Sample selection

This study examines institutional change in savings groups that were formed and trained by CARE’s COSALO project in Nyanza province in Western Kenya between January 2009 and July 2011. The COSALO project operated in three districts: Vihiga, Rachuonyo and Nyamira. Two of the locations were selected for the study, namely Rachuonyo and Nyamira. These two districts neighbour each other and are home to different ethnic groups: Rachuonyo is in the Luo-speaking part of Nyanza, while Nyamira is from the Kisii-Luo-speaking part. So by selecting them this made it possible to study groups operating in different socio-cultural contexts and offering scope for their comparative analysis while keeping the logistics of the study feasible. .

Initially, the aim was also to study groups that were formed at different times and in different ways. First were ‘old’ groups who had been trained at the beginning of the project and hence were at least a year old at the beginning of this study so that by April 2011 they were supposed to be operating autonomously. Second, the idea was to observe the training of some ‘new‘

groups and to follow them through in order to be able to observe whether and how the adoption of the rules drifted over time in comparison to the older groups. However in practice we were not actually able to observe the training process for logistical reasons so had to use qualitative interviews with these new groups to understand what had happened in a similar way as the older groups. Moreover, since the analysis revealed little difference in performance between these categories, it does not actually differentiate them in practice.

74 A third category of groups was also anticipated. The project anticipated that groups would spontaneously replicate themselves using the new approach and there was some evidence from a previous study that this was happening.¹⁸ In terms of research, the idea was that if spontaneously replicated groups were found in the study areas, they would have been studied as a means of examining how groups explain rules to each other. If the replicated groups were found to follow similar rules as the groups that were trained by ‘professional’ trainers during the project, and if it is possible to find out how the ‘indigenous’ trainers argue for rule/norm changes, then this research project would have been in a position to assess more deeply how the local institutions (rules and norms) had in fact changed. However, despite the apparent evidence of their existence we were not in fact able to identify these groups in the field.

In order to select groups for the study, CARE was asked to draw up a list of what it thought were its best trainers. It may appear odd to ask for the trainers they thought were the best.

However, this was to seek to ensure that the groups had the best opportunity to understand and implement the new rules, rather than to find that the rules had not been implemented because the training had not been done well. By selecting the trainers that the implementer itself thought were most successful, the aim was to mitigate this problem of variability in training quality. The idea was then to randomly select from the shortlisted ‘best’ trainers, a few whose groups could be studied.

As discussed in chapter 1, in terms of training in COSALO project CARE used three different approaches to organising the training, what it calls delivery channels: first, trainers who were directly employed and managed by CARE; second, trainers managed by faith-based organisations, i.e. churches or FBOs; third, it wanted to test out a private sector approach in which trainers were managed by private businesses (franchisees). In total CARE had trained 50 trainers across these three delivery channels

However, instead of shortlisting the ‘best’ trainers as we requested, CARE had asked its different regional offices to provide not a selection of good trainers but the ‘best’ trainer under FBO and franchisee category in each region. Also the trainers selected by CARE regional offices had already been informed that they had been selected for the study and a time arranged when the research team would meet the four best trainers, two from each area. CARE had selected these trainers as their best based on its understanding of their groups overall performance in rule following and the financial performance (judged on return on savings) these trainers produced. I decided to proceed with their suggestions anticipating that there was still likely to

18 Results of a study of post-project replication of group in COSALO. FSD Updates No 7 March 2012.

75 be adequate variation in their results to be of interest, and as the subsequent chapters will show, there was indeed more than sufficient variation among the performance of these groups to form the basis of the research.

Initially the intention was also to select only trainers from the FBO and franchisee delivery channels in order to have comparison, and to exclude those directly implemented by CARE. This was because the intervention was also seeking to lower the cost of delivery by implementing through these channels as CARE’s own costs tended to be higher. The project sponsor, FSD Kenya was therefore concerned to find ways to scale up the intervention by lowering training costs. However, having selected two districts, in the first field visit it was found that there were no franchisee trainers in Rachuonyo District, only FBO trainers and those directly managed by CARE. Hence from Rachuonyo CARE had selected two trainers that were under the local church (FBO). Since we also found that these FBO trainers were still visiting some of the groups after they had - in theory – finished the training, we then decided to drop one of these and substitute groups that had been trained directly by CARE as in this case the trainer (regarded as a good one) was no longer present and this therefore offered some comparison which matched the original intention of the methodology.

Each trainer was then asked to list all the groups that they had trained and that had completed at least one share-out and rank them into good, medium and poorly performing groups. Then one group from each category was randomly selected. CARE officials in Rachuonyo assisted in ranking the groups of the trainer that had left. This ranking was based on the Return on Savings at the time of share-out.

As table 3.1 indicates, the total sample consisted of 24 groups: half of the groups, 12 groups, were from Nyamira, six groups that had been in existence for at least one year and another six that were formed in April 2011 when the research project started.¹⁹ Likewise, there were 12

19 The complexity of new group formation processes was interestingly revealed more fully during our last visit. We then found out that only the FBO channel in Rachuonyo had actually recruited three entirely new groups. The franchisee in Nyamira used existing groups and in two cases asked members from existing groups to form a new group and in the third case presented an existing group as a new group.

The FBO channel in Nyamira had recruited two new groups, but the third one was an existing group that had been formed in February 2011. According to CARE rules trainers were not supposed to form groups with members that were already in other Savings Groups – so this was in itself a breach of the rules but goes to demonstrate how incentives affect the way rules are actually implemented. Within the Franchisee channel all the members of two new groups were already in other CARE groups. However, while filling the CARE application form for the new groups, the trainer noted that no one belonged to other COSALO groups. The benefit of presenting an already existing group as new group enabled the delivery channel and the trainer to receive the payment for forming a group twice. The fact that several of the ‘new’ groups were actually ‘old’ groups was another reason why the old and new groups were in the end analysed as one category.

76 groups from Rachuonyo, nine groups that were at least one year old in April 2011 (and more than two years old in May 2012) and three ‘new’, that were formed in April 2011.

The sample consisted of 24 groups but the exact total number of group members varied over the period of research. At any one time there were around 690-695 members in the groups.

However, since members left groups and new members joined, the research collected financial data about 1025 individuals who had been group members in these 24 groups over a period from April 2011 until May 2012. This in itself suggests a high level of turnover of membership.

Socio-economic data was collected from 630 individuals that were members of the groups in April 2011 and that attended the group meeting in April 2011. During April 2012 socio-economic data was collected from two groups from which data had not been collected in 2011.

Table 3.1. Overview of final sample

Nyamira Rachuonyo Total

Number of groups 12 12 24

Number of trainers 2 2 4

Groups by delivery channels

1. CARE direct 0 6 6

2. Faith Based Organisation 6 6 12

3. Franchisee 6 0 6

Groups > 2 years old 6 9 15

Groups 1 year old* 6 3 9

Financial data on group members (from records) 507 518 1025 Socio-economic data on group members(respondents) 370 260 630

*In April-May 2012