less effective anti-tank weapon than a better rmed and armored tank. By the end of the war this proved to be unarguable and the Tank Destroyer force went ou of existence,
U,S. MARINE CORPS ARMOR
In the early 1920s the U.S Marine Corps had few light tank companies equipped with the 6-ton tank which had been copied from the French Renault F.T. tank Some experimenting was done with annored cars and with Marmon-Herrington light tanks, but the need for amphibian tank was never met. A Christie amphibian tank was deck-loaded on a submarinean launched in
ar n w s org ou ree talion in antry regiments, a four-battalion regiment, a hore party engineer batt lion,
battali on, an other elements including a li ht talion. Thi organization was soo altered to ntry regiments, a rtiller regiment with three witzer attali an on lO5-mm. howitzer
an engineer battalion, light tank battalion eapons attalion, a scout company, signa
an amphibian tractor battalion, a medical a service battalion, a guard company an the l headqu te s company. Then a second divi ion nized. Eventually six divisions plus separate al combat eams, auxiliary organizations, para
air unit were formed.
n n y r s
assigned one reinforced medium tank company of 18 anks plus platoonof four flamethrower tanksan two li ht tanks. Unfortunately, ac of hipping often made it necessary to leave behind on ut f the three medium tank companies in divi l nk battalion. Opera tionally, it might have been bette to have provided space for these tank an to have reduced the number of infantry carried for a iv operation at least for the initiJllanding.
By the time of the landing Iwo lima in February 1945 the light flamethrower tank had been replaced by flamethrowing Shermans. In fact mo of the Shermans ad flamethrowing capability, but of these the most effective, becauseoftheir longer range, were th se which
Christie amphibi tank 10a subma ineJar U.S. Marin Corps maneuve of Pu lO Rico 924. his pro,'edto be a b ndalley, the
tra became the ari Corps assault vehicle. efe se epa rtm nt arineCorps) 528927)
39
Successive waves VT3sformingand moving shorewardatlwolima.
An LV wilh boll-on armor pulling a disahledLV on Leyl e Island (Photo: U.S. Army No. SC 26061
(Photo: U.S. Navy 50-G 312456)
fired through the 75-mm. gun tube rather than from the machine-gun portin the front plate.
In the operation on Okinawa in April 1945 the Japanese developed an efficient defensive system against the tank infantry teams. They first sought to eliminate the infantry by high volume fire and then turned high volume fire onto the tank. Ifthisfailed, anti-tank assault teams with satchel charges would try, under cover of smoke, to destroy the tank. Nevertheless, the American use oftanks on Okinawa reached a high peak as evidence by a dispatch issued by General Ushijima shortly before his death and found later: "Theenemy's power lies in his tanks has become obvious that ou general battIe against the American Forces is battle against their
coming ashore inand debarkingJrom their at Namu,.in the Kwajalein Atoll Februar 1944. (Photo: courtesy U.S. Marine Corps) tall tion al1woli and Amlrac casuallie Jour days later already parlially buriedin the SoJ volcanic ash. (Photo: U.S. Coast Guard)
41
Satanjlam lhroll'er lv15 Lighl IOnks J3lh Ar red Group whichJought in Ihe Luzon, Philippines, campaign Ihat began in January 1945.
(1945-1950)
With the end the wa in Europe inMa 1945 and in the Pacific three months later the Western Allies proceeded to demobilize rapidly In the wholesale thinning down of American forces the formidable strength of the armored fonnations was destroyed, weakness that was soon to cause concern when it became apparent that the U.S.S. R was demobilizing much more slowly an was maintain
ing strong occupation forces in Eastern Europe.
Before the end of 1945 twelve of the sixteen annored divisions had been inactivated, leaving only the 1st, 2nd,
(U.S. Army41 651)
assigned to it, bu only one company each battalion was in fact organize an these companies wereequipped with nothing more powerful than M24 Chaffee light tanks in case heavier tanks should damage Japanese roads and bridges. Even the Armored Center at Fort Knox was inactivated at the end of October 1945 and most of its functions were taken over by the Armored School.
There was, however, still an obvious prime need for mechanized if no for armored units in the U.S. occupa
tion forces in Europe. These units had to be flexible in organization and highly mobile to carry ou security duties, and they had to require the minimum person
nel, for men were in shortsupply in rapidly demobiliz
nstituent cavalry reconnaissance squadrons few separate tank battalions, All the tank nd the cavalry reconnaissance squadron of an 4th Armored Divisions became Con
quadrons, The 1st Constabulary Regiment basically from the th Armored Group nstabulary Regiment from the 2nd Cavalry 3rd from elementsofthe and 4th Armored the 4th from the 4th Cavalry Group an
the 6th Cavalry Group, the 5th from ele
he 4th Armored Division, the 6th from the 6th Cavalry Group, the 10th from ele
t Armored Division an from the 771 st lion the 11th from the th Cavalry Group ts the 4th Armored Division, the 14th
Group, an
Group and elements the st Armored stabulary, whose trength reached nearly arly 1947 was by its very nature a transient
TIE3 Mine Exploder mounted on a Sherman bogged down on Ihe /ronlier o(Germany, Ihe week be/ore Chri tmas 1944 drawbacko/Ihe
"Aunt Jemima" it was called, was thaI with each disc weighing three
IOnsilsank like a slon inlo themud o/balil -mired roads, (U,S, Army)
organization that became outdated by the changing political situation an the confrontation between East and West in Europe, Th HQ an HQ Company was inactivated in November 1950 an the ,S, Con
stabulary was superseded by th newly activated Seventh Army, However the 2nd Constabulary Brigade and the 15th and 24th Constabulary Squadrons, from the 15th an 4th Constabulary Regiments respectively continued to function until December 1952 when they were inacti
vated the last of the Constabulary units,
peeps andjeepsat Ihe Siegji'ied Lin th Wesl Wallo/Germany, (Courtesy Col. G, B, Jarr tt)
43
The dragon's leelh the German SI WalllVerenot as invulnerable a had been feared by the Allies. TheylVerebroken down by lank gunfire to create
palh (U S. Army)
The problem assaulting the Siegfried Line loomed large before the event. The M4A3E2 "Jumbo" specially armored Sherman assaull lank was buillto breach lhese anti-lank defenses which propaganda ha declared10be "impregnable". fnpoinloffactartillery alld lank fire creOled cavities inlhe
dragon's teelh withau I undue trouble. (U.S. Army)
There was still no Congressional authorization war, despite the fact that armor enthusiasts the tank as the main weapon of land warfare.
serving with armored units in the war had their basic branch. In 1947 armored officers be assigned to the cavalry branch and the artment announced that it expected there would ly be statutory approval ofan armored cavalry place the cavalry. The marks ofthe old antago
tween tankmen and horsed cavalrymen-an sm which was equally strong in the British vealed themselves in the proviso that, until oval was given, tank officers woul be detailed valry unless they objected", and, by the same avalry officers who did not desire to serve with uld be "transferred to or detailed to other arms ices."
rm "armoredcavalry" for the new arm pleased ose involved. Thos who ha never served with ought that "armor" best described what it was . Others argued that the arm was still carrying functions of cavalry-mobility, firepower an
tion whatever it was mounted on "cavalry"
continue to be called. When statutory approval ly given for the new arm in the Army Organiza
of 1950, it was given the name of "armor". It continuation of the cavalry."
Sandbags were among Ihe "field fixes" to afford protection (mainly psychologicalin this case) against the devastating hand-held Pan zerfaust.
This Sherman is leaving concealment in NiederbetschdOlf its way to the Riller hofen front on the easternFa tier France. January 1945
(Courtesy Col. G. B. arrett)
Despite this decision and the unpopUlarity of the term "a mored cavalry" it did not disappear from the U.S. Army. Five regiments perpetuated it in their designation as"armored cavalry regiments", and still do so. Th first of these five regiments to be organi ed in this role was the 3rd Armored Cavalry, which, as 3rd Cavalry, ha first been inactivated in 1942 to form 3rd Armored Regiment in 10th Armored Division an had then been re-activated an had formed 3rd Cavalry Group. became an armored cavalry regiment in 1948. Later in the same year the 2nd, 6th, th, and 14th
Annored Cavalry were organized from unit of the U.S.
Constabulary. All were activated except the 11th which was not activated until 1951 during the Korean War.
Sherman 3rd Armored Division knocked alit by German artillery fire al Bergerhausen near Cologne January 3. 1945. Fifteen U.S.
visions servedin the North-West Europe campaign-and another one in/taly. (US. Army SC 20J343-S)
45
917
the"fieldfixes"appliedto prote Shermans against German Panzerfaustfire.
(Courtesy Co J. B. Jarr ll U. S. rmy SCI 97062])
l/ellx, Belgium , tank and jeeps0/75thInfantr Division are alnJedwhil 10camoujlagethemfrom enemy gr oundan airobsefl1otio in the
condilions that prevailed011 th Weste,." Front. (ETOH 45 8805)
47
Shermansof714th Battalion at Bischwiller, France, January 8, 1945, preparingtofire into Drusenheim. The 714th Baltalion was a "spin-oj}"" battalion from 121h ArmoredDivision after September 1943. The 12th Armored Division, it will be nOlicedinIhe relevanl table compiledfrom Ihe officiallisl, had only tIVO, instead three, organic tank battalions-the'23rd and 43rd. The official caption 10 this picture, hOlVever, suggests thai the 12th Armored Division didinfact have a third tank battalion under command: the 714th, which was its own offspring. (U.S. Army SC198784)
The annored cavalry regiment of this period had three reconnaissance battalions as its main strength and was equipped with light tanks and 69 medium tanks. Its primary role was described as being "t engage in security, light combat, and reconnaissance missions. The regiment is no designed to engage in combat with hostile annor or strongly organized defenses."
Since their inception the organization of the annored cavalry regiments has changed somewhat, the main difference being that each has an air cavalry troop and has added helicopters to its equipment. The traditional cavalry designations of squadrons and troops have replaced the battalion and company designations.
(SINCE 1950)
When the North Koreans attacked the South in June 1950 the only tanks near enough to be mshed into action were the M24 Chaffees ofthe four tank companies assigned to the occupation divisions in Japan. The com
panies were fonned into a provisional tank battalion which first went into combat in support of the 24th Division on July 11. The enemy was equipped with T-34/85s. Fo over three weeks the light tanks had no support from heavier annor. Then in the first week of
reconnaissance company, it brought the activation of fifth annored cavalry regiment, and it saw the re-activa
tion of four annored divisions, as well as the activation of tank battalions for the Regular Anny infantry divisions.
The National Guard infantry divisions brought into Federal service were the 40th (Califoruip) and 45th (Oklahoma), both of which fought in Korea, the 28th (Pennsylvania) and 43rd (Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vennont), both ofwhich went to Gennany, and the 31st (Alabama and Mississippi), 37th (Ohio), 44th (Illinois), and 47th (Minnesota and North Dakota), all ofwhich became training centers for reinforcements.
None of the annored divisions or the five armored cavalry regiments served in Korea.
ARMORED DIVISIONS
At the outbreakofthe Korean Wa only the 2nd and 3rd Annored Divisions were active. The 2nd had had an unintermpted record of service since its activation on July 15, 1940; the 3rd had been inactivated in Gennany on November 9, 1945 and then reactivated on July 17, 1947 as a training division. A third annored division, the 5th, had only recently been inactivated for the second time. Its first inactivation was on October
1945; it had then been reactivated on July 6,1948, only to be inactivated again on February I, 1950. Soon after the beginning of the fighting in Korea, the 5th was reactivated yet again (on September 1, 1950), the first of the four annored divisions that were reactivated
d Sherman Company A, 701st Bmtalioll, 91h U.S. Army, crrrryilig both authorized and unauthorizedstowag at Brachelen,
45. (U.S. Arm)' Courtesy Col. G. B. Jarrett)
un 3r
u.s
Armyin Lu mbourg, Januar 3, 1945. The 36,which had a90-111111gUll on 10 chassis, couldtakeon any (U.S. Army SC148613)49
Th Baili Ih Bulge Sherman 7741h Ballalion,3rd U.S. Army,pa ses a knock d oul German POIllher in Ihe Joresl n ar Bovigny, B lgium Janum 17 1945.
divisions was restored to six on June 15, 1954, when the 4th was reactivated. On March 15, 1955 the 3rd became
combat division. A year later, on March 16 1956 the number active armored divisions was reduced to four with the inactivation on thatdate the 5th and 6th Annored Divisions. From 1957 to 1962 the Ist Armored Division was reduced to a single combat command.
Thereafter it reverted to full organization.
Th organization of an armored division was no longer what it had been in World War II. Towards the end of the war the need for more annored infantry in the division had been generally recognized an the Wa Department had under consideration a proposed structure which would increase the total divisional strength by 4,000 to about 15,000. The actual increase
introducedin 1948, was to 15,973. The reserve command was augmented to allow it to function as a third combat command when required. A fourth infantty battalion was added an the number companies in each battalion was increased from three to four, making 16
infantry companiesin the division instead the previous nine The division was also given battalion of heavy artillery (I 55-mm. self-propelled howitzers) and bat
talion of self-propelled anti-aircraft guns to add to the three 105-mm. self-propelled howit er battalions. Th number tank battalions was increased to four by the addition of heavy tank battalion which was equipped with M103s. Th reconnaissance battalion was retained.
Th total number tanks in the division was 373. Th first armored division to which this reorganization was
The Lighl Tank T7 wilh1I mock-up Ihe Lighl Tank T7£2 on ils righl. The T7 becam all ull ll1pl 10replace Ihe M4 Medium Sherman , butil jell di lrou ly belIVeen the lools lighl tank or medium unk. II was probably Ihe besl lighl lallk World War ll but 01 ils /ruilion nobody wanled a
lighl tank. adend to goodlank. (U.S. Ordnance Department)
oader an deeper than battlefields of mall, self-contained, fast-moving mperative no only in the concentra
tack bu also in di persion for defense.
the Army had to retain its ability to -nuclear wars, where the requirement persion were no as important."*
ization was the pentomic (or pent na) en applied to all armored division by ange was needed in the basic structure at command set-up already provided ility. far as the tanks were con
till four battalions but all four were ipped the heavy M 103 with their withdrawn from Army ervice. Th ks was360-306ofthem with 90-mm.
6-mm. gun The number of armored artillery battalions remained the was herethat the greatest changetook
was given an atomic capability.
was 14,617.
valry hi tory, p. cit. p. 80.
oftank and infantry battalions which varied according the mis ion and other relevant factors. Th change in the armored divi ion because of the continuance of combat commandsalbeitunderthe title brigade headquarters, wa less than in the other type of division.
ROAD armored division had a divi ional base with four artillery battalions, an engineer batt lion and othersupportunits, an an armored cavalry quadron of 18 light tanks. As its maneuver elements it had six tank battalions and five mechanized infantry battalions. And it had three brigade he dquarters to whi h the various unit could be assigned. Each tank battalion had 54 medium nd two light tank , and each mechanized infantry b ttalion had two light tank s. Th gave the division a total 40 light tanks (including the armored cavalry's), an 12 medium or in battle tanks. It total strength wa 15 966
Th armored cavalry quadron in all four type of division had an air cavalry troop equipped with heli
copters.
In 1965 th t Cavalry Division wa reorgani ed as fifth type of division airmobile-and was sent to fight in Vietn m.
plendid vehicleII'hi h us de ds om'e 10rh IOralh natl lju reivledium T 7. (U.S.Ordn nce Dep rtment)
51
The /l.tfenium Tank lvl711'asimennedas a replacement/orIheM4 Sherman. but was incapablea/becomingso because weighthanbeen so enhan ced th it was badly l{nderpol\'ered. Prot/ue/ion continued10 be cOHeen/rated011 themoreefficient vehicle- t h e M4 Sherman. (John ennon)
M22 AirborneLight Tank training Il'ith infantr ar ri Knox. In/aclnone\Vasuset/by U.S. troopsin combal.and nl a/ew bythe British who called
the tank the Locust. (ColJrtesy Marmom-Herringt Co.)
M24 Light tank, called the Chaffee by the Srilish, saw only limiled serviceillWorld WarIlbut boreth brllnt0/the initial North Korean attackinJuly 1950 This M24 Chaffeeisjiuedwith 23-inch experimental0/1."'/ '
track/Ofimprovingjlotalion. (U S. OrdnanceDl'jl:llll1
V>
...,
The bridge over the Rive/' RMne: the bridge at magen wMch was caplured illlaCIby 91h ArmoredDivision on Ma ch 7. 1945.
(U S. Army
Th final statusofthe armored divisions was as follows:
6t Inactivat September 18, 1945 at Camp Shanks,
Ne York.
Reactivated September 5 1950 at or Leonard
Wood Missouri.
Inactivated rch 16, 195 at FortLeon rd Wood
7th Inactivated October 9, 1945 at Ca p Patric Henry, Virginia.
Reactiv ted No mb 1950at Camp Roberts, California.
Inac ivated November 15, 1953 at Camp Roberts th Inactivated November 13 194 Camp Patrick
Henry, Virginia.
9th Inactivated October 13 1945 at Ca Pattick
Henry Virginia.
10th Inactivate October 15, 1945 Camp atrick Henry Virginia.
11th Inactiv ted Septembe 30, 1945 in Austlia.
12th Inactivated Decem ber 17, 1945 at Camp Kilmer
The bridge over the Rive/' RMne: the bridge at magen wMch was caplured illlaCIby 91h ArmoredDivision on Ma ch 7. 1945.
(U S. Army
Th final statusofthe armored divisions was as follows:
1st Inactivated April 26, 1946 Camp Kilmer, New Jersey.
Reactivated March 7 1951 at Fort Hood, Texas.
nd Ha ined active in e July 15, 1940.
3rd Inact vated November 9 1945 in Germany.
Reactiva ted July 15, 1947 at FortKnox, Ke ucky s a training division and on March 15 1955 as co ba division.
4t Inactivated March 194 in Germany.
Reactiv.ated June 15 1954at Fort Hood, Texas. 5th Inactivated October 11, 1945 Camp Kilmer,
Ne Jersey.
Rea ctivated July 1948 at Camp Chaffee, Arkansas.
In ctivated February 1950 Camp Chaffee Reactivated September 1950 at Camp Chaffee.
Inactivat March 16, 1956 at Camp ffee.
6t Inactivat September 18, 1945 at Camp Shanks,
Ne York.
Reactivated September 5 1950 at or Leonard
Wood Missouri.
Wood Missouri.