Research, Practice and Design Knowledge

The connection seen in theory, research and design knowledge is one of the core elements of this research and methodologically very important.

According to Schoen (1983):

‘If we separate thinking from doing, seeing thought only as a preparation for action and action only as an implementation of thought, then it is easy to believe that when we step into the separate domain of thought we will become lost in an infinite regress of thinking about thinking’ (p.280).

Cross (1999) made the distinction between epistemology, praxeology and phenomenology, as presented in the preceding chapter, leaving the dichotomy between designing and theorizing. Research can be conducted in various ways - as a working method, by drawing upon the distinctions among cultural

knowledge, common knowledge, theory and practice. Or, as Glanville (1999) suggests, knowledge can be derived from extending our beliefs, which leads to a science of conjectures. The fact that we are willing (in theory, at least) to test these conjectures to destruction leads to a science of refutations, in Popper's (1963) opinion. Popper originally stated:

‘(1) It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory, if we look for confirmations.

(2) Confirmations should count only, if they are the result of risky predictions;

that is to say, if, unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have expected an event which was incompatible with the theory - an event which would have refuted the theory.

(3) Every ‘good’ scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is.

(4) A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is nonscientific.

Irrefutability is not a virtue of theory (as people often think) but a vice.

(5) Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it.

Testability is falsifiability; but there are degrees of testability; some theories are more testable, more exposed to refutation, than others; they take, as it were,

(6) Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory. I now speak in such cases of corroborating evidence.

(7) Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers-for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by re-interpreting theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status. (I later described such a rescuing operation as a conventionalist twist or a conventionalist stratagem.

One can sum up all this by saying that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability’ (p.47-48).

It thus follows that, whatever theory is developed through the screening of the existing theories of design, and whatever discourse is generated in the selected matter, the proposed design theory is a proposition that, though unproven, must be considered as true, as it has not been disproven in Popper’s sense.

The research conducted here is qualitative, both in its literature review

conducted to understand design and existing design theories, as well as in its evaluation of discourse models and the research into practice. This also includes the conferences, which are executed to generate and understand how

knowledge is generated and how the frame of design can be extended. The research presented here becomes increasingly pragmatic, since it is not

committed to one philosophical system, and especially since there is no strict dualism between the mind and the reality. It culminates in a situation where it is no longer concerned with the design reality, as it attempts to change the subject (Murphy 1990).

Friedman (2003) describes design practice, which changes existing situations, as

‘One form of design practice is allied to art and craft. It is intuitive. It sometimes produces desired results’ (p.13). The focus here is on ‘sometimes,’ since practice sometimes produces failures. He adds, ‘Another face of design practice involves efforts to render the outcomes of design predictable’ (p.514). With respect to research, Friedman sees design research mainly acting within clinical research, as was stated in other parts of this thesis (Ibid).

Swann (2002) makes the case that there is much to criticize about design practice and subsequently closes the gap between design practice and theory and knowledge through Schoen’s epistemology of practice-based work, reflection in action and action research. He also suggests that action research and the action of designing are so close that it would require only a few words to be substituted within the theoretical frameworks of action research to be

applicable to design (Ibid).

Model A1.4a Theory and Practice

Archer (1999) speaks about the practice-led research in design, which can be termed as research through design. Practice-led research is a mode of enquiry in which design practice is used to create an evidence base for something

demonstrated or discovered. It involves a researcher undertaking a design project subservient to stated research aims and objectives. Further, ‘…the main motivation of practice-led researchers is to elicit and communicate new

knowledge and theory originating from their own design practices’ (Pedgley 2007, p.463).

There are others, like Newbury (1996), who see that there is a difference. He elaborates on this:

‘The answer to this dilemma lies, I believe, in making a distinction between academic research in art and design, and art and design practice. The means of the distinction is the obligation to methodological transparency that is an integral part of the academic. Whereas an artist or designer can simply present his or her end-product, and refuse further explanation, the academic art or design

researcher is obliged also to map for his or her peers the route by which they arrived at that product’ (p.15).

In other words, as long as we do not create a methodological transparency, there is a difference between research and design practice.

Design knowledge and practice are very much connected and perhaps identical for Cross, since he sees design knowledge residing in its processes (e.g., the tactics and strategies of designing), and therefore, in the methodology applied to the study of design processes. The design process, which has been so

successfully elaborated over the past decades, is only a part of a bigger story to Dorst (2008). This larger model includes the design object, the designer, and the design context.

With regard to a theory developed by Latour, Ingram et al. (2007) speak of the challenge to think of products in terms of verbs, rather than nouns (e.g., referring to ‘cellphoning’ instead of ‘cell phones’) in order to call attention to the human and nonhuman actors. This also extends the focus towards the practice and processes of design. In his four orders of design, Buchanan (2001) develops a theory in which design moves from focusing on symbols, through things and action, to finally arrive at thoughts. This model supports the notion that, at a certain point in history, the connectedness of action, practice and knowledge became the focus of study, indicating that there is still an important and strong connection to be drawn. However, the dichotomy between practice and knowledge is difficult to sustain. Thus, the connection between acting and

knowing must be elaborated, as it will reappear throughout subsequent chapters, particularly those discussing design epistemology and action research.

Summary:

While there is a difference between a design practice and a research practice and knowing, there is a way to view them together, especially if we extend designing into the realm of thoughts, as Buchanan (2001) does. If we achieve this, the dichotomy between practice and knowledge is no longer sustainable.

However, without a methodological transparency, the difference between research and design practice will remain. The gap between design practice and theory and knowledge can be overcome through the framing as ‘reflection in action’ and ‘action research’ (Swann 2002). Action research and the action of designing are very closely linked, as it is explored in a later chapter presented in Part C, looking at the validation of the theory. A theoretical model is a

proposition that, though unproven, is considered to be true, as it has not been disproven. Therefore, a validation offered in Part C is necessary. It is also a move towards a more pragmatic position, since the work is not committed to one philosophical system, and especially since there is no strict dualism between the mind and the reality. It culminates in a situation where we no longer seek the answer to the question of a design reality, as it rather becomes a question of changing the subject (Murphy 1990). In other words, we shift the focus on the subject of designing theory, through working with theory and through designing conferences, as well as through interviews, which are of equal importance here.