6 7 indeed ruling in fact even if his only subject is himself.

Dio does, however, bring his speech back to the original theme of ruling peoples, by making the common assertions about the king’s duty to

care for and improve his people: 'the good king looks upon himself as

being king (ßaauXeueLv) not for the sake of his individual self, but for

the sake of all men' (1.23). Helping men is his god-ordained duty

(3.55), and a king is expected to try to elevate his subjects morally as well as materially, although Dio emphasizes this aspect to different

degrees in different discourses. In 3.7 he conceives of the king’s

moral influence as a more or less inevitable side-effect of his holding power: ’VThen a man governs and holds sway over all mankind, his prudence avails to help even the imprudent ... his temperance serves to restrain

even the intemperate' and so on with the other cardinal virtues. The

most ambitious claim to reform, where a man 'having managed his own life admirably, endeavours by the persuasion of speech combined with goodwill and a sense of justice to train and direct a great multitude of men and to lead them to better things', occurs in a context which leaves the political authority of such a person unclear, which perhaps betrays Dio's lack of concern on this point (4.124).

The king's goodwill and solicitude are to be exercised in a rule that he holds because God has everywhere appointed the superior 'to care for and rule the inferior', which means that 'for the foolish he has made the wise to have care and thought, to watch and plan' — upovoeuv h c x u

67*We find several traces in Dio of one feature of [the] individual- ethical TiauöeLa, namely the social-ethical corollaries: dpxttv eauiou= apxttv av$pw7ta)V. This eyMpdreta = apxn in its widest meaning is teach­ able, and this is the aim and purpose of Cynic TtaLÖeua' (Höistad,

Kpoßo uXeueLV (3.62). The paternal care and indeed tenderness that Dio calls for are necessary because 'the shepherd's business is simply to

oversee, guard, and protect flocks, not, by heaven, to slaughter,

butcher and skin them' (4.44). The 'shepherds', to justify their claim

to rule, need training for the task (see 4 9 . 2 ) , 68 but, granted their permanent superiority in this as in other fields,there is little danger of failure.

The titles granted to God as the king's model reveal the public face of monarchy, showing what functions 'must at the outset be inherent in the royal function and title' (1.41). Such duties are those which impel the king to protect the w eak and bring men into unity, just as Alexander proclaims that the king, as well as displaying the common virtues of a good man, must also take delight in bestowing benefits, which activity approaches more nearly to the divine nature (2.26). The

titles of saviour and protector of men are gained when a ruler carries out his tasks well (see 3.6). Yet the motives behind acts of generosity of the kindly and humane king are not necessarily altruistic. Dio

emphasizes now the love won by this behaviour (1.20), now the fact that whereas other functions of royalty are obligatory, that of benefaction is alone voluntary and b] essed , that i s , at the r u l e r ' s whim (1.23) . Viewed in

this light such acts lose much of their universality and fail to emerge as a consistent organized substitute for rule based on justice and consultation.

The paradoxical description of rule as a burden not only suggests that such irksome duties as fall on his shoulders should be borne more nobly by a king than they would be by a private citizen (3.5 and 4.24) but that the larger portion of all burdens will fall to him because of his kingship, and that he should embrace them with open arms: 'He is actually more fond of toil than many others are of pleasure or of wealth' (1.21: cf. 62.3).69 The ruler who does accomplish his task is weighed down by cares (3.55), but can console himself with the

reflection that he is following a noble precedent. Hercules toiled and struggled to win eventual fame (8.28), while Diogenes the Cynic bore

68 Cf. 4.21: eav pev yap amcppmv xau xqv xou Alos CTtuaxapevos Tcxvnv xqv ßaacÄLKnv, and 2.44 ßaauAuxriv m b d e u a t v .

69 As Beranger comments on the use of the word uovog (Reohevches, p.179): 'Les fatigues, physiques et morales, que comportait l ’exercice du pouvoir sont evoquees avec c o m p l a i s a n c e '.

w i t h i n s u l t s j u s t a s O d y s s e u s h a d done from t h e s u i t o r s ' f o r he r e a l l y r e s e m b l e d a k i n g and l o r d ' ( 9 . 9 ) . Dio d o e s n o t p r o p o s e t h e Cy n i c l i f e i n i t s e x t e r n a l s a s a m od el f o r r u l e r s , b u t d o e s u s e s i m i l a r e x p r e s s i o n s a b o u t t h e s o l i t a r y i n d i v i d u a l a n d t h e m o n ar c h immer sed i n t h e c a r e s o f a n E m p i r e . The e f f e c t o f t h e k i n g ' s l a b o u r on h i s s u b j e c t s i s u n i m p o r t a n t i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h w h a t h i s e f f o r t s t e l l u s a b o u t hi m a s a n i n d i v i d u a l d i s c h a r g i n g h i s d u t y . I f h e f a i l s t o f u l f i l h i s t a s k he may be c a l l e d no t r u e k i n g b u t a s l a v e , e v e n t h o u g h h o l d i n g o f f i c e ( s e e e . g . 1 4 . 1 8 ) . T h i s o f c o u r s e i s f a r f rom b e i n g a p o l i t i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n , b u t s t e m s f rom D i o ' s b e l i e f t h a t ' i n e v e r y r e s p e c t human b e i n g s , b e c a u s e o f t h e i r d e p r a v i t y , a r e f a r t h e r removed f ro m a s t a t e o f f r e e d o m ' [ t h a n any f o r m a l s l a v e r y wo ul d b r i n g a b o u t ] ( 7 4 . 9 ) . Fr eedom b e l o n g s t o t h e k i n g h i m s e l f i n a s p i r i t u a l s e n s e — ' y o u w i l l n e v e r b e k i n g u n t i l y o u h a v e p r o p i t i a t e d y o u r a t t e n d a n t s p i r i t , and, by t r e a t i n g i t a s y o u s h o u l d , h a v e made i t commanding, f r e e - s p i r i t e d and k i n g l y ' ( 4 . 7 5 ) . T h a t i s , f r e e d o m a p p l i e s m o s t t r u l y t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l who, ' e n a m o u r e d o f i n d e p e n d e n c e i n t h e s p i r i t u a l s e n s e ' ( v o p x o e t öoGs a u x o v o y t a s e p w x t , 8 0 . 3 ) , c a n b e f r e e , and i n t h e m i d s t o f s u b j e c t s i n d e p e n d e n t . Only o t (ppovtyot c a n be f r e e i n t h i s way and c an do a s t h e y w i s h ( 1 4 . 1 7 ) . Thus f r e e d o m m u s t b e d e f i n e d as t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h a t i s p e r m i t t e d an d w h a t f o r b i d d e n , s l a v e r y a s i g n o r a n c e o f t h i s ( 1 4 . 1 8 ) . When Dio u s e s t h e ' p o l i t i c a l ' s e n s e o f f r e e ­ dom he s t i l l l i n k s i t c l o s e l y t o m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t , f o r i t i s a b s e n c e o f v i r t u e i n t h e A l e x a n d r i a n s t h a t makes Rome l i m i t t h e i r f r e e d o m . 70 The same l a c k o f c o n c e r n a t d i f f e r e n c e s o f s t r u c t u r e i n t h e m s e l v e s a p p e a r s when Dio a n a l y s e s d e m o c r a c y i n t e r m s a p p r o p r i a t e t o m o n ar c h y a s i f o n l y t h r o u g h t h e e x a m i n a t i o n o f one man c a n p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s p r o c e e d ( 3 2 . 2 5 f f . ) . 71 The t e r m s t h a t a r e i m p o r t a n t do n o t d e s c r i b e t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f g o v e r n m e n t b u t a r e r e l a t e d t o i n d i v i d u a l a c t i v i t i e s , so t h a t p r e s e r v a t i o n c a n come o n l y f rom g u a r d i a n s an d l e a d e r s , w i l l i n g s t e w a r d s d e l i g h t i n g i n t h e c i t y ' s o r d e r . A demos m u s t a c q u i r e t h e s e

70 See 3 2 . 5 1 : Fr eedom i s n o t a d v a n t a g e o u s f o r t h e A l e x a n d r i a n s and so God h a s g i v e n them Tiatöaywyous xoug cppovtywxspous xrjs koAcojs.

71 I n 3 2 . 2 7 - 8 Dio e x p l a i n s t h a t d e m o c r a c y i s o f two k i n d s , one good, a c c e p t i n g f r a n k s p e a k i n g i n i t s c r i t i c s an d g r a t e f u l t o t h o s e v o u S e x o u o t Hat ö t ö a a n o u a t . . . ov ( d e m o c r a c y ) eyw x t ^ q y t x p s d e t a s Hat ß a a t A t n y g cpuaeojs, an d t h e ba d k i n d , more common and r e s e m b l i n g a t y r a n t .

traits if it is to possess a ’divine and kingly nature' (32.26-7).

Dio distinguishes monarchy and tyranny, true and false kingship, by means of the character of the ruler, and is emphatic that there will never really be a foolish or unjust king (62.7). He refers to the^true* king (1.15; 2.69), the ’ideal' and ’good’ king (1.11, 12; 3.25), the

'good' shepherd (3.41). The tyrant, by contrast, is one unworthy to rule (2.75). Lists of the qualities displayed by kings and tyrants (see 1.11-36 and 3.39-41) set out the contrast in personal ability and

inclination and show that 'the man who does not possess the right

qualities, i.e. a character firmly formed along individual-ethical lines, is not a basileus at all, however great his power as regards external things'.72 Dio's descriptions of the benefits of concord and unity in a state occur not in his essays on kingship but in the speeches addressed to fractious cities. He contributes little that is original to this theme and does not introduce the emperor as reconciler of intra-city or even inter-city disputes, except in an ironic way (32.69-71).

PLUTARCH

In Plutarch's Life of Solon the friends of the statesman are

described as urging him to seize absolute power and not to be concerned for the name of the thing 'as if the virtues of him who seized it would not at once make it lawful sovereignty' (ßaaLÄcua) (Sol. 14.4).

Plutarch does not claim to agree with this view, and yet in one of his pieces of advice on statecraft he gives an account of government to the uneducated ruler which assumes that the ruler himself is responsible for

the working out of wisdom and law in the state, and therefore presumably the source in some measure of these qualities (see e.g. 780e) . The rulers' functions must however be related to the fact that they 'serve god for the care and preservation of men' (780d) .

With his task so defined, the ruler’s personal qualities will

necessarily bulk large in a description of his office. Not surprisingly, then, we find Plutarch liberally scattering throughout his political

works lists of virtues and gifts of intellect possessed by the good ruler or exemplified in the lives of former rulers, particularly

Alexander the Great. Plutarch shows Alexander’s superiority to Darius not by stressing his military strength but by pointing out that he excelled 'in virtue and greatness of soul, in courage and justice’

(339b), precisely the qualities which he believes should be possessed by all men.

The long list of virtues given later shows the same concern for all-round excellence with a certain-stress laid on those qualities most likely to win the esteem of the king’s associates:

euaeßetav xept -öeoug, xuaxtv xpog (ptAoug, euxeAetav, eyxpaxetav, eyxetpLav, acpoßuav xpog davaxov, eu^uytav,

cptAav^pwxuav, oytAuav euctpyoaxov, a^euöeg ?jdog, euoxa^etav ev ßouAatg, xayog ev xpa^eotv, xpwxa 6o£qg, xpoatpeatv ev x(p xaArn xeAeauoupyov (342f) .

Almost everything is here that could reveal the good man, except, this time, justice. That Plutarch does not consider these traits most fitting for kings alone is clear from his attribution of individual virtues possessed by Alexander to various renowned figures, not all kings, and two indeed, Pericles and Thermistocles, the statesmen of a democracy (see 343a) .

The gentler virtues naturally predominate in the instructions

Plutarch gives to municipal 'statesmen' (see especially 823f and 824d-e) and so could not be taken on their own as indicative of what Plutarch