Research Design and Case Selection

I expressed in chapter 1 how this research project emerged in response to a trio of confounding aid policy announcements made over the course of six months in 2013. Each of these announcements conveyed a definitive policy choice: Australia would abandon its spending ramp-up to 0.5%; the Netherlands would abandon its 40-year long policy of spending at least 0.7%; and the UK, having just reached the 0.7% target for the first time, promised to continue to spend this amount for the foreseeable future. I was driven to understand how these choices were determined. In methodological terms, my case selection was Y-centred: this research proceeded using a ‘causes of effects’ approach, not an ‘effects of causes’ approach (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 41)95_.

Case selection based on the dependent variable is often considered taboo when conducting social science (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 100), partly due to the influence of King, Keohane and Verba’s (1994) volume Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. As Goertz and Mahoney (2012, 41) acknowledge, “quantitative scholars have clearly come down as a group in favour of the effects-of-causes approach as the standard way to do social science.” Yet recent scholarship has shown how “methodologists rooted in the tradition of large-N studies… provide misleading advice” (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 100) by mistakenly extending the logic of inference used in quantitative research to qualitative research (Goertz and Mahoney 2012)96_.

The reality is that foreign policy analysis is a predominantly Y-centred approach. It generally seeks to explain why a given foreign policy decision was made. This research project was initially triggered by observing surprising events occurring in the real world. I was motivated to explain

95 _{Scholars working within the ‘quantitative culture’ operate using an ‘effects of causes’ approach. Such scholars}

prize the controlled experiment and seek to “estimate the average effect of an independent variable of interest” (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 41). In contrast, as Blatter and Haverland (2012, 99) point out, “[s]mall-N research with an emphasis on causal-process tracing does not rely on the co-variation of variables across cases to draw causal inferences”.

96 _{For overviews of the ‘state of play’ of causal inference in qualitative research, see Collier, Brady, and Seawright}

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these surprising events by asking about their causes (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 42). Alongside being “interested in explaining outcomes in individual cases”, I was also driven to study “the effects of particular causal factors within individual cases” (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 42). My approach was to begin with a series of outputs (significant and confounding aid policy decisions relating to aid spending) and work backwards to explain how these outputs were realised. In doing so, I proceeded in the manner described by Stuart (2008, 576), who explains how “foreign- policy decision-making takes as its starting point the dependent variable–a specific foreign- policy choice by an international actor–and seeks to explain how this choice was arrived at by the agents… involved in the decisional process” (emphasis added).

As I conducted preliminary research into the three aid policy announcements that prompted the project, it became increasingly evident that to simply recreate the decisionmaking processes which led to these policy announcements would not provide a definitive answer to the research question. In response, I sought to identify a series of comparable aid policy decision outputs (as opposed to announcements) which were the product of distinct decisionmaking episodes. My solution was to reconstruct the three decisionmaking processes which led to the definitive strategic level aid policy statement published by the Governments in power when the research- initiating announcements were made—the Abbott, Cameron-Clegg and Rutte I Governments, respectively (refer Neack 2014, 9).

Figure 3.C: Research Design Summary

What soon became clear was that my research design would benefit greatly if, in addition to being able to make cross-country comparisons, I could also examine changes within countries over time. To generate temporal comparisons, I decided to also examine an additional three decisionmaking episodes—those which produced the definitive aid policy statements of the government’s preceding those already identified. My final research design therefore called for the reconstruction of six aid policy decisionmaking episodes that resulted in what I consider to be the definitive aid policy declarations of consecutive Governments in three countries. A benefit of adopting this research design for these countries was the way it allowed for the effects

Approach and Method

Page79 of changing government ideology on aid policy to be examined. As Figure 3.C highlights, in each of my case study countries, the most recent general election (at the time of settling on my research design) had seen government change hands, bringing to power governments of different ideological orientation97_.

Table 3.B below is an expanded version of Table 1.A presented in chapter 1. A crucial reason I selected these six decisionmaking episodes to reconstruct was that the decision outputs that were produced were comparable. These episodes resulted in what might be called ‘White Paper equivalent’ outputs98_{. This was highly beneficial for three important reasons}99_{. First, such}

episodes conform to a predictable pattern. While many foreign policy decisionmaking episodes are difficult to delineate, White Paper-type processes have definitive start and end points. Moreover, a formal government announcement and/or press conference usually takes place at the initiation of the process and at its completion, where the final policy document is typically launched. Media coverage attends these set piece moments, which usually involve speeches from the responsible cabinet minister.

Second, the relative accessibility of White Paper-type decisionmaking processes is crucial in permitting effective causal process tracing (something discussed in more detail in the following subsection). As Blatter and Haverland (2012, 25) argue, “[b]ecause causal-process tracing depends on gaining a comprehensive overview over the temporal unfolding of the causal- process, the ability to provide a dense description of critical moments, and the possibility of gaining deep insights into the perceptions and motivations of important actors, the accessibility of a case is the primary precondition for investigation”. White Paper-type decisionmaking episodes are not conducted as “behind closed doors” to the extent that most foreign policy decisions are (Beach 2012, 3) and because of their semi-public nature, it is relatively easy to identify the participants100_.

97 _{Having a means to compare governments with different ideological stances was particularly important given the}

reason Cameron’s decision to maintain his Government’s commitment 0.7 % was so surprisingly is precisely because it confronted expectations about how Conservative governments are likely to behave in times of fiscal pressure. Likewise, it was surprising that the Netherlands finally made the decision to abandon the 0.7% target during a Coalition in which the PvdA (Labour) was involved, rather than during the previous centre-right coalition (which relied on the far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) of Geert Wilders to form government).

98 _{The UK Government did not produce a White Paper type policy related to aid during the course of the}

Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government (2010-2015). However, while the Spending Round 2010 encompasses policy issues ranging far beyond just aid, the process by which this document was produced is comparable with a White Paper process.

99 _{As discussed in chapter 1, the fact that the decisionmaking episodes from Australia, the Netherlands and the UK}

during this period produced similar outputs contributed to my selection of these countries to study, rather than, for example, Canada or Norway.

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Table 3.B: Case Selection Summary

Series One Series Two

Au

st

ra

lia

Defining Declaratory Policy

An Effective Aid Program for Australia: Making a real difference—Delivering real results

Australian aid: Promoting prosperity, reducing poverty,

enhancing stability

Episode Designation AUS I AUS II

Short name Effective Aid Australian aid

Publication Date 6 July 2011 18 June 2014

Government Gillard Labor Government _{(minority Government)} Abbott Government

(Liberal / National Coalition)

Political Orientation Centre-left Centre-right

Head of Government Julia Gillard Tony Abbott

Principal

(Position)

Kevin Rudd (Minister for Foreign Affairs)

Julie Bishop (Minister for Foreign Affairs)

Trigger for Episode

(date)

Rudd’s announcement of Independent Review of Aid

Effectiveness (16 November 2010)

Abbott Government’s announcement to cut aid spending

and integrate AusAID with DFAT (5 / 18 September 2013) Th e U ni te d Ki ng do m

Defining Declaratory Policy _{Building our Common Future} Eliminating World Poverty: Spending Review 2010

Episode Designation UK I UK II

Short name Building our Common Future Spending Review 2010

Publication Date 6 July 2009 20 October 2010

Government Brown Labour Government Government (Conservative / Liberal Cameron-Clegg Coalition Democrat Coalition)

Political Orientation Centre-left Centre-right

Head of Government Gordon Brown David Cameron

Principal

(Position)

Douglas Alexander (Secretary of State for International Development)

Andrew Mitchell

(Secretary of State for International Development)

Trigger for Episode

(date)

Speech by Douglas Alexander (19 January 2009)

Conservative / Liberal Democrat Coalition Agreement commitment

to conduct a spending review (12 May 2010) Th e N et he rla nd s

Defining Declaratory Policy

Letter to the House of Representatives presenting the

spearheads of development cooperation policy

A World to Gain: A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment

Episode Designation NED I NED II

Short name Spearheads letter A World to Gain

Publication Date 18 March 2011 5 April 2013

Government Rutte I (VVD / CDA Coalition + PVV support) Rutte II (VVD / PvdA Coalition)

Political Orientation Centre-right Centrist (Purple Coalition)

Head of Government Mark Rutte Mark Rutte

Principal (Position)

Ben Knapen (State Secretary for European

Affairs and Development Cooperation)

Lilliane Ploumen (Minister for Foreign Trade and

Development Cooperation)

Trigger for Episode (date)

VVD & CDA Coalition Agreement commitment to “fundamentally review and [modernise]” Dutch

development policy (30 September 2010)

VVD & PvdA Coalition Agreement commitment to reduce aid spending

below 0.7% (29 October 2012)

Approach and Method

Page81 Third, White Paper-type decisionmaking episodes are highly deliberative and the decision output therefore can be taken to represent a considered view. Unlike many foreign policy decisionmaking episodes, a White Paper-equivalent producing episode ultimately results in a tangible decision output of considerable length101_{. The decisionmaking process generally}

incorporates input from a relatively wide range of stakeholders. Although final approval ultimately rests with the principal, the collaborative nature of these types of decisionmaking episodes is more likely to reveal were tensions and differences of opinions exist between different individuals and groups.