RUSSIAN SLR DEVELOPMENTS

The earliest attempts to make a Russian SLR were similar to those elsewhere: a standard bolt-action rifle was modified to enable gas pressure to operate the bolt. Like other designs, the Roshchepei39 _ri-

fle used many parts of the original, and the gas operating system was grafted onto the weapon. A somewhat questionable source described his rifle as follows:

The rifle of Roshchepei reportedly excelled in its simplicity and com- pactness, and in this sense evoked great interest. But the incompe- tent Tsarist officials, bending low before the West without faith in the ability of the Russian people, did not appreciate the talented original- ity of this simple soldier who worked as a regimental blacksmith. The Russian warriors were not fated to hold the rifle invented by Roshchepei in their hands.40

In actual fact, if the weapon had any commonality with other de- signs of the time, it was heavy, awkward to operate, and probably prone to breakages, all of which would probably have ruled out ser- vice use in any event, with or without the intervention of the “in- competent Tsarist officials” who were the scapegoats for the Com- munists for many years.

The real originator of the SLR in Russia has to be Vladimir Gri- gorevich Federov (1874–1966), who, unlike many gun designers and gunmakers, had significant military training. He was initially trained at the Mikhailovsky Artillery School, then served as a pla- toon commander in the First Guards Artillery Brigade (1895–1897), at the end of which he was selected for training at the Mikhailovsky Artillery Academy. Part of the course was concerned with ballistics. Following graduation he went on to join the Weapons Section of the Main Artillery Commission, where new weapons were both designed and examined.

He also had the opportunity of working with S. I. Mosin, director of the Sestroretsk Weapons Factory in St. Petersburg, and it seems that it was then that Simonov converted a Mosin-Nagant rifle to semiautomatic operation. Publication of his book on SLR theory and design appeared in 1907.41 _{Initial work concentrated on activat-}

ing a bolt, but he then progressed to a design with a recoiling barrel with two locks that engaged in lugs in the breech block. This was the 1907 model, which had some serious faults.4 2 _{Despite this,}

there was enough in the design for the authorities to recommend that Federov and his coworker, Vasily Alekseyevich Degtyarev (1879–1949), later a famous weapon designer in his own right and creator of the Degtyarev range of machine guns, move permanently to Sestroretsk, where much improved working conditions were avail- able.

By 1911 Russia was well in advance of the rest of the world in the development of the SLR, and a competition was arranged in which the Federov rifle was to be tested against the To k a r e v4 3 _{rifle and}

against designs from FN of Liège (the Karl A. Brauning weapon) and from AB Svenska Vapen och Ammunitionsfabriken of Stock- holm (the Carl Axel Theodor Sjogren design). The Federov pre- vailed, based upon the fact that the weapon had fired thousands of rounds with only minimal problems.

Like many others after him, Federov did not rest on his laurels, and by 1912 he had made up his mind that the 7.62mm x 54mm R Model 1891 cartridge was far too powerful for use in an SLR. He opted for a less potent load, to reduce recoil (and improve operation from the point of view of the user), increase barrel life, improve feeding, and most importantly improve fire control. Rather than de- sign a cartridge specifically for the purpose, he looked around until he chose the Japanese 6.5mm x 51SR round, a reduced charge round. The new weapon, which was issued from 1916 onward, was known as the Model 1916 Avtomat, and it was used for troop trials by the 189 Izmail’skiy Infantry Regiment.

The weapon weighed 9.7 pounds, was 40.9 inches long, and fired the Japanese cartridge at 2,664 fps, a package that was remarkable for its time. The rifle was fed from a 25-round magazine and oper- ated on the short recoil system. The locking system was very similar to the original 1911 design.

After the Russian Revolution of 1917, Federov was still in favor, and the Soviet leadership wanted no fewer than 9,000 of his new Av- tomat rifles. Production was impossible, but he made every effort, as did Degtyarev, to get the order fulfilled. The two finally decided that the only way to get the job done was to partly machine, partly hand finish the weapons; the powers that be authorized this method and reduced the initial demand to 150 weapons. Once a total of 200 had been reached, a further order for 300 more was issued. By almost superhuman effort, Federov and Degtyarev managed to get produc- tion flowing, and by the end of 1920, production was running reli- ably at 50 rifles per month. Production was finally stopped on 1 Oc- tober 1925 after 3,200 Federov Avtomats had been produced.

The Federov was well in advance of its time, being easily handled, reliable, and effective as a military weapon. Unfortunately it was also too delicate for military operations in the long term, as dirt soon caused jams, and fully automatic fire accuracy was poor. Nevertheless the weapon was reissued in the Russo-Finnish War of 1939–1940, so it proved to be the father of all subsequent military assault rifles.

The real secret lay in the correct choice of cartridge.44_{The secret}

of controlled automatic fire lay in the weight of the weapon: too light, and there would be no control of where the second and subse- quent rounds went (see “U.S. Self-Loading Rifles” and the M14); too heavy, and the weapon could not be readily carried and used by the soldier whose weapon it was intended to be. However, very few people really appreciated what role the weapon had in battle. In- fantry officers were accustomed to firing at ranges up to 1,200 yards (a range at which even snipers are inaccurate and at which the bolt actions of the time could only deliver vaguely aimed mass fire), which led to the same situation in Russia as happened in the United States nearly half a century later. The true value of the small-caliber weapon was not really appreciated in Russia until experience in World War II taught the Russians that assault rifles were intended to provide covering fire at medium ranges (up to 300 or 400 yards at most) and killing fire only at short range. The day of the long-range, individually sighted shot was to pass, but it took a long time in coming.

Federov and Degtyarev combined their efforts in the years 1921 and 1926 and produced a number of automatic weapons, none of which were adopted for service, but this effort laid down the princi- ple of a family of weapons that the Russians would embrace whole- heartedly in ensuing years. The man who benefited from this idea was Mikhail Timofeyevich Kalashnikov (1919–), whose family of weapons has gone down in history.

Russia has produced a number of exceptional rifle designers, and following Federov came Tokarev,45 _{who was master armorer of the}

12 Don Cossack Regiment in the late 1880s. By 1907 he was train- ing at the Officer’s Rifle School in Oranienbaum and then in 1908 went to Sestroretsk, where he must have come into contact with Federov and Degtyarev. His first rifle design was tested against the Federov rifle in 1911. By 1921 his rifle design had been modified, and it came to the attention of the Main Artillery Commission, which was “of the opinion that the proposed Tokarev system and its further development for the small calibre cartridge is desirable.”4 6

H o w e v e r, despite the mention of the small-caliber round, To k a r e v was looking at full-caliber (chambered for the 7.62mm x 54mm R cartridge) SLR designs at the time.

The Artillery Commission set up a competitive testing of the available SLR designs, of which the survivors after the first cut4 7

were Federov’s 7.62mm version of his 1916 rifle, Degtyarev’s modi- fied 1916 design, and the Tokarev recoiling-barrel design. All three

weapons could be loaded directly into their magazines by the stan- dard five-round Mosin-Nagant cartridge clip. The result of the test was that all of the rifles were too complicated and were lacking in strength and reliability for military consideration. Six months was al- lowed to the three designers to improve their offerings and to make up two identical weapons for testing.

The next series of tests was held in June 1928. Federov led a group of designers known as the Inventor’s Collective (consisting of F. V. Fe d e r o v, V. A. Degtyarev, D. V. Uraznov, A. I. Kuznetsov, and I. I. Berukov) to present an improved recoil-operated Federov rifle and two other rifles with the Degtyarev gas-operated system. Tokarev persisted in offering his recoil-operated weapon. The test results were considered, and all four weapons withstood the main phase of the tests. However, no order for production could be given, as none of the rifles was in finished form. The collective also brought into question Tokarev’s action, suspecting that it might be vulnerable to barrel bending during combat operations.

By the time the third set of tests took place the competitors were reduced to the Degtyarev and Tokarev rifles. Degtyarev offered a de- sign with a fixed five-round magazine. Tokarev’s rifle came with de- tachable five- and 10-round magazines. As both weapons were still demonstrating previous faults, they were rejected. Furthermore, it was then ordered that recoiling-barrel weapons were unsuitable for the military, and so Tokarev was forced to start work on the design of a gas-operated rifle that included a new bolt and bolt carrier system. The collective decided that the Degtyarev model was to be put into production, and eventually 500 rifles were ordered. This was to be known as the 7.62mm SLR Model 1930, and troop testing was done in 1933 by the Moscow Proletarian Rifle Division. At the same time Sergei Gavrilovich Simonov (1894–) appears on the scene.

Simonov had presented his first SLR design for the 1926 trials and was rejected. He had made a significant error in mounting the gas-operating system on the side of his rifle, resulting in a wide weapon that was difficult to strip in operational conditions. He re- designed the weapon and in 1931 offered a gas-operated system with a bolt locked by a vertical sliding wedge. In no time this weapon became the favorite to replace the Model 1891 Mosin- Nagant rifle for the Russian Army.

It was adopted on 22 March 1934 as the 7.62mm Simonov Auto- matic Rifle Model 1936 (or the AVS36). By 1938 the weapon was in mass production, and in 1938 and 1939 a total of 34,681 of these rifles were made.

The ways of bureaucrats are always hard to fathom, and nowhere more so than in the decision of the Soviet Pe o p l e ’s Commissar for Defense to announce another SLR competition. The reasoning be- hind it seems to have been that the Simonov was overly complicated, easily jammed by dirt and powder residue, and prone to mishandling by soldier users. There may have been some persuasive lobbying by To k a r e v, because when the latest tests were over, although none of the weapons submitted were ready for adoption, the Tokarev might be reworked quickly enough to make it a viable proposition. Te s t e d again (against the Simonov and a weapon designed by one Rukasish- nikov), the Tokarev was declared the winner, and the rifle was adopted in early 1939 as the Model 1938 Tokarev SLR (SVT38).

There can be little doubt that Stalin was acting behind the scenes in this matter, for he was a devotee of the SLR.4 8 _{The Simonov-}

Tokarev conflict has all the hallmarks of political infighting, and the production comparison between the two weapons is quite striking. The Tokarev needed much more workplace area for its manufacture, many more machines, more manufacturing time and increased costs; was heavier and needed more raw materials for its production; and had 25 more parts than the Simonov. Vannikov wrote that

Simonov had created a lighter model with the nest automatic mecha- nism. But, as a consequence of carelessness by the designer himself in manufacturing the rifle, it showed somewhat poorer results than Tokarev’s design. Being a member of the commission, I was in charge of accepting new designs into the arsenal of infantry weapons—an ex- acting and responsible matter. For example, as opposed to other types of equipment, a rifle is usually accepted for use over many years, since subsequent changes in its design unavoidably require both complicated measures in organising combat training in the army . . . and also long and expensive technological reequipping of industry. This is especially true as it relates to the self loading rifle, and it was therefore clear to me that the best of the models was Simonov’s. It had not failed because of design failures, but for production reasons . . . which could be eliminated completely.49

So despite its obvious manufacturing shortcomings, the SVT38 was accepted by the Russians, with the approval of Stalin himself.

In the field there were problems, partly due to dust and sand, es- pecially with new weapons from the factory heavy with protective grease. These problems occurred at high and low temperatures, which meant most of the year in central Russia. There were also re-

ports of gas regulation, and the magazine was not well locked into the rifle and could fall out. Although a redesign was planned, the sudden invasion by the Germans meant that the SVT40 was on is- sue for the rest of the war. Nearly 1.4 million SVT40s were pro- duced (of which 51,000 were the sniper rifle version), and it was only in 1945 that production was discontinued.

The problems with the rifle and the cartridge led to a number of studies of alternatives, one of which looked at a rifle firing the 7.62mm x 25mm Tokarev pistol cartridge, and another looked at the possibilities with the 7.62mm x 39mm M43 cartridge. The prospects with the latter cartridge looked good, but the question of its origin has puzzled many historians and weapons experts for years. The first argument is that the Russian cartridge developed from the German 7.62mm x 39mm kurz cartridge, which was fired by the StG44 range of weapons. Russian sources, however, argue that they had started design work on the new cartridge as early as 1939. Whatever the truth of the matter, they had certainly looked at a 5.45mm cartridge in 1939, a project that was shelved for the dura- tion of World War II.

The problem facing all designers of small-caliber cartridges is that of balancing caliber and propellant charge to produce a cartridge with better ballistics than a pistol cartridge but with less recoil than a full-blown rifle cartridge. Further, in 1939, and even in 1945, the value of the smaller calibers was not yet known, with most armies being fond of the cartridges at about .3 inch in caliber. Further, most armies were still wedded to the concept of aimed shooting out to 600 or even 800 yards, which seemingly demanded a big car- tridge. These full-load cartridges were utterly unsuitable for the as- sault rifle concept, being uncontrollable on automatic.

Once the decision had been made to go ahead with the 7.62mm x 39mm cartridge, Sergei Gavrilovich Simonov (1894–1986), who had designed a weapon to fire the 7.62mm x 25mm cartridge, now designed and produced his SKS45 carbine. Earlier versions had been produced but were not field-tested until about 1944. The new cartridge, however, was perfect for the basic design, which was to be used at ranges of up to 400 yards. Some of the new rifles were sent to the front, and reports were favorable. This resulted in adoption as the SKS45. The one problem was that the magazine capacity was only five or 10 rounds, so the SKS45 was not an assault rifle, merely an SLR.

At the same time that the SKS was being field-tested, Kalash- nikov appeared on the scene as well. After an apprenticeship during

which he must have been in contact with Degtyarev, Simonov, and S u d a y e v, or at least their weapon designs, he produced a 7.62mm self-loading carbine that was tested in 1944. The SKS45, however, won the contest, and Kalashnikov’s design was rejected. At the time Kalashnikov was only 25 years old, and as is the case with all good engineers, he went back to his drawing board to rethink his idea.50

The result was the AK47, a weapon that is still in service, albeit somewhat modified today. It has spawned a family of arms based on the original design,51_{and the success of the basic design is due to a}

number of factors. Perhaps the first is the ease of use, which ap- peals to all soldiers who are armed with the weapon. It handles well, is easy to strip and assemble, and is (assuming there is a basic regime of cleaning applied) very reliable. There is criticism of the noise made by the safety catch/change lever, but this is offset by the heavy bolt, which goes a long way to ensuring that every round is properly seated in the chamber. Further, the fitted cleaning rod and a strict regime of cleaning that was standard in the Soviet Army en- sure that jams are a rarity.52

Various modifications were made to the original AK47, including a folding stick version, but the main changes were in the manufac- turing process. The Russians experimented with machined receivers but went back to the original sheet metal receiver quickly, and the new design was known as the AKM. In the early 1970s a new car- tridge was developed (the 5.45mm x 39.5mm M74), which may have been due to studies made of the U.S. 5.56mm x 45mm round (otherwise the U.S. .223 Remington). So the AKM was redesigned to fire this cartridge, and the new weapon became the AK74. If any- thing, this rifle is more reliable than the AKM, because the cartridge rim of the M74 round is thickened to allow the even heavier bolt of the AK74 to extract the round without tearing through the rim, an- other problem with the M16.

The Russians had thus arrived at the same conclusion as the Eu- ropean and U.S. military: the smaller caliber round did more dam- age out to its optimum range of about 300 or 400 yards and allowed assault rifles to be built that could fire the round on full automatic. By the late 1960s all modern armies were equipping, or planning to equip, with small-caliber rifles, and the Russians had taken the lead in producing a rifle that today is still regarded by combat soldiers as the most reliable weapon available. It is this reliability that causes many soldiers to comment that they would rather have an AK74 or even an AK47 or AKM in preference to their issue rifle—be it a vari- ant of the M16, the Israeli Galil, the German G3, or the British SA80.