Non-Routine Operations

Within the half of the proposed conceptual framework that focuses on dynamic complexity, Non-Routine Operations form one of the two aspects. The occurrence of disasters may seem singular, thus making each humanitarian mission unique and difficult to compare to another, ultimately inhibiting the development of routines in HL operations. However, Kovács (2011) argues that demand for HL is quite stable on a global scale.

To some degree, therefore, HL is a routine occurrence. For organisations and individuals involved in humanitarian operations, routine is very different from the routine SC management in commercial organisations, which would conceivably be easily overwhelmed by the disasters humanitarian organisations tend to operate in. Routines are inherent to particular organisations and not universally applicable. In their

discussion of messy problems, Mintzberg et al. (1976) highlight their distinct lack of structure. In HL this can be evidenced by the dynamic change in SCs that are by their very nature transient, quickly formed and quickly disbanded in response to a particular disaster (Day et al. 2012). In messy problems, uniqueness and non-routine nature are furthermore characterised by limited applicability of standardised solutions or approaches (Wagner 1995). While there have been some efforts towards standardisation in HL, each response retains unique elements and depends on local needs assessment and significant adaptations beyond the initial emergency response phase (Kovács and Spens 2009, Richey 2009, Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009, Rawls and Turnquist 2011, Kunz et al. 2014). Furthermore, disaster response and therefore HL remain non- routine operations due to the very limited organisational learning that takes place owing to a prominent lack of performance measurement and continuity in HL (Thomas and Kopczak 2005, Davidson 2007, Maon et al. 2009).

Adding to the non-routine nature of HL is the environment humanitarian responses operate it. The operating environment is marked by extreme uncertainty and often does not provide necessary infrastructure, the financing depends on donations, there are many diverse stakeholder groups, and not a loss of profits, but a loss of lives is at stake (Thomas 2004, Tatham et al. 2009, Day et al. 2012). Compared to commercial logistics, HL operates in an exceedingly uncertain and dynamic environment that is far beyond the control of any manager or organisation (Van Wassenhove 2006, Day et al. 2012). However, due to their humanitarian mandate, the humanitarian organisations will not withdraw from such an environment, even though it makes operations arduous and often costly, as well as dangerous. On the contrary, new participants will usually join in as disasters are happening, despite the inherent challenges and dangers. Logistics is one of the most testing aspects for new organisations or individuals that want to contribute to a humanitarian response, with aid often lost or obscured due to the logistical challenges new entrants encounter (Day et al. 2012).

HL spans all the stages of the SC life cycle (Apte 2009, Day et al. 2012). Throughout the life cycle the priorities of HL change a lot more quickly than in commercial situations; in the initial emergency response, speed is most critical as it reduces suffering and death, but in longer-term efforts security and efficiency become more important (Day et al. 2012). SCs follow the demand of a product during its life cycle, with phases of introduction, growth, maturity and decline and the SC has to be planned accordingly (Higuchi and Troutt 2008, Harrison and Van Hoek 2011). Different strategies might be appropriate during different stages of the cycle and for different

products (Aiken et al. 2003, Higuchi and Troutt 2008). In terms of commercial SC theories, supplies are usually “pushed” to the disaster area, whereas a “pull” system is only applied in the longer-term reconstruction (Kovács and Spens 2007). With short lead times, a short life-cycle, highly unpredictable demand, and high product variety, humanitarian goods could be described as innovative goods requiring a responsive SC (Fisher 1997). Order winners and market qualifiers are the basis for selecting appropriate SC techniques in commercial environments (Fisher 1997, Aiken et al. 2003). In the humanitarian context, the mandate to alleviate suffering sets the targets, further complicating the development of routines.

Flexibility is necessarily an important feature in HL. This includes volume flexibility to respond to disasters of different magnitude and size, delivery flexibility regarding the time it takes for supplies to reach the beneficiary, as well as mix flexibility concerning the types of good that are being delivered (Beamon and Balcik 2008). HL is known to be particularly agile (Oloruntoba and Gray 2006, Charles et al. 2010, Bozkurt and Duran 2012, Oloruntoba and Kovács 2015). HL as a system has to be able to react instantly to unforeseeable disasters, as its raison d’être. Furthermore, the lives of beneficiaries depend on HL’s ability to deliver the correct items to the correct location as quickly as possible in the immediate aftermath of a disaster.

The SC structure is therefore somewhat different from a commercial context. As previously mentioned, the customers are not simply the people who pay for goods or services, and the suppliers are not necessarily being paid for the supplies (Charles et al. 2010). The flows that make up a SC are also different. Information flows are usually scarce and hard to control, as they often depend on the media, whereas the financial and material flows are strictly unidirectional from the donor to the beneficiary (Long and Wood 1995, Charles et al. 2010). Instead of connecting suppliers with customers in the way of ordinary SCs, HL links one customer group with another. The manifold disparities to ordinary commercial SCs demonstrate that HL is indeed a non-routine operation.