What are the requisites of a valid trial in absentia?

A* "(1) the accused has already been arraigned; (2) he has been duly notified of the trial; and (3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable." Parada v.

Veneration, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1353, March 11,1997,269 SCRA 371,376 (citing People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 [1986]).

Q. Does the provision on trial in absentia preclude forfeiture of bail bond under the Rules of Court for one who jumps bail?

A. No, the new provision "does not lend itself to a latitudinarian construction."

People v. Judge Prieto, Jr., L-46542, 21 July

Sec. 10 ART. Ill - BILL OP RIGHTS 133

1978. (Prieto's argument was that the time to forfeit bail should be after conviction, not upon jumping bail.)

Q. What is the reason for allowing trial in absentia?

A. To speed up the disposition of criminal cases. People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986).

Right to counsel

Q. Why must an accused enjoy the right to counsel?

A. This is a realistic recognition of the obvious truth tR&t the average defendant does not have the professional skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is represented by an experienced and learned counsel.

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

Q. What duty is imposed on the judge by the guarantee of the right to counsel?

A. If the defendant appears without counsel he must be informed by the court that he has a right to have counsel before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel. If he desires and is unable to employ counsel, the, court must assign counsel to defend him. This is a right which the defendant should not be deprived of, and the failure of the court to assign counsel or, after counsel has been assigned, require him to perform this duty by appearing and defending the accused would be sufficient cause for the reversal of the case. U.S. v. Gimeno, 1 Phil. 236 (1905).

Q. What are the pre-arraignment duties of the trial judge? "

A. Under Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the four-fold duties are:

"(1) to inform the accused that he has the right to have his own counsel before being arraigned; (2) after giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of counsel; (3) if he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable time to do so;

and (4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign counsel de oficio to defend him." People v. Agbayani, G.R. No. 122770, January 16,1998, 284 SCRA 315, 333 (citing People v.

Holgado, 85 Phil. 752, 756 [1950])

THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION:

A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Sec. 14

Q. Petitioner contends that the trial court should have appointed a counsel de oficio when his counsel consistently failed to appear for his cross-examination. Decide.

A. The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused who has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment. No such duty exists where the accused has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a counsel of his own choice.

At the most, the appointment of a counsel de oficio in a situation like the present case would be discretionary with the trial court, which discretion will not be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse.

Libuit v. People, G.R. No. 154363, September 13,2005; Sayson v. People, 166 SCRA 680 (1988).

Q. Both the transcript of stenographic notes and the order issued by the trial judge failed to disclose categorically that the court informed the accused of his right to counsel. Is this sufficient ground to reverse conviction?

A. No. The trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. People v. Agbayani, G.R. No. 122770, January 16,1998,284 SCRA 315,334. However, the Court admonished all trial courts to have their compliance with their pre-arraignment duties put on record. Id. at 335-36.

Q. After conviction, accused discovers that the "lawyer" who defended her was not a member of the bar. May she be granted new trial?

A. Yes. She has a right to qualified counsel. Delgado v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 357 (1986); People v. Santocildes, Jr., G.R. No.

109149, December 21,1999.

.ni' Q. Appellants fault the trial court for appointing counsel de 'Aoficio despite their insistence to be assisted by counsel of their own choice;

and second, for refusing to suspend trial until they shall have secured the services of new counsel.

A. We have held that there is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte, pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system.

Indisputably, it was the strategic machinations of appellants and their counsel de parte which prompted the trial court to appoint counsel de oficio. The unceremonious withdrawal of appellants' counsel de parte during the proceedings of August 24,1998, as well as their stubborn refusal to return to the court for trial undermines the continuity of the

Sec. 17 ART. Ill - BILL OF RIGHTS 135

proceedings. Considering that the case had already been dragging on a lethargic course, it behooved the trial court to prevent any further dilatory maneuvers on the part of the defense counsel. Accordingly, it was proper for the trial court to appoint counsel de oficio to represent appellants during the remaining phases of the proceedings. People v.

Larrafiaga, et al., G.R. Nos. 138874-75, February 3, 2004.

Q. In times of emergency, may a person be denied the right to confer with counsel?

A. No. Diokno v. Enrile, L-36315, December 19,1981.

Q. Convicted of rape, accused sought to withdraw his appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that he could not afford counsel.

Should he be allowed?

A. No. He should be given counsel de officio instead. People v. Rio, G.R. No. 90294, September 24,1991.

Q. The accused contends that the judge's appointment of a counsel de oficio deprives him of his constitutional right to be defended by counsel of his own choice. Decide.

A. The 'preference in the choice of counsel' pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation [Art. Ill, §12(1)1 rather than one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution [Art. Ill, §14(2)].

Amion v. Judge Chiongson, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22,1999.

Right to be informed

Q. What is the purpose and scope of the right to be informed?

A. The object of the written accusation is — first, to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Eveiy crime is made up of certain acts and intent;

these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. U.S. v. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 223 (1904).