June 4, 2014 / G.R. No. 200148 Facts:
Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF). On the other hand, Rivera used to be the Accounting Manager of BANFF. Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her resignation to be effective on February 3, 2006. However, Rivera actually continued working until March of the same year to complete the turnover of papers under her custody to her successor, Lumapas. Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her remaining salaries, benefits and incentives. She informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid, but the check representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong. This prompted Rivera to send text messages to the company’s official cellphone describing how terrible Syhunliong is as a boss on April 6, 2006. On April 16, 2007, Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel.
Held:
Syhunliong filed his complaint against Rivera more than one year after the allegedly libelous message was sent. Its institution on April 16, 2007 was made beyond the prescriptive period provided for in Article 90 of the RPC.
The plea of prescription should be set up before arraignment, or before the accused pleads to the charge, as otherwise the defense would be deemed waived; but, as was held in People v. Moran, this rule is not of absolute application, especially when it conflicts with a substantive provisions of the law, such as that which refers to prescription of crimes.
Further, Section 9, Rule 117 partially provides that the defense of extinction of criminal action or liability, e.g., prescription, is not deemed waived even if the accused had not raised the same in a motion to quash. In Rivera’s case, the issue of prescription is raised in her comment to the petition before the SC. Syhunliong does not specifically refute Rivera’s averment, thus, it is deemed admitted. The text message which Rivera sent to Lumapas falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication. Rivera was speaking in response to duty to protect her own interest and not out of an intent to injure the reputation of Syhunliong. Besides, there was no unnecessary publicity of the message beyond that of conveying it to the party concerned, Lumapas, who at that time was the best person to help expedite the release of her claims.
Ariel T. Lim v. People of the Philippines
November 26, 2014 / G.R. No. 190834 Facts:
Lim issued a 2 Bank of Commerce Checks, payable to CASH, in the amount of P100,000 each. He gave the checks to Willie Castor as his campaign donation to the latter’s candidacy in the 1998 elections. Claiming that the printing materials were delivered too late, Castor instructed Lim to issue a “Stop Payment” order for the 2 checks, which were used for the payment of the same. The checks were then dishonored and 2 demand letters were sent by Ms. Badiee to Lim, who then filed a complaint before the Office of the Prosecutor. After receiving the subpoena, Lim issued a replacement check for P200,000, which Ms. Badiee was able to encash. Nevertheless, 6 months after payment, 2 Informations for violation of B.P. 22 were filed against Lim before the MeTC, which found petitioner guilty.
Held:
Although the payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond the 5-day period provided for in B.P. 22 would normally not extinguish criminal liability, the Court has acknowledged extraordinary cases where, even if all the elements are present, the conviction of the accused would prove to be abhorrent to society’s sense of justice.
The fact that Lim had already paid the value of the dishonored checks 6 months before the filing of the Information in court is enough to exonerate him, in keeping with justice and equity. The spirit of the law (protection of the credibility and stability of the banking system) would not be served by penalizing people who have made restitution for damages even before charges have been filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the informations has already attained the purpose of the law.
On the other hand, payment of the bounced check after the information has been filed in court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused. Since from the commencement of the criminal proceedings in court, there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that the accused had every intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded check, then there is no equitable and compelling reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the letter of the law should be applied to its full extent.
The Court's ruling in this case should be well differentiated from cases where the accused is charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d). Damage and deceit are the essential elements of the offense and the check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying the value of the dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the civil liability of the crime but not the criminal liability.