between information that is useful in making decisions and that which is not impertinent. Often they must avoid the natural temptation to delay their decision until more information makes the situation clearer or risk losing the initiative. In all likelihood, once military action is underway more information will be simply further cloud the picture. Our leaders must be able to “feel the battlefield tempo, discern patterns among the chaos, and make decisions in seconds much like a Wall Street investment trader, but with life threatening consequences. In short, we must ask ourselves, “From the strategic corporal to the Marine expeditionary force (MEF) commander, how do we ensure: that each and every Marine has the decisionmaking ability needed to execute his or her responsibilities?”
The Essence of Decisionmaking
In answering the question, we must first gain a fundamental understanding of decision making itself. Decisionmaking is the foremost human factor, indeed unique contribution, involved in warfare. In effect, it is the means for implementing the human will. As long as wars result from opposing human wills, they will be emotional and chaotic in nature. Technological or scientific solutions alone will not be adequate to
resolve these conflicts; nor will they be able to lift “the fog of war.”
“Our leaders must be able to “feel” the battlefield tempo, discern patterns among the chaos, and make decisions in seconds much like a Wall Street investment trader, but with life threatening consequences... how do we ensure that each and every Marine has the decisionmaking ability needed to execute his or her responsibilities?”
Generally, we know that there are two primary models for human decisionmaking – the analytical model and the intuitive, or recognitional model. Military leaders at all levels are familiar the analytical model because it is the one historically used in our formal schools. In this model Marines prepare estimates of the situation that eventually evolve into potential courses of action. Analytical decisionmaking uses a scientific, quantitative approach, and to be effective, it depends on a relatively high level of situational certainty and accuracy. The greater the degree of situational certainty and awareness, the more effective analytical decisionmaking becomes. Unfortunately, the analytical model does not lend itself well to military applications once the enemy is engaged. At that point, military situations most often become very ambiguous, and the leader cannot afford to wait for detailed, quantitative data without risking the initiative. Analytical decision- making offers distinct advantage when the situation allows an indefinite amount of time for analysis, such as during pre-hostility
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contingency planning, but it rapidly diminishes in usefulness “once you cross the line of departure.
While analytical decision making is based on a comparison of quantitative options, recognitional decision making depends on a qualitative assessment of the situation based on the decider’s judgment and experience. It does not look for the ideal solution; instead, it seeks the first solution that will work. Research by noted psychologist, Dr. Gary Klein, indicates that most people use the intuitive model of decision making over 90 percent of the time. Ironically, until recently our formal schools focused on the analytical model. This began to change, however, with a growing acceptance of the ideas of the late Col John R. Boyd, USAF (Ret.) Boyd demonstrated that a person in the midst of conflict continuously moves through a recognitional decision pattern that he termed the “Observe – Orient – Decide – Act (OODA) Loop.” He pointed out that the leader who moves through this OODA cycle the quickest gains a potentially decisive advantage in the conflict by disrupting his enemy’s ability to respond and react. In short, the leader who consistently makes the faster decisions can interfere with his opponent’s decisionmaking process and effectively degrade his ability to inflict his will and continue the struggle. Col Boyd’s ideas, entirely consistent with the Marine Corps’ maneuver warfare philosophy, were incorporated into our doctrine in 1989. As Co1 Boyd recognized, the chief advantage of intuitive decisionmaking in military operations is its speed. Numerous
military historians and sociologists, including such notables as John Keegan and S.L.A. Marshall, have pointed that the normal tendency for inexperienced leaders under extreme conditions is to wait for as much information as possible before making a decision. Of course, the longer the decision is delayed, the more opportunities are missed. Initiative can be forfeited to the enemy. For this reason, Sun Tzu noted that, “Speed is the essence of war,” and Patton observed, “A good plan executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week.” History has repeatedly demonstrated that battles have been lost more often by a leader’s failure to make a decision than by his making a poor one.
Napoleon believed that the intuitive ability to rapidly assess the situation on the battlefield and make a sound decision was the most important quality a commander could possess. He referred to this intuition as coup d’oeil, or the strike of the eye,” and thought that it was a gift of nature. More recently, however, practitioners of the military art have come to believe that while heredity and personality may well have an impact on an individual’s intuitive skills, these skills can also be cultivated and developed. Prior to and during World War II, the Japanese called this skill,
ishin denshin, or the “sixth sense,” and they
observed that it began to appear after months of intense repetitive training in a cohesive unit. During the same time period, the Germans referred to the capacity to make rapid, intuitive decisions in combat as “character.” They attempted to first identify innate intuition during their recruiting processes
Required Reading 2, Continued
and then cultivate the skill forcing their officers to repeatedly make tactical decisions under stressful situations throughout their professional schooling. While some might point out that both the Germans and Japanese were on the losing end of World War II, we might be wiser to ask how they were able to achieve such great military successes given their relative size and resource limitations. Napoleon may be correct if he meant that intuition cannot be taught the traditional sense, but both the Germans and the Japanese were successful in assuming that – through repetition – it could be learned.
“If we know that the effectiveness of intuitive decisionmaking is dependent upon experience, we must seek ways to give our Marines that experience. We should recognize decisionmaking as vitally important combat skill and promote its development throughoutout our training curriculum . . .”
How Do We Cultivate Napoleon's Coup p'Oeil;
Character. If we accept that intuitive combat
decisionmaking skill will be exceedingly important for all Marines in the: 21st century, we must seek to cultivate that ability. Our first step, however, must be to identify an important prerequisite for sound decision making – sound character. As often as not, the really tough issues confronting Marines in the three block war will be ethical/moral quandaries, and they must have the wherewithal to handle them appropriately. We cannot anticipate and train Marines for each
situation they may face. All Marines must, therefore, possess a moral consistency to serve as compass. Making the right ethical decisions must be a thing of habit. This why we created the Transformation Process where we recruit bold, capable, and intelligent young man and women of character and recast them in the white hot crucible of recruit training. We immerse them the highest ideals of American society – the time honored values of our Corps – honor, courage, and commitment. We place these values on them in a framework of high institutional standards to which they are held strictly accountable. We further foster the acceptance of these values through the unit cohesion and sustainment phases. The common thread throughout Transformation is an emphasis on the growth of integrity, courage, initiative, decisiveness, mental agility, and personal accountability – the basic skills needed to make timely, accurate, and ethical decisions in the heat of combat.
Repetitive Skills Training. If we know that
the effectiveness of intuitive decisionmaking is dependent upon experience, we must seek ways to give our Marines that experience. We should recognize decisionmaking as a vitally important combat skill and promote its development throughout our training curriculum, but in our formal schools' curriculums and our local unit training programs. We must face the paradox that our least experienced leaders, those with the least skill in decisionmaking, will face the most demanding decisions on the battlefield. Just as we expect a Marine to employ his weapon under combat duress we must likewise demand that he employ his mind.
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Marines need to be comfortable with using their intuition under highly stressful circumstances. In short, we must make intuitive decisionmaking an instinct, and this can only be accomplished through repetition. Training programs and curriculums should routinely make our Marines decide a course of action under cold, wet, noisy conditions while they are tired and hungry and as an instructor continually asks them “what are you going to do now Marine?”
Unit commanders must scrutinize their training programs to ensure that operational exercises are geared
to challenge the intuitive decisionmaking processes of subordinates leaders at every level in their command. Training must account for the role of uncertainty in decisionmaking. We should literally bombard them with information and get them used to making decisions under varied circumstances without complete information and with contradicting or false information. Similarly, we must continually review and revise our formal schools’ curriculums – from the Schools of Infantry to the Marine Air Ground Task Force Staff Training Program and up to and including the Marine Corps War College to dramatically increase the number of times we force each Marine to make decisions.
Our Warfighting Lab has led the way in developing practical tools to support this type of instruction with the computer assisted training simulation known as the Combat Decision Range (CDR). The CDR puts the squad leader square in the middle of the three block war and requires him to make decisions across the spectrum of conflict, from humanitarian relief to midintensity firefight, with the media watching. During a single 30 to 45 minute CDR training scenario, a Marine squad leader must make 15 to 30 urgent, life or death decisions while land navigating and communi- cating both up and down the chain of command. The results of experimentation with the CDR indicate that we are on the right course. Squad leaders who routinely exercise in the CDR gain confidence in their intuitive abilities and make sound decisions more rapidly.
Initiatives similar to the CDR should be pursued in all of our professional schools and in our operational units. At each level, from young, aspiring noncommissioned officers to our MEF commanders, our training should be geared to putting the Marine in the appropriate stressful environment for his or her grade, forcing them to make timely decisions. Initially, it is important that the correctness of the decision not be an issue. The “right” decision is any decision as long as it is timely. After all, in combat situations there are rarely any right
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“The results of experimentation with the CDR indicate that we are on the right course. Squad leaders who routinely exercise in the CDR gain confidence in their intuitive abilities and make sound decisions more rapidly.”
Required Reading 2, Continued
or wrong answers, As the conditioning proceeds, appropriate post exercise critiques and debriefs will begin to identify in the participant’s mind the credibility of various decisions (or “solutions”) in relative terms. Through this process, they will begin to develop an intellectual framework for making time-critical decisions in their billet. Self-Study. A personal commitment must be made by each Marine to focus on developing his or her own decisionmaking abilities. This means self-study; but simply reading history is not enough. We need to read it with an eye toward examining the relevant decisionmaking processes that took place during the particular event. Why did the commander make this decision? What information did he have when he made it? What information did he not have? Was it timely? What subsequent decisions did he make and why? What were the results? Personal study of history and the military art in this manner promotes an ability to recognize patterns and later, to exploit them. While it is no substitute for personal experience, the dedicated study of conflict and warfare complements tactical decision games, simulations, and exercises in establishing a mental framework for making time-sensitive decisions.
Command Climate. While most realistic training in the world may never be able to replicate the stresses associated with making decisions in combat, we must pursue means of conditioning a willingness among our Marines to make those decisions. We should literally inculcate a “culture” of
intuitive decisionmaking throughout our Corps. To do so requires that commanders at all levels create within their units an atmosphere that encourages, not inhibits, their subordinates to make decisions. Subordinates must be assured that their leaders will back them up when they make a poor tactical decision. Debriefs and critiques must challenge the subordinate’s rationale, but not threaten his or her pride or dignity. This, of course, is not possible in a command where micromanagement or a “zero-defect” mentality is prevalent.
Continuing to March
The Marine Corps Combat Development Command will dedicate itself to identifying developing and cultivating appropriate intuitive combat decision-making skills at all levels. Our Warfighting Lab will continue to take the lead with initiatives such as the Traders Game with the New York Mercantile Exchange, concepts and ideas exchanges with the New York City Fire Department, and the Dynamic Decisionmaking Wargame involving traders, firefighters, police officers, air traffic controllers, and other professionals. The Lab should eventually expend their experimentation efforts in this area beyond the training realm. They should seek to answer such questions as: Can certain personality types develop intuitive skills more readily than others? Is there a means for testing this? Do different billets, assignments, and military occupational specialties require different types of intuition? Should our manpower processes – Continued on next page
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recruiting, promotion, billet assignment, command selection, etc. – consider these factors? Answering questions such as these will help us field leaders at all levels with the decisionmaking skills they will need to fight and win the three block war.
Summary
Our warfighting philosophy, both now and with the growth of operational maneuver from the sea, is one of maneuver. Maneuver doctrine to be successful, demands high tempo in order to retain the initiative. Without leaders who can make timely decisions under extreme duress, this doctrine simply cannot succeed. These leaders cannot rely on the traditional, analytical approach to decision making. Advances in the information technology will never clear Clausewitz’s “fog of war” to a point where
the analytical model is timely enough to guarantee victory. Marine Corps leaders, therefore, need to develop confidence in their own intuition – an intuition rooted firmly in solid character. We must actively seek out means for cultivating intuitive decisionmaking skills among our leaders at all levels from the strategic corporal to the MEF commander. Since these intuitive skills result from experience, we must include repetitive decisionmaking skills in all of our formal schools curriculums and in the (training programs of our operational units. Finally, our commanders must foster a climate within their units that is supportive of intuitive skill development. Doing these things will cultivate coup d’oeil and guarantee our success on the 21st century battlefield.
Preview to Required Reading 3
Introduction The article “Strategies of Decision Making” was written by Dr. Gary Klein. Dr. Klein developed the Recognition-Primed Decision model and multiple other decision-making resources used by the Marine Corps and other organizations.
Reading Scope and
Perspective
The SNCO should read the article “Strategies of Decision Making” from the perspective of a leadership trainer and war fighter. In order to develop full appreciation for the article’s scope and perspective, the readers should ask questions similar to those below. For training purposes, the student should be prepared to answer the perspective building questions.
• What is the purpose of the article?
• How do proficient decision makers make decisions?
• How would you describe the team decision-making process? • How can the operational decision-making process be improved?
Reading Terminology
The following article discusses the following concept, terms, or issues. • Multi-attribute utility analysis
• Decision analysis
• Operational decision making
Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis
Multi-attribute utility analysis is the technical term that describes the process of comparing systematically generated options by assessing a value to them and choosing the best value. The analytical decision-making process utilizes this process to support decision making.
Decision
Analysis
Decision analysis refers to the process of evaluating an option as a move in a chess game. The decision maker looks at a branching tree of responses and counter-responses and estimates the probability and utility of possible future state in order to calculate the maximum and minimum outcomes.
Operational Decision Making
Operational decision making refers to the process of making decisions that are applicable in the operating environment.
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Required Reading 3
Instructions Read the following article and think about the decision-making processes and how the intuitive processes can be enhanced by the SNCO.