One thing is clear, don’t do any research. Don’t ask the public any questions on this subject. The answers are never reliable. In instances where the head says one thing and the heart another, studies are useless if not misleading.
Ulruich and Sarasin (in Carrigan and Attalla, 2001: 566)
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is largely threefold: firstly, as discussed in the previous chapter, to consider the epistemological assumptions, adopted methodologies and
methods used in previous research into ethical consumer behaviour and their implications for the validity and reliability of such research. Secondly, to attempt to argue the case for the particular paradigm which shaped the research conducted for this thesis, partly in response to the evaluation undertaken of existing research to date. As a result of this, the third aim of this chapter is to discuss the methods that were used in the research.
In relation to the first and second aims, Arbnor and Bjerke (2009) note that such
methodologies will be based on a set of philosophical presumptions and methodological viewpoints, or paradigms, which affect the collection and analysis of data, and
consequently which have implications for the conclusions reached. They note that such paradigms consist of a conception of reality, a conception of science, a scientific ideal and ethical / aesthetical aspects. This is significant, as Easton (in Moller & Wilson, 1995: 413) states:
Most researchers are very little exercised by the how of research…. There is also a widely held belief that the broader issues of methodology are irrelevant to
‘practical researchers’…. but what is often obscure is the fact that assumptions have been made and values smuggled into the decisions without the decision
maker being aware of the process. Furthermore, it is not always realised how the methodology used in a research program critically influences the output of the research process and its interpretation.
Therefore, views on the nature of the world, reality, and the way in which knowledge is developed have profound implications for the methods used to conduct research. As Easton suggests, this then influences the way in which research is undertaken, the type of data gathered, the way in which it is interrogated, and ultimately the outcomes. The choice of methods therefore influence the output from those methods. The following section will therefore address both of these aims by addressing the research paradigms relevant to the study. This will be done both with reference to the literature concerned specifically with research philosophy and methodology, but also to the marketing and ethics literature discussed in the literature review.
Research Methodology
As previously mentioned, Arbnor and Bjerke (2009) note the importance of research paradigms. They argue that such paradigms are based on a series of assumptions, and they in turn affect the ultimate choice of research methods (or the operative paradigm).
This series of relationships is shown in figure 17:
Figure 17: Paradigm and operative paradigm (Arbnor and Bjerke, 2009: 17)
Ultimate
presumptions Methodological
view Study area
Theory of science
Methodology
PARADIGM
• Conception of reality
• Conception of science
• Scientific ideal
• Ethics / aesthetics
OPERATIVE PARADIGM
• Methodological procedures
• Methodics
Therefore, they define methodology as: “…the understanding of how methods are
constructed, that is, how an operative paradigm is developed.” (p17). However, they argue a discussion of methodology must include all of the above elements, and the elements cannot be described in isolation as this operative paradigm relates the study to a methodological view, which in turn is based upon a paradigm. Easterby-Smith et al.
(1991) support this, reasoning that an understanding of philosophical issues (the ‘theory of science’ noted above) assists in clarifying research designs, recognising which designs will work and which will not, and identifying designs which may not have previously been considered. Therefore, any discussion of research methodology must establish both the paradigm and the operative paradigm. This chapter will therefore begin by examining the philosophical issues (or ‘theory of science’) appropriate to the objectives outlined in the previous chapter. In doing so, a critique of previous studies of ethical consumption will be offered to help better understand the research to date. Issues of methods (methodological procedures and research techniques) and methodics (the planning and conducting of the research) will then also be considered.
Theory of Science: Research Philosophy and Approach
As previously established a research paradigm relates to a theory of science containing four key elements as follows. Firstly, the conception of reality relates to the philosophical ideas about the construction of reality (ontology). A conception of science relates to the nature of knowledge (epistemology), the scientific ideal relates to the role of the
researcher in the research process, and ethics / aesthetics relate to claims about what is morally suitable in the research and how the research should be presented. The latter element will be discussed later in this chapter.
Conception of reality: ontology
Problems of reality relate to ontological considerations. According to Connolly (1995: 1) ontology is: “…the study of the fundamental logic of reality apart from appearances”.
Hindess (1977: 4) notes that:
Where ontological doctrines are invoked with respect to the social sciences they generally concern an alleged distinction between the essential properties of things social and those of (all other) things natural which, far from being established by scientific investigation, is supposed to call for a corresponding distinction in scientific methods of investigation.
Therefore, in addition to comprising theories about what exists by drawing contrasts between the natural and social worlds, ontology is also inextricably linked to the conception of science highlighted above, and this will be developed in the following section. In relation to these two contrasting views, Bryman and Bell (2007) note that they are referred to as objectivism and constructionism. Here Bryman & Bell (2007: 22) define objectivism as an ontological position which: “…implies that social phenomena confront us as external facts that are beyond our reach or influence”, and constructionism in which:
“…social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors… not only produced through social interaction, but also in a constant state of revision.” Philosophical arguments rage on each side: as Hindess (1977) notes, objectivist thought has a long history, recognised most readily in the work of Kant who, as with the previous discussion relating to ethics, sees no difference between social and natural science: “…human actions, like every other natural event are determined by universal laws” (in Hindess, 1977: 13). Constructionist thought has its roots in more recent traditions, with an ontological enquiry of ‘being’ significantly developed by Heidegger (influenced by Hegel and Nietzsche) and his phenomenological concept of ‘Dasein’, or
“being there” (Sedgwick, 2001, Guignon, 2006). Sedgwick (2001) notes that
phenomenology here is a term coined by Heidegger’s teacher, Husserl, and is composed of
‘phenomenon’ (to show itself; the manifest) and ‘logos’ (discourse). Thus phenomenology is the meaning grasped whenever one engages with the world; it is concerned with the meaning of ‘being’ being rooted in understanding; to be means to be understood as something. As van Manen (1990) notes, phenomenology is the study of lived experience;
to understand: “What is this or that kind of experience like?” (van Manen, 1990: 9). The ethical perspectives and arguments put forward in chapter two as well as some of the identity work considered in chapters three and five clearly depend on this particular ontological paradigm, and this will be considered further in due course.
It should be noted that Laverty (2003) posits a difference, however, between Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology, the former of which understands humans as ‘knowers’, the latter of which comprehends humans as:
“…concerned creatures with an emphasis on their fate…” (p7). That is, phenomenology seeks to answer primarily epistemological questions about ‘how we know what we know’,
whereas hermeneutic phenomenology seeks to arrive at an understanding ‘what it means to be a person’ (Laverty, 2003). It should be noted that there are problems with both of these ontological and epistemological viewpoints, however which require further exploration. In order to highlight these it will first be useful to explore the development of ontological thought and how it relates to the arguments put forward earlier in this thesis.
The phenomenological concerns described influenced poststructualists and
postmodernists such as Rorty, Derrida and Foucault (Guignon, 2006). This poststructuralist thought, as it applies to the social world is worthy of further discussion, particularly as it applies to conceptions of ethics as discussed in the previous chapter. Sedgwick (2001) argues that structural thought is based around reaching an understanding of the conditions in which meaning is produced in social forms, but in order to formally
understand these conditions, they must be conceptualised as being fixed; essentially that there is some ‘absolute truth’ which underpins these forms. Thus, structuralism must be rooted in an objective ontological perspective. However, Foucault realises that there is no
‘absolute truth’, only ‘epistèmès’ or perspectives: “… the will to knowledge does not achieve a universal truth; man is not given an exact and serene mastery of nature.”
(Foucault, 1971: 95). Thus, Foucault takes the Nietzchean perspective that new ways of being can be created, and believes that creation occurs through discourse or knowledge.
Similarly, Derrida (2001: 4) argues that the totality in structures cannot be revealed: “…the relief and design of structures appears more clearly when content, which is the living energy of meaning, is neutralised.”; that is, any representation of an object merely shows that object at any given moment in its history. Likewise, with history, Foucault (1971) takes a synchronic approach; there is no beginning, end, or inevitabilities, only synchronic structures made up of particular isolated epistèmès, and each society has its own ‘truths’.
Therefore, for the post-structuralists the existence of an objective reality is unlikely, perhaps even impossible, as ‘reality’ or ‘being’ only carry any meaning if that reality or being can be perceived. Hollis (2002: 203) also refers to hermeneutic ontology, which:
“rests with intersubjectivity and a meaningful order as it is understood to be from within”, or as he cites Dilthey: “…life has no meaning outside itself.” (p219). However, Hollis concedes that it is unlikely the two ontological viewpoints will ever be reconciled, and
whilst he only takes the perspective of an ‘umpire’, a relativist argument is suggested, noting that:
…science is a human institution and, like all other institutions, needs to be understood from within. It no doubt includes rules for arriving at objective
conclusions, but these rules too are social and the objectivity of the conclusions is internal to the process by which they are reached.
Indeed, it was argued in the previous chapter that an objective ethics is an impossibility, but that through their personal perspectives consumers create their own ‘internalised’
rules (or conclusions reached through social and internal processes), although the
relativist positions invoke the problems also previously discussed. As Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have argued, the effect of pluralism was the emancipation of people from ‘moral objectivism’, and as Bauman (1993) argues, despite the efforts of twentieth century philosophy to reduce plurality, morality is ‘cast’ in the practice of everyday life; human conduct is not governed by a series of set rules which are not open to interpretation.
These arguments are borne out also in the marketing literature; similarly, in terms of value Firat and Venkatesh (1995) had posited the multiple values, choices and practices of consumers which are contextual, fluid, changing and often contradictory, and Gabriel and Lang (2006: 9) point out that consumerism is a: “…complex… phenomenon that both describes social reality and also shapes our perceptions of social reality.”. Holbrook and Hirschmann (1982) have argued the importance of the experiential aspects of
consumption which are often overlooked through the adoption of objective perspectives.
Significantly, Vargo and Lusch (2008) argue that value, as they understand it, is phenomenologically and idiosyncratically determined, and highlight the experiential nature of value, with a role for consumer culture theorists to understand how consumers:
“..perform service with firm-provided offerings.” (Arnould, in Vargo and Lusch, 2008: 4).
Here they do not distinguish between ‘phenomenological’ and ‘experiential’; whilst Holbrook and Hirschmann (1982) had identified the experiential nature of consumption, this was limited to particular forms through which the role of affect is prominent. It is more likely, however, that all consumption is rooted in experience and the term
‘phenomenological’ accounts for this wider definition.
However, whilst it may be easier to concede that there is no universal, objective ‘value’
which is derived by consumers as argued in chapter four, the danger of a purely subjective
ontology is similar to that which faces a relativist moral position; it is difficult to arrive at universal moral obligations rather than just a series of social or moral preferences held by individuals. As Searle’s social ontology (in McGann, 2011) asserts, social ‘facts’ are
ontologically subjective, but they may have a ‘truth’ behind them which means they can be studied in the same way as objective phenomena. For example, local or international laws related to the protection of the human rights of workers or the polluting effects of particular chemicals do have objective properties; they can exist, and they can protect from harm (bearing in mind Bauman’s [1997] warning that ethical authority does not derive from the state’s powers to legislate). Care should therefore be exercised in the application of ontological considerations; it can be easy to focus on the debates between the ‘two traditions’ at the expense of focusing on what the research aims to achieve.
Indeed, Rorty (1999) agrees with Hollis (2002), noting that the ontological debates around objectivity and intersubjectivity had not really changed over his lifetime, and the result of this argument is his realisation that: “philosophy was no help in dealing with Nazis and other bullies.” (p16), and also that his reading of Hegel was that: "...Philosophy is just a matter of out-redescribing the last philosopher." (p11). The pragmatist thought introduced in chapters two and four, and in particular the work of Rorty (1982 and 1999) is worthy of further consideration here in respect of not only a solution to this problem, but also a philosophical connection between ontological and epistemological concerns and the issues discussed in the previous chapter.
Rorty (1999) defines ontological differences as the opposition between reality and appearance. His agreement with a socially constructionist ontological position is clear in rejecting terms such as ‘objective value’ and ‘objective truth’, and in stating his agreement with the postmodernist criticisms of the ‘traditional’ philosophical discussion of ‘reason’.
However, due to the continued debates around objective and subjective reality Rorty adopts a pragmatic position; not concerned with asking questions about reality or
knowledge (and therefore not concerned about ontology), but with philosophical practices which are socially and politically useful. Indeed, Connolly (1995) notes that ontological considerations have been neglected at the expense of epistemology in recent times, because despite the notion that: “…modern practices express an overlapping, contestable set of ontological or metaphysical assumptions…, the most pressing contemporary issues
of politics, psychology and ethics do not require us to make these presumptions explicit objects of reflection.”
As discussed in chapter two, pragmatist arguments correspond well to the arguments previously proposed in favour of pluralism; it was noted earlier that there are problems with ‘pure’ hermeneutic phenomenological enquiry and they relate to the discussion in the previous chapter around the danger of relativism; that they ‘protect’ against judging the moral values of others, an extreme example of which could be as with Rorty’s example of ‘dealing with Nazis’. However, it is clear that the emancipation of the postmodern consumer has led to the increasing subjectivity and plurality in moral concerns and choices, particularly in the domain of consumption. Rorty (1982 and 1999) argues that rather than engage in philosophical ontological debates, one should
recognise that objectivity and subjectivity are parts of the same culture to help humans make sense of the world around them in the best way possible to improve their lives.
Thus, he adopts a slightly different position to the two opposing ‘sides’ as: “…the
‘postmoderns’ are philosophically right though politically silly, and the ‘orthodox’ are philosophically wrong as well as politically dangerous.” (p18). Similar to James, therefore, whilst rejecting a philosophical objective ontology, Rorty does not reject the practices associated with it; he believes science and religion, for example, to be useful in human progress, but that claims to truth should be rejected, and philosophers should confine themselves to justification, and: “…the only point in contrasting the true with the merely justified is to contrast a possible future with the actual present.” (Rorty, 1999: 39).
Bauman (1997) agrees that truth is: “…a certain attitude we take [or]… wish or expect others to take to what is said or believed…” (p112), but argues that truth is only of consequence when in the context of opposition; when trying to assert who is right and who is wrong (with an insinuation that ‘the other side’ must be in the wrong and that the side in the right can speak with the authority to which others must obey).
Of course, any ontological discussion as it relates to this thesis is to arrive at an
ontological perspective in which the study can be grounded. There are many parallels to draw between the work of Rorty (1982 and 1999) and the arguments put forward both in the previous chapter and previously in this chapter. The ‘reality’ under investigation here relates to the ethics and conceptions of value of a particular group of people (in this case, consumers of clothing). The case for ethical pluralism was previously advanced, alongside
a corresponding subjective and multi-dimensional conception of value. Rorty’s (1999) moral position is essentially pluralist, noting that relativists reject the notion that there are: “…unconditional, transcultural moral obligations rooted in an unchanging, ahistorical human nature.” (pxvi). As with previous arguments relating to consumer ethics and value being a matter of trading off’ or making compromises, Rorty (1999) argues that: “Moral choice is always a matter of compromise between competing goods rather than as a choice between the absolutely right and the absolutely wrong” (pxxvii); hence the consumer adoption of bounded rationality. As a pluralist argument would progress, he argues that nobody’s sense of moral responsibility is rational and objective; just a result of how they were brought up. Rorty sees the moral problem as not the prevention of descent into ‘evil’ as a result of not following moral rules, but a pragmatist problem of finding ways to decrease human suffering and increase human equality, increasing the chances of everyone to start life with an equal chance of achieving happiness. He does not claim to be a moral relativist, however, as he (as all people do) believes his beliefs to be the ‘right’ ones. Likewise, Bernstein (2010: 62) says of James’ pragmatic pluralism that:
Too frequently we are blind and insensitive to what is genuinely different from us, and we are all too quick to scorn and condemn it… We fail to make the effort to see how the world feels and looks from the perspective of those with other life experiences. But we can enlarge our understanding and sympathies to appreciate other points of view… This does not mean that when we make a serious effort to understand other points of view we will simply accept them or suspend our critical judgement.
This pragmatic (and pluralistic) approach appears to therefore be an attractive base for the ontological foundation of this research, albeit with relativist origins. The key message
This pragmatic (and pluralistic) approach appears to therefore be an attractive base for the ontological foundation of this research, albeit with relativist origins. The key message