Rules-in-Use

‘Forgetting’ when Compensation too Complicated: The idea that grievances should be for-

gotten (halaydhalay) is not a universal given in Somali society, it is an option in situations where conflict has been so complex or devastating as to make calculation of mag compensation im- possible. When applied, this principle stands in marked contrast to the popular notion in interna- tional post-conflict theory that truth-telling is one of the essential mechanisms in successful peace-building (Bloomfield et al., 2003; Kiss, 2000). As with any approach to finding a basis for the establishment of peace in the aftermath of conflict, it offers a pragmatic means of resolving immediate disagreements, albeit often without removing deep-seated, residual distrust between antagonists. That pattern was plainly evident in areas in Somaliland in the course of the re- search that informs this thesis. This form of institutionalised collective amnesia, although heavily

criticised in some instances (for example, in relation to Zimbabwe: Bloomfield et al., 2003: 36) is recognised as a valid part of many peace-building processes by others (Mendeloff, 2004). How- ever, the risks of individual impunity and continued distrust between parties must also be acknowledged.

Somali Instigated and Managed: The process remained locally instigated throughout, mean-

ing that conference, meeting and mediation schedules remained sufficiently flexible to accom- modate changing needs. Very explicitly, this meant that the primary institutional arrangements were manifestly endogenous and could be adapted as circumstances required. This is a signi- ficant indicator of a process which could be said, using the definition on page 42, to be an ex- ample of the ‘spontaneous emergence’ of a constitutional regime. Because it is spontaneous in this sense, the participants retain a sense of institutional memory and comfort: there is a widely shared understanding of the institutions within which they are to work precisely because they are based on understood local custom.

The point that this highly locally-referenced process of decision-making suggests that the pro- cess that occurred between 1990 and 1997 did indeed represent a case of ‘spontaneous’ emer- gence is, of course, a significant claim. While no complex socio-political situation is ever likely to exist in which external influence is completely absent, and that was certainly not the case in Somaliland during this period, it is nevertheless significant that increasingly stable meta-consti- tutional and constitutional regimes were negotiated with little external involvement in the con- stitutive sphere. What external involvement there was took the form of instrumental support for local processes.

There is another interesting angle in this that is also worth noting. The lack of external engage- ment was not an unintentional act of forgetfulness. Somaliland was (and continues to be) mar- ginalised because many of the main international diplomatic and aid actors have committed themselves to different processes in the southern Somali areas. In that sense, it was a con- scious decision for most outsiders to avoid extensive interaction with Somalilanders in the con- stitutive sphere. Many argue that this was fortuitous for Somaliland, and it is quite possible that is true. However, many Somalilanders urged greater foreign engagement, and continue to do so. This institutional arrangement is categorised as a ‘rule-in-use’ not because the circumstance itself was internally agreed, but because it forced the development of immediate institutional re- sponses to the need to manage the process of reconciliation locally. It could equally be argued that the lack of external engagement in the organisation and practice of deliberation forced Somalilanders to rely almost entirely on endogenous institutions to support deliberation and decision-making. That would suggest this entry should be categorised as a contextual institu- tion. As previously noted, the typology is sometimes difficult to apply.

Collective Clan Responsibility: The principle that each clan should take responsibility for the

actions of individuals within that clan’s territory, represents the pragmatic application of a much broader principle of responsibility, and as such is categorised as a rule-in-use arising from con- scious deliberation.

The established customary norm would be for mag-paying groups to act as guarantors of indi- vidual behaviour, but in the post-1991 context in Somaliland, the large number of disaffected, under-employed and armed youth required a more rigidly territorial form of clan-based discip- line. Again, as a pragmatic solution, there have been downstream consequences of this change: formal transfer of authority for security to clan entities has complicated the disarma- ment process, institutionalising a justification for clans to maintain militia, which in turn has con- tributed to the recasting of some conflicts in clan terms (for example, those relating to Berbera port and to Hargeysa airport).

Use of Third Party Mediators: The involvement of mediating individuals or groups external to

an immediate conflict, but sufficiently engaged with it has been mentioned above (for example, see page 180), and is worthy of inclusion as an influential principle. The SNM was clearly not an external group during the Berbera and Bur'o conferences in 1991, so external mediation was not always employed. However, the Gadabuursi and Dhulbahante delegations were instrument- al in resolving the Berbera conflict and in preparing the way for the Boorame conference. This latter example is therefore an example of the principle in practice. In fact, external actors tend to play an important role even where they are not leading the process at the time. For example, at many of the most important conferences, including Berbera, Bur'o and Boorame, the resolutions themselves were drafted and amended by a drafting committee including three members of the non-Isaaq clans. Garaad Saleebaan (Dhulbahante) and 'Abdirahmaan Aw 'Ali Farah (Gad- abuursi) were both associated with the SNM, so to that extent straddled both sides. The third member was Mohamed Abdi 'Ali Bayr (Warsangeli) who was not an SNM affiliate. They were well aware of the role they played as a non-Isaaq drafting committee (Saleebaan 'Afqarshe', 2007a). Similarly, in Hargeysa, the committee assembled to agree the synthesised constitution were very conscious of the role they played in trying to satisfy the majority of conference deleg- ates rather than just the government, and the membership was drawn from all the major clans (Mohamed Saeed Mohamed 'Gees', 2007). The issue of external involvement in Somali peace- building initiatives is a contentious and topical one. The fact that international organisations played so minor a part in the Somaliland process is often cited as a basis for its success. There is considerable support for that position, but it is equally important to note the role that ‘out- siders’ (usually ‘interested outsiders’) have traditionally played in Somali conflict resolution97_.

It would seem that there is scope here for outside agents to seek constructive engagement us- ing institutions such as this as the basis for a negotiated space for such engagement. That is the argument put forward in a separate paper by the author of this thesis (Walls and Kibble, 2010).

97. _{Mohamed H. Mukhtar is explicit in proposing this as an essential ‘ingredient’ for peace in the southern}

Somali areas alongside the presence of trustworthy delegates, creative ideas and a reinterpretation of Somali ‘sovereignty’ (Abdulahi A. Osman and Issaka K. Soaré, 2007: 123-126), while Rashiid Gadhweyne notes the importance in different situations of internal emissaries and those from third party clans who have an interest (often as neighbours) in resolving a conflict (2009: 125-126).

Local and Diaspora Funding for Peace and Conflict: Another essential element in the peace-

building processes is directly related to the local management of conferences already men- tioned, but is also worth drawing out as a separate item. With each series of mediations, meet- ings and conferences predominantly locally or diaspora funded, the consequent limitation in funds removed the incentive to prolong the negotiation process unnecessarily or to offer overly generous allowances98_{. This was not necessarily adopted intentionally as a principle: outside}

financial assistance may well have been welcomed had it been offered (indeed, it was both offered and welcomed in a number of specific and relatively small-scale instances). This would suggest that, much as was the case with Somali instigation and management, this was some- thing of a perversely coerced situation. However, the manner in which hosts took responsibility for mobilising the necessary resources for each meeting or conference had the very immediate effect of making all those involved very aware of the limits to resources, but also the potential flexibility of deadlines where resources permitted. The experience of the Peace Committee who ran out of funds before achieving the goals they were pursuing illustrates the point more negat- ively: even a relatively prosperous diaspora group was so heavily reliant on small donations from a variety of interested sources that when that interest waned, so too did their involvement. Significantly in this discussion, conflict too was self-funded. It is difficult to ascertain the impact of this, but the observation made by a number of interview subjects and commentators that the Somaliland public effectively sued for peace because they had grown so tired of conflict must presumably have been facilitated by the fact that much of the funding for that conflict was com- ing from local and diasporic communities themselves.

This arrangement is included under the title rules-in-use because fundraising did develop a very deliberate and specific set of expectations. The hosting of conferences was shared to a large degree, and the responsibility for funding lay primarily with them. While this principle arose from a contextual sense of fairness and responsibility, the practice was deliberate and specific to the conference or meeting at hand.

98. _{A number of Somali and non-Somali authors have noted the effect of ‘dhaadhac’ (literally ‘things that}

fall’ - Davies, 1988: 61) on the long series of parallel Somali peace conferences. Dhaadha’ refers to the al- lowances and per diems paid to delegates by external donors during the post-1991 peace conferences with the aim of supporting them while they re-establish a viable ‘national’ government for Somalia. It is commonplace for commentators to see these allowances as a prime incentive in the desire of delegates to prolong the conferences in order to maximise personal benefit (see for example, Mohamed H. Mukhtar in