point of view, orthodox) responses before judging the doctrinal accuracy of a work-
in the Chapter which follows, considerable attention is given to the origins, nature, and various functions of the figurai rea or image as a mnemonic and organizing device which enabled the reader to internalize the doctrine as he read it, memorized it, and finally acted upon it. This discussion, while not directly concerned with penance, provides a basis for the more focused analysis of penance and its modes of
representation found in Chapters IV and V. As I will attempt to show in Chapter IV, the evolution of the res or image as a mnemonic and
organizing device for the compiler {compilator) also initiated a greater awareness of how best to represent the doctrine of penance, and other doctrinal elements with it, so that the reader's moral or behavioural response to the texts would correctly reflect the doctrine of the Latin manuals.
37 CHAPTER III
Interpretation and Representation
In Chapter II we considered the penitential tradition and noted some differences between the treatment of penance in the "first wave" Latin manuals (intended for the confessor) and the "second wave" vernacular works of instruction aimed primarily at the penitent. To summarize, these differences were described in terms of an increased tendency on the part of the vernacular writer to anticipate likely reader responses and to modify his presentation of penance rhetorically in order to guide his readers towards a correct understanding of the sacrament of penance
(see p. 35). The present Chapter, although not directly concerned with penance, looks more broadly at the genesis of late medieval figurai imagery and examines its role in the vernacular expression of doctrine.
The medieval preacher was not unaware that the ways in which divine truths are expressed in Scripture are as diverse as the conditions of . mankind they address. As Alexander of Hales stated in his Simaaa: since the end (finis) of Scripture and preaching is to instruct sinners in thS ways of salvation, and since the conditions of men are manifold; then the mode of instruction must also be manifold so that the "mode matches the objective" (see pp. 55-56). Alexander's syilbjgism is central, I
believe, to an awareness of the function of the figurai modes for the I teaching of doctrine. Christian doctrine was secure, indeed it was the ultimate point of reference for medieval textual ity. ^ 4.4
38 It was because of that very security— the a priori and unified nature of divine truth— that attention could be given by the late medieval preacher or teacher to the development of texts which would cater to the diversity of needs and conditions represented by the laity, while maintaining the essential unity and integrity of doctrine. The genre which emerged as the primary vehicle for the teaching of doctrine was the compilation (compilatio). As a teaching aid the compilation— whether in the form of a sermon, tract, picture or allegory— brought together various topical groups of doctrine and orgainized them using a variety of techniques ranging from alphabetical ordering to the use of schematic images such as trees or castles. It is the latter compiling technique— the use of the figurai image— which we will consider in general terms in the present Chapter and in more specific ways, in
Chapter IV, as an important influence upon the ways in which penance was taught in the "second wave" vernacular compilations.
A central tenet of the interpretation of Scripture was that God spoke by means of figurative language in order to bring invisible divine truths within the cognitive grasp of sinful men.i Before the Fall, man had a more direct apprehension of God, an inward vision which did not depend upon bodily or material sight for its understanding. After the Fall man's vision became limited to the visible things or res of the temporal world; his understanding was defined by what he could see with the "outward eyes of the body".z
^ George H. Tavard, Transiency and Permanence: The Nature of
Iheology According to St. Bonaventure (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1954), pp. 4-5.
z The term "res" is used here in the limited sense defined by Augustine in De Doctrina Christiana as "that which is never employed as a sign of anything else: for example, wood, stone, cattle, and other
39 Gregory the Great likened man's expulsion from Eden, and his
consequent spiritual blindness, to the experience of a child born and raised in prison whose knowledge of the sun, moon, stars, and mountains is limited to the stories or descriptions given him by his mother. He has no direct experience of the outside world, and the darkness of the prison is more real and more believable than what, for him, are the
invisible things of his mother's stories.®
In view of this gulf between the visible and invisible realms. Scripture and the Incarnation act as vital bridges between the realm of invisible spiritual truths and visible temporal things.4 Augustine's temporal res, unable to signify, may become, through the inspirational mediian of Scripture, a figurai res (figurai sign) which has the
capability to signify just as a word or signim (proper sign) does.
This signifying power of things or rea was held to be the primary distinguishing feature of Scripture as compared to profane literature. As Hugh of St. Victor explains in his twelfth-century work, the
Didascalicon, the philosopher knows only the signifying power of words (Augustine's "proper signs") as established by "usage". Words as signs are inferior to the “significance of things" (Augustine's "figurai signs") since the figurai signs are established not by temporal "usage"
things of that kind". See On Christian Doctrine; The Enchiridion, v| translated by J.F. Shaw (Edinburg, 1873), p. 8. j
3 G.R. Evans, The Ihought of Gregory the Great (Cambridge, 1988),
I
p. 94. ^
'9
40 but by divine wisdom.® Thomas Aquinas echoes the same principle in his definition of the nature of the inspiration of Scripture:
We must acknowledge that God is the author of Holy
Scripture. It lies within His power, not only to provide words to convey a required meaning— something which men can do— but also to provide the things themselves [to which the words refer].®
Augustine cites the stone which Jacob used as a pillow and the ram which Abraham offered up instead of his son as two examples of res which have the power to signify; they are "things which are signs of other
things".7 These res are given to us by God, according to Augustine, in order to convey the thoughts of God to man through visible things.® They are, like the Incarnation, embodiments of divine truth which.
6 A.J. Minnis and A.B. Scott, Medieval Literary Tîieory and
Criticism (c. 1100- c. 1375): Jhe Commentary Tradition (Oxford, 1988) p. 72.
6 Ibid., p. 241.
7 Augustine distinguishes between "things which are signs of other things" ("figurai signs") and "signs . . .which are never employed except as signs" ("proper signs" or words). The difference lies in the status of words as things which can only function as signs, whereas "figurai signs" can function both as signs and as things: "Signs are figurative when the things themselves which we indicate by the proper names are used to signify something else, as we say bos, and understand by that syllable the ox, which is ordinarily called by that name; but then fifther by that ox understand a preacher of the gospel as Scripture signifies . . .". (De Doctrina Christiana, pp. 8,9,43). This
distinction works upon the epistemological premise that the term "bos" calls up before "the eye of the mind" the "species" of an actual ox as imprinted upon the memory. This "species", which is held in the memory, in turn functions as a "figurai sign"— a sign which is rooted in the original sense perception of an actual ox {De Trinitate, p. 275).
41 although temporal or visible, are nonetheless rooted in the
transcendental or invisible.
Augustine invokes Paul in his description of the movement from spiritual blindness to spiritual sight as a journey from an alien country back to the "fatherland":
Suppose, then, we were wanderers in a strange country, and could not live happily away from our fatherland, and that we felt wretched in our wandering, and wishing to put an end to our misery, determined to return home. We find, however that we must make use of some mode of conveyance . . . We have wandered far from God; and if we wish to return to our Father's home, this world must be used, not enjoyed
[fruor], that so the invisible things of God may be clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made,— that is, that by means of what is material and temporary we may lay hold upon that which is spiritual and eternal.®
Augustine's description of visible res as "modes of conveyance"
highlights the Keoplatonic influence at work in his understanding of the relationship between the visible and invisible: we are to use the
temporal things in order that we mi^t enjoy the spiritual things. If, however, we linger in order to enjoy the temporal things, if we "set ourselves to enjoy those things which we ouj^t to use", we might easily
42 "turn back from the pursuit of the real and proper objects of
enjoyment".lo
For Augustine the transition from spiritual blindness to spiritual sight was made possible by the Incarnation: the "Word made flesh". The "Wisdom of God" or Christ, the proper object of our enjoyment, appeared to men in the form of mortal flesh in order that the "outward eye" could see what the "weak and dim" inward, spiritual eye could not. Thus
spiritual blindness was remedied, since Christ demonstrated in the visible and mortal state the invisible divine attributes. However, Augustine makes clear that the Incarnation lost nothing of the reality of divine truth since, although the "form" of truth changed from
invisible to visible, the essential nature of truth remained unchanged: In what way did He come but this, "The Word was made flesh,
and dwelt among us"? Just as when we speak, in order that what we have in our minds may enter through the ear into the mind of the hearer, the word which we have in our hearts
becomes an outward sound and is called speech; and yet our | thought does not lose itself in the soimd, but remains
complete in itself, and takes the form of speech without 1 /] being modified in its own nature by the change: so the |
I Divine Word, though suffering no change of nature, yet ,
became flesh . . .n i
lo Ibid., p. 9. n Ibid., pp. 14-15.