4.2 Alternative sources for semantic
4.3.2 The role of the interlocutor
Note that the role of the interlocutor is defined with respect to the agent who performs the reflective test. What if that is not the right co-ordinate to ensure actual mutual understanding in the triangular structure that A, B and their in- terlocutorC form?34 If we shift the interlocutor’s test with respect to the partner in the dialogue who triggers the autonomy check, we end up in a similar prob- lem: the bonds do not secure congruence of judgments in each party’s reflection. It seems that these polarizations on the 1st– or 2nd–person perspective lead us astray. Sharedness of expectations between A and B should not privilege either A’s orB’s expectations when settling who can be an appropriate mediator. Let’s see what a cross check would yield as a gloss of A’s reflective test:35
Definition (Autonomy-Interlocutor-Cross)
A can mean f by S if A can expect B and any interlocutor of A and B to act accordingly and if B can expect A and any interlocutor of A and B to act accordingly. 36
reflective test:
Definition(Autonomy-Interlocutor-like-A): Acan mean f byS if any interlocutor ofA and
B who is likeB can expectAto act accordingly and ifAcan expect any interlocutor ofAand
B who is likeB to act accordingly.
34 Cf. Davidson (2001).
35 This could also work. For the gloss ofA’s test:
Definition(Autonomy-Interlocutor-Cross–2): Acan meanf bySifAand any interlocutor of
AandB can expectB to act accordingly and ifB and any interlocutor ofAandB can expect
Ato act accordingly.
As a gloss B’s reflective test: Definition(Autonomy-Interlocutor-Cross–2): A can meanf
byS ifB and any interlocutor ofA andB can expectA to act accordingly and ifAand any interlocutor ofA andB can expectB to act accordingly.
36 The situation from the perspective ofB is completely symmetric.
Definition(Autonomy-Interlocutor-Cross): A can mean f by S if A can expectB and any interlocutor ofAand B to act accordingly and ifA can expectB and anyAand interlocutor ofAandB to act accordingly.
When Alf checks if he has reason to mean f by S, he asks:
Definition (Autonomy-Interlocutor-Cross-Test)
“Can I expect B and any interlocutor of A and B to act accordingly?” and “Can B expect me and any interlocutor for both of us to act accordingly?” I check whether B and myself can expect any interlocutor for both of us to act accordingly either as a speaker or as an interpreter who could supportS to mean f.
Note that we should immediately clarify the scope of ‘any’: The interlocutors picked by A or B should belong to the overlap of sets from which A and B pick their interlocutors. The exam should require that A’s and B’s choices actually should belong to set of agents they both consider to be interlocutors of A and B. Note also that here we are not trying to prove an ‘only if’ statement. We do not claim that a successful autonomy test is the only source of normativity. Instead, we claim that such a test is a legitimate source; if the outcome of the test is successful, then we can reasons for a judgment. Furthermore, we highlight that such examination does not necessarily commit with an intrinsicalistic point of view — (v.a/b) still holds, as elicited in 2.3.3 above: Semantic normativity in general may be non-intrinsic, i.e., not all norms need to be semantic.
Now let’s see if this new revision can resist the problem of a choice of different interlocutors for A and B in their respective tests. Suppose A and B indeed take different interlocutors C and C0. Recall that C and C0 are interlocutors for A and B, they belong to the overlap of the sets from which A and B pick their interlocutors. Note thatC andC0 are themselves interlocutors: C can both stimulate and respond to mean f by S as A does and anticipates, and C0 can both stimulate and respond to mean f byS asB does and anticipates. Suppose then that A and B do pick C and C0 respectively in their own tests. Let’s see what a cross check would yield as a gloss of A’s reflective test:
Case(Autonomy-Interlocutor-Cross-A)
A can mean f by S if A can expect B and C to act accordingly and if B can expectA and C to act accordingly.
This could gloss B’s reflective test:
Case(Autonomy-Interlocutor-Cross-B)
A can mean f by S if B can expect A and C0 to act accordingly and if A can expectB and C0 to act accordingly.
So each of C and C0 is expected to be an appropriate stimulator of, and responder to an utterance of S. This gives that C and C0 are congruent judges: if A can expect B and C to act accordingly and C stimulates/responds as C0, thenA can expectB and C0 to act accordingly, and this is parallel to what holds for B, C, andC0.
Alf Bea
C’ C
Figure 4.1: Diagram illustrating how C and C0 is expected to be an appropriate stimulator of, and responder to an utterance of S to mean f.
Consider yet another case that could be thought to be a possible flaw or objection to (Autonomy-Interlocutor-Cross). Suppose C1–C4 are interlocutors to A and B. Suppose A runs the following test:
Case(Autonomy-Interlocutor-Cross)
A can mean f by S if A can expect B and C1 to act accordingly and if B can expectA and C2 to act accordingly.
This could gloss B’s reflective test:
Case(Autonomy-Interlocutor-Cross)
A can mean f by S if B can expect A and C3 to act accordingly and if A can expectB and C4 to act accordingly.
If C1–C4 are expected to be appropriate stimulators of, and responders to an utterance of S, will they be congruent judges? Indeed, they will be! This is supported by the restriction made explicit before, namely that the sets from which AandBpick their interlocutors should overlap. Only in case this restriction were not placed would A’s and B’s test become problematic.
An objection that is raised against Korsgaard’s notion of normative force is that it remains unsatisfyingly subjective.37 (Autonomy-Interlocutor-Cross) tests whether the attribution made by both sides, the speaker and the hearer, can be properly held by an interlocutor of theirs, someone who can be a stimulator and wait for the same reaction as the speaker does, and who can respond to the stimulation as the interpreter is supposed to do.