Chapter II The Destruction of the 5 th South African Infantry Brigade at
2.3 Rommel Realizes That Crusader Is Not a Diversion 20 November
Rommel was now convinced of the seriousness of the British intentions, and realized that Crusader was more than a diversion to distract his planned attack on Tobruk, scheduled for the next morning. Rommel ordered Crüwell to seek and destroy the British armour in an attempt to keep the attack on Tobruk on track. Crüwell ordered his two scattered tank divisions to advance and concentrate on Gabr Saleh and attack the British 4th Armoured division using overwhelming force. Fortunately for the British, the German plan was revealed through intelligence intercepts. This prompted Norrie to order 22nd Brigade to disengage with Ariete and move across from Bir El Gubi to Gabr Saleh to support 4th Brigade.257
The British at last achieving their desire for a tank on tank battle at Gabr Saleh had to be satisfied with pitting two armoured brigades against the two German panzer divisions, which fell short of the concentration of British armoured forces envisaged in the original plan. In the event when the clash did occur at 1630 hours, it took place between 4th Armoured Brigade and 15th Panzer-Division as 22nd Armoured Brigade and 21st Panzer Division had not yet arrived on the battle field. The British, who had assumed a strong defensive position, were steadily forced backward, once again leaving control of the battlefield to the Germans at dusk. (Map 2) This enabled the Germans to recover and repair their damaged vehicles while the British tanks damaged in the battle were permanently lost.258
256 Murphy, The Relief of Tobruk (p. 88). 257
Agar-Hamilton, The Sidi Rezegh Battles (p. 153). See also Stewart, The Early Battles of the Eighth Army, (p. 20).Rommel’s awareness of the British intentions was no doubt heightened by a BBC broadcast at 2100 announcing a major British offensive in the Western Desert.
258 The German war diary for the 15th Panzer-Division shows no losses in tanks for the day while the 4th Armoured Brigade had suffered a total of 68 tanks lost in three days. Agar-Hamilton, The Sidi Rezegh Battles (p. 159). Richard Humble estimates 4th Armoured Brigade losses in the encounter with 15th Panzer Division as 26 tanks lost. The British claimed a further 30 German tanks destroyed once again seriously over estimating the damage they had inflicted. Humble, Crusader (p. 108). See also Murphy, The Relief of
During the day the 7th Armoured Brigade now defending Sidi Rezegh and doing a job better suited to an infantry division, came under attack by the German 90 Leichte-Division reinforced with heavy artillery. Despite a concerted effort, the British easily retained their positions without the Germans being able to dislodge them. Gott decided to replace the 7th Armoured Brigade with the Support Group, commanded by Major-General J. C. "Jock" Campbell, which due to its infantry and artillery component was better suited to defend and exploit the gains made thus far at Sidi Rezegh. At the same time the 5th South African Infantry Brigade was ordered up to, and expected to arrive late afternoon at Sidi Rezegh to give much needed infantry support there. 259 (Map 3)
The impression was gained by Gott that the enemy forces manning the escarpment in front of 7th Armoured Brigade were weak.260 He suggested that the Support Group together with 5th Brigade, be used to clear the escarpment overlooking Sidi Rezegh at 0700 on the 21 November. The 7th Armoured Brigade was then to make contact with the Tobruk garrison at dawn on the 21 November, by meeting elements of the 70th Division ordered to break out of the encirclement.261 Cunningham agreed that Major-General R.M. Scobie, commander of the 70th Division ensconced in Tobruk would attack out of the Tobruk perimeter towards El Duda at dawn on 21 November, while the Support Group assisted by the 5th Brigade would drive north-west simultaneously joining up with it. The 1st Brigade would remain at Bir El Gubi screening Ariete. The linking up with Tobruk marked another departure point from the original plan which called for the destruction or neutralisation of the enemy armour before a breakout from Tobruk would be attempted. 262 The poise now displayed by the British, in invoking the link up with Tobruk before the German tanks had been decisively defeated, was brought about by British overconfidence in the results of the impending tank battle.263
That morning the South Africans received orders to move 1 Brigade up to Bir El Gubi, either capture the point if it was not too heavily defended, or mask it if it was felt that an attack would draw unnecessary casualties. The British obviously felt that the 22nd Armoured Brigade had dealt Ariete a sharp blow and that the South Africans would be able to dislodge the supposedly weakened Italians from Bir El Gubi with ease. The 5th Brigade was to move up to the vicinity of Sidi Rezegh in support of 7th Armoured Brigade and to meet the sortie that was being sent forth from Tobruk. The South Africans
259 Agar-Hamilton, The Sidi Rezegh Battles (p. 162).
260 Playfair, A History of the Second World War, Mediterranean…, III (p. 42). 261
Agar-Hamilton, The Sidi Rezegh Battles (p. 163).
262 Murphy, The Relief of Tobruk (p. 90). This has been described by the official New Zealand history as being a “haphazard” way of conducting the operation in the light of identifying, in the planning phase, that the neutralization of the Axis armour was a prerequisite to any breakout attempt by the Tobruk garrison. 263
were to provide 7th Armoured Brigade with valuable infantry support by seizing and holding the raised rim of the escarpment to the north allowing observation to be gained as far as El Duda. 264
As discussed above, the 22nd Armoured Brigade was had been rushed to Gabr Saleh, in order to bolster the 4th Armoured Brigade for the much anticipated tank clash. This exposed the South Africans to the Italian armoured formation at Bir El Gubi, leaving them decidedly edgy at their prospects of an infantry brigade being pitted against a tank formation, albeit Italian.265 Pienaar was hesitant and lacked precise information as to the strength and disposition of Ariete. At 0900, while advancing cautiously, the lead elements of 1st Brigade came under Italian artillery fire and the South Africans halted and entered into an artillery duel with Ariete which lasted the whole day. 266
Map 3 The situation on 20th November, with the 1st SA Brigade taking over from the 22nd Armoured Brigade and masking a very much intact Ariete. The 5th Brigade prepares to make its way to Sidi Rezegh to join the 7th Armoured Brigade. The 4th Armoured Brigade survives an attack by the German 15th Panzer-Division.267
264
Murphy, The Relief of Tobruk (p. 89). See also Agar-Hamilton, The Sidi Rezegh Battles (p. 164).
265 Murphy, The Relief of Tobruk (p. 89). Described by the official history as being a ”curious” role for infantry.
266
Agar-Hamilton, The Sidi Rezegh Battles (p. 166). 267
At 1138 orders were received that Sidi Rezegh had been captured by 7th Armoured Brigade and that 5th Brigade must advance to Sidi Rezegh and make ready to advance the next day to El Duda linking up with the Australians breaking out of Tobruk.268 At 1400 Brink received a message from Brigadier Dan Pienaar the commander of 1st Brigade that 22nd Armoured Brigade had departed and that he felt that an attack on Ariete at Bir El Gubi by infantry would be a useless waste of lives.269 Brink fully concurred with Pienaar and instructed him to take up defensive positions effectively masking Ariete. At 1600 30 Corps confirmed that Brigadier B. Armstrong commander of 5th brigade was to advance on Sidi Rezegh, and in response, at 1630, 5th Brigade made a somewhat cautious move toward the objective. Brink was concerned that a night move may have to take place, and he received permission from Gott to halt 5th Brigade as soon as night fell and then resume the advance at dawn. The South Africans were reluctant to move at night having had an adverse experience on their approach march at the beginning of Crusader. Night moves were essential in desert warfare being one of only a few methods available for concealment in a desert bereft of foliage and terrain features. The South Africans placed themselves at an acute disadvantage compared with the enemy who made good use of darkness to manoeuvre their forces. 270 The advance was eventually halted at 1805, a mere 20 kilometres short of Sidi Rezegh, after being delayed by three low flying attacks that resulted in a number of casualties.271
At day close, The British has managed to concentrate two of their armoured brigades the 4th and 22nd at Gabr Saleh both having suffered grievous losses while inflicting very little damage on the core of the Axis armoured formations. 7th Armoured Brigade held the important landmark of Sidi Rezegh leaving the British confident that the forces in front of them were weak, and buoyed in the belief that they had destroyed approximately 100 Axis tanks to date which supposedly amounted to a substantial percentage of the forces facing them. In fact the Axis had suffered relatively little, managing to inflict substantially more damage than they had received. (See Figure 12A and 12B) It was due to the mistaken assessment of the damage inflicted on the Axis armoured forces that the British ordered the
268
DOCD, Brink Papers, Box 55, p.27,28 1 SA Division Operations Report Cyrenaica 1942, 18 November - 2 December 1941.
269
DOCD, Brink Papers, Box 55, p.30, 1 SA Division Operations Report Cyrenaica 1942, 18 November - 2 December 1941.
270 Agar-Hamilton, The Sidi Rezegh Battles (p. 169). The official history describes Brink’s reluctance to move at night as an honest recognition of the low standard of training throughout the division. BoxPlayfair, A
History of the Second World War, Mediterranean…, III (p. 43).
271 DOCD, Brink Papers, Box 55, p.34, 1 SA Division Operations Report Cyrenaica 1942, 18 November - 2 December 1941. and Agar-Hamilton, The Sidi Rezegh Battles (pp. 167,169). Auchinleck in his despatch incorrectly cites Armstrong as seeking permission to halt his brigade at nightfall, when in fact this was as per his instructions from Brink. and TNA, WO 32/10160/337, Auchinleck Despatch on Operations in the
Middle East, I November 1941 to 15 August 1942. Armstrong protested against this in a letter to
Auchinleck were he attempted to put the record straight. and TNA, CAB 106/638, Letter Armstrong to Deputy CGS, Objection to Field-Marshal Auchinleck's Despatch, 1948.
70th Division holding Tobruk to undertake their breakout the next day. Originally this was only to be undertaken once Axis armoured forces had been effectively neutralised. The British now earmarked the 5th Brigade and the 7th Support Group Brigade link with elements of the 70th Division breaking out of Tobruk.
Figure 11A Enjoying a mug of tea after capturing Hobok are (l. to r.) Lieut.-Colonel W. Kirby, Commanding Officer of 3rd Transvaal Scottish (who was later killed in action at Sidi Rezeg), Brigadier B. F. Armstrong, and Major Harry Klein, Commanding Officer of No. 1 S.A. Armoured Car Company.272
Figure 11B Newspaper cutting announcing the escape of Brigadier Armstrong from a POW camp during the Italian Armistice in September 1943.273
272