Schiller develops this point further in Letter XIII.

27 Fichte’s work on aesthetics was more or less confined to the essays based on his course o f popular lectures in Jena, already referred to, ie. ‘On the Spirit and the Letter in Philosophy’ and ‘Lectures concerning the Scholar’s Vocation’.

28 J.C Fichte, ‘Letter to Schiller, 27.06.1795’, in (ed.) Daniel Breazeale, Fichte: Early Philsophical Writings, N ew York: Cornell, University Press, 1988, p.393.

In this letter Fichte expressed his dismay that Schiller could not understand why he had apparently blurred the distinction between the philosophical spirit and the aesthetic spirit, and had rejected his article for the Horen. Fichte later made his belief, which Schiller found so objectionable, that the work o f scholar and artist can be equivalent, completely explicit. See his essay:

‘On the Nature o f the Scholar, and his manifestations in the sphere o f freedom, 1805’, in (ed.) (tr.) David Simpson, German aesthetic and literary criticism: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.99.

SECTION 1: Friedrich Schiller Chapter 3

Schiller’s human subject is not constituted solely by the operation of the drives. Somewhat belatedly, he tells us that the drives are present in the subject, because the human being has a two-fold nature.29 The drives are 'active in him'.30 What does this mean? We seem to have returned to the world of Kant’s transcendental ego. He states, firstly, that the drives are part of a finite mind, which is, in itself, neither matter nor form. This we can presumably amplify as Person operating within condition. But does this mean that separate drives operate within the unity of themselves? This is just about possible, but somewhat paradoxical. Secondly,

Each of these two primary drives... strives inevitably and according to its nature towards satisfaction; but just because both are necessary, and yet strive towards opposite ends, these two compulsions cancel each other out, and the will maintains a perfect freedom between them. It is, then, the will which acts as a power (power being the ground of all reality) vis-a-vis both drives... but neither of these can act as a power against the other.

In terms o f the bi-fold structure that Schiller has already described, this seems to place the will in a rather ambiguous position. It is presented in this quotation as an

independent entity, possibly occupying the middle ground which we shall later see him identify with the play drive.33 Yet, also, being familiar with Kant, we associate the will with the operation of the practical reason; and, as we have stated, Schiller has placed the mental operations that are equivalent to the practical reason quite definitely

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in the form drive, which covers our ability to think and decide morally. This suggestion seems to be confirmed further, in that it seems reasonable for the will to

29 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: in a series o f letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XI; § 1.

30 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: in a series o f letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XX; § 2. Ill; § 2.

31 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: in a series o f letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIX, §10.

32 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: in a series o f letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIX, §10, p. 135.

SECTION 1: Friedrich Schiller Chapter 3

belong on the side of pure Person, free and undetermined as we would expect it to be. Person, as we have seen, however, belongs with the form drive.

Now, in the quotation given above, Schiller appears to be assigning the will some kind of superior, co-ordinating role. Perhaps Schiller means us to understand that there is some way in which the form drive can assess the extent to which the drives are balanced or unbalanced. Certainly the sense drive, by definition, would be unable to perform this task. Once a person has achieved a point of equilibrium between the drives, perhaps the form drive, or that aspect of it that we call the will, would be conscious of the existence of a point of balance, and could strive to maintain it by seeking out new sensuous experiences, reflecting upon them and analysing them, thus keeping the drives healthy and strong. However, we have also been told that the drives compete, and Schiller is scathing about those people who are dominated by an over-developed form drive.34 The form drive clearly cannot be trusted to fulfil an adjudicating role in the mental activities of mankind. Worries such as this, regarding the exact way in which we should be interpreting Schiller’s model have probably

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underlain the doubts expressed by writers, such as Murray and Schaper, about either the coherency of Schiller’s thought, or the extent to which he has understood Kant.

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However, Schiller relied on Reinhold for much of his knowledge of Kant,36 and his comments about the will seem to be compatible with Reinhold’s conception of

34 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: in a series o f letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIII, §5, p.91; XXIV, §§5, 6, p. 177.