THE ROLE OF CONSENSUS

Threats to a unified science of organizational behavior take two major forms—those that relate specifically to science, including its theory and method, and those that impair unity by jeopardiz-ing the creation of a stable and widely recognized body of knowledge that might be presented to practitioners as a basis for their actions. The latter is the concern of this discussion.

The Consensus Problem

A lack of consensus appears to exist in the field of organizational behavior, and as a result the field’s limited amount of hard knowledge is often bemoaned. The evidence is there, but the con-sensus of knowledgeable scholars that makes it knowledge often is out of reach because conflict-ing values block the way. Testimony to this effect is not hard to find.

In the introduction to his volume dealing with organizational behavior’s conceptual base Hartman (1988) discusses this fragmentation using terms such as “disarray,” “no consensus,”

“conflict,” “disunity,” “disagreements.” The authors of a more recent handbook of the field (Clegg, Hardy, and Nord 1996) use their introduction to paint a picture that presents organizational be-havior as infused with controversy and partisan politics; this latter volume appears in its own way to contribute to the fragmentation as well, even to extol it.

A well-argued treatment of the consensus problem is that of Pfeffer (1993), which subse-quently has sparked a great deal of debate pro and con. The thesis of his paper is that when

THE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 29 sciences have developed shared theoretical structures and methodological approaches about which there is substantial consensus, these sciences and their members have experienced a number of positive consequences, including increased allocations of monetary and other resources. Organi-zational behavior, being fragmented as it is, holds a position low in the pecking order when rewards and resources are distributed among the sciences. In short, we are not viewed as doing a very good job, and this is true because of our lack of consensus. Pfeffer argues that consensus can be attained through the efforts of an elite network of individuals who utilize political positions and processes to impose a uniformity of view on a discipline. He seems to say that this should happen in organizational behavior. This appeal for consensus is reiterated in a later paper (Pfeffer 1995), but it is apparent that he prefers consensus around certain theoretical positions over others.

Not surprisingly, a number of organizational behaviorists jumped up to dispute Pfeffer on a variety of grounds. In general, the thrust of these views is that consensus is not really a desirable goal after all, and that enforced consensus is particularly undesirable. Tolerance for diverse ap-proaches, theories, and methods should not be suppressed, and in any event there is no one best way that clearly deserves a dominant position. On occasion this rebuttal is mixed with a substan-tial dose of anti-science rhetoric (Van Maanen 1995).

All this having been said, it remains true that science relies on some degree of consensus among knowledgeable scholars, and that science has proved over and over again that its methods can advance understanding, prediction, and control to the benefit of human society. Certainly, some degree of disconsensus can be absorbed, and innovative, creative contributions should not only be tolerated, but supported. The questions are how much consensus is needed and in what areas; these are empirical questions as Pfeffer (1995) notes. Once the emotions that values arouse are activated, it is amazing how difficult it is to see the balanced, middle ground. For a balanced discussion of these issues from a perspective tempered by the passage of time, see Fabian (2000).

The Inability to Compare Competing Theories

One outgrowth of the consensus problem is a view that one cannot decide objectively between competing theories that use different languages, hold different assumptions, and utilize different constructs, thus reflecting totally disparate value systems. Under these circumstances, compari-sons are impossible in the same sense that “comparing apples and oranges” is impossible. Science is said to be at a loss in such instances, and amongst the theory pluralism that we face at present, science becomes essentially useless (Scherer and Dowling 1995). Note that this argument re-quires a large number of very different theories coming together from different directions to offer contradictory solutions to common problems. This must be so if science is to be effectively neu-tralized. Thus, “create as many new and unique theories as you possibly can” becomes the rally-ing cry of proponents of this view; they are out to sink consensus (Clegg and Ross-Smith 2003).

Practitioners in particular are left helpless to make decisions in the face of this barrage of compet-ing theories and may be expected to eschew organizational behavior altogether.

The response to this line of reasoning is that it creates a pseudo-problem, a mirage, that is readily soluble in that science serves to test theories through research that is just as applicable to competing theories as to any others (McKinley 1995). Although valid, this position needs some amplification.

First, the theory pluralism that exists at present is not made up exclusively of scientific theo-ries. There are a number of philosophic statements in existence that do not generate testable hypotheses and thus are not falsifiable. Subtracting this philosophic content reduces the degree of theory pluralism substantially. For example, many of the phenomena that exist in this world have

30 SCIENTIFIC INTRODUCTION

multiple religious explanations and scientific explanations (confirmed by research) as well. To include the religious “theories,” which are untestable, as part of the total count of scientific theo-ries is unwarranted.

Second, a close study of existing organizational behavior theories reveals that the most fre-quent situation is one where the theories occupy different, nonoverlapping domains. There are instances of overlap and even some cases of competing positions, but this is not the norm by any means. Those who argue that an inability to compare competing theories is a major barrier to attaining consensus are simply wrong, at least insofar as organizational behavior is concerned;

there are not that many competing theories, once theoretical domains are clearly drawn.

Third, competing theories can be compared using appropriate research designs. Differential experimentation that serves to determine the relative effectiveness of various approaches or hypotheses is commonly conducted. Any good theory contains clear specifications for operationalizing its variables, and these may be used in comparative research. For a good ex-ample of how research to deal with competing theoretical positions may be conducted, see Latham, Erez, and Locke (1988) and the more extended treatment of this research contained in Frost and Stablein (1992). What is clearly evident here is that with sufficient creative input into the research process, science can handle competing theoretical positions (see also McKinley 1995 on this point). Thus, a basis for achieving consensus, where it might otherwise appear to be lacking, does exist within science.

Fourth, a consensus of knowledgeable scholars can develop in the absence of full agreement among protagonists. Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theory (see Chapter 5) is generally assumed to be deficient in certain respects, based on extensive research conducted to test aspects of the theory. Yet to my knowledge Herzberg never repudiated his theory in any regard, and he contin-ued to hold out against the growing consensus until his death. This is not unusual, and it does not matter. A few voices in opposition does not vitiate consensus.

Fifth, it is not correct to say consensus is totally lacking in organizational behavior; agreement among knowledgeable scholars in support of a theory occurs quite often. But the qualifier among knowledgeable scholars is important here. Organizational behavior has developed a breadth and depth of information that defies comprehension by a single person. There are specialties and subspecialties, and it is these that furnish the knowledgeable scholars whose judgment is at issue.

To add in the many who know little or nothing about a particular theory and its research is bound to create an appearance of disconsensus as competing values become involved against an am-biguous (uncertain) background, but that is not the kind of consensus science seeks.

Sixth, practitioners (such as managers) do not require a consensus on the part of organizational behavior to utilize the tools, technology, and theories of that discipline. It would certainly be helpful if such a consensus existed, but managers in a particular area of a business, say human resources, are not necessarily uninformed consumers; they can make judgments as to the validity and usefulness of what comes to them from organizational behavior, and they do so all the time.

Many of these inputs from organizational behavior prove useful and help to solve important practical problems. As a former practitioner of organizational behavior in the personnel research unit of a large corporation and a consultant in that area throughout my professional career, I can attest to the practical value of these inputs. In actuality, the freedom from political wars that the practitioner has may compensate for any lack of knowledge. Certainly errors are made, but low levels of consensus do not prevent practitioners from making choices among the potpourri of organizational behavior tools, technologies, and theories. And again, as Donaldson (1992) con-tends, the degree of consensus available to practitioners is probably greater than the critics have maintained.

THE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 31 The Road to Consensus

It becomes apparent from the above discussion that it would be very useful to have an operational measure of consensus on various matters within organizational behavior. With hard data on what knowledgeable scholars think, it would be possible to avoid much of the ambiguity that surrounds this treatment.

Actually, during the 1980s, a certain amount of data became available on the extent of consen-sus around first-generation organizational behavior theories that had achieved considerable vis-ibility (Miner 1990). The correlations among data from different sources ranking these theories as to their validity ranged from 0.74 to 0.94. This is indicative of a considerable amount of con-sensus. More recent research of this nature provides evidence of increasing consensus around a number of theories in organizational behavior (Miner 2003). The field is still very young, and it is too early to expect high levels of agreement, but we are moving in that direction.

One might think that consensus could be obtained by noting the most frequently cited publica-tions in the field and then building a picture of organizational behavior’s knowledge base from the content of these publications. Unfortunately, however, evidence indicates that those publica-tions that do particularly well in citation counts do so not because of the perceived quality of the publication or its usefulness to practitioners, but because of the usefulness to scholars of the field in carrying out their professional tasks (Shadish 1989). This is not the stuff out of which a picture of our knowledge base can be created.

Yet, there are multiple signs pointing to improving consensus as organizational behavior ma-tures. One such sign is the increasing degree to which citations to other disciplines are appearing in the journals (Blackburn 1990). Discourse across disciplines is on the upswing; talking only with those people within the field who represent a reflection of one’s own image is decreasing.

When communication opens up in this way, at least the potential for consensus opens up as well.

A second encouraging sign is the relatively recent emergence not of meso theories per se, since such theories have in fact been in existence for some time, but of an explicit concern with the identification and creation of such theories, which bridge a major value-gap in the field. To the extent that they prove valid, meso theories can represent a major integrating force within organizational behavior.

In writing meso theory, one is forced to deal both with psychological and sociological vari-ables as well as with the literatures that surround those varivari-ables. The result should be an inte-grated theory that not only ties together the two levels of analysis, but also commits the author to some type of synthesis of the two value positions. Accordingly, a strong commitment to a meso approach to theorizing could go a long way toward fostering consensus and firming up a stable knowledge base for organizational behavior.

In short, although it does seem that consensus is at a rather low level overall within organiza-tional behavior, there are subfields and sectors where this is not the case. Thus, a body of accepted knowledge does exist within the field and is available to practitioners—a smaller body than many would desire, but still important. Furthermore, there are certain trends in evidence that seem to argue for improved consensus in the future.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has delved into the characteristics of research that can be used to test scientific theories. In all of this it should be understood that organizational behavior research may serve additional functions beyond merely testing theory. Hypotheses derived from practice may be

32 SCIENTIFIC INTRODUCTION

evaluated through research to determine if what has been assumed to be true really is true. Areas that present particular problems may be studied to obtain a clearer picture of the landscape. The point is that scientific research in organizational behavior is not simply a matter of theory testing, yet theory testing is probably the most important function of organizational behavior research because a well-validated theory can establish a wide range of knowledge.

In the preceding discussion, certain terms that are to be found in the references, and that are often used in the literature, have been deliberately avoided. This is in part because these terms have taken on a variety of value-laden excess meanings that tend to stereotype the user. In some instances the terms are too ambiguous for most scientific purposes as well. Kuhn (1970), in intro-ducing the term “paradigm,” intentionally used it with a wide range of meanings (Astley and Zammuto 1992), and it continues to possess this same ambiguity today. In addition to paradigm I have avoided such terms as normal science, positivist theory, and incommensurability for the same reasons.

This is not to say that most of the concepts that appear to be covered by these terms are not treated—to the contrary, they are treated in detail, but using other words. Nor am I trying to avoid labeling my own position. The discussion here clearly identifies my commitment to science and spells out at considerable length the concept of science I have in mind. Terms such as paradigm, normal science, positivist theory, and incommensurability come to organizational behavior from philosophy, however. As a result, there is no commitment to make them precise and specific, in the mode of science. At the same time, there is no necessary commitment on the part of organiza-tional behavior to make them part of our vocabulary—and we should not.

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