2. Topic
2.6. Bottom-up school of thought
The bottom-up school o f thought in contrast to the top-down school of thought starts its implementation methodology from the street-level bureaucrats and the actors which are involved in the actual delivery o f service (Hjem and Hull, 1982; Hjem, 1982; Hjem and Porter, 1985, 1993). Some bottom-up approaches start from local networks who deliver the policy services. This network is then used as a platform to identify the local regional and national networks that participate in the delivery of policy implementation through planning and execution (Lipsky, 1980). This gives the researcher the different levels of policy implementation, starting from the bottom-up (street-level bureaucrats) to the top, the Policy
Makers. This essentially turns the top-down hierarchy upside down (Hjem et al., 1978; Hjem and Porter, 1981; Hjem and Hull, 1985).
The bottom-up school of thought views policy implementation as a decentralized process. This school o f thought believes the input from the street-level bureaucrats and their agency(ies) have a greater input in the implementation of policy due to the amount of discretion they are afforded in carrying out their assigned roles (Hjem and Porter, 1981;
Lipsky, 1980; Long and Franklin, 2004). Lipsky argues that the street-level bureaucrats have to show a measure of discretion within their roles in order to implement public policies. The street-level bureaucrats have to administer the policy on case by case bases as End User needs varies within their interpretation of the policy being administered. They need to be able to administer the policies in some cases with insufficient resources and guidance from Policy Makers or even with the existence of a conflicting policy (Lipsky, 1980; Taylor and Kelly, 2006).
Policy implementation is argued by proponents of the bottom-up school of thought occurs at the macro implementation with the Policy Makers and the micro implementation level with the street-level bureaucrats (Matland, 1995). Due to this factor, there is little opportunity for policy implementation to be standardized across the board (Matland, 1995;
Winter, 2006). The environmental factors can have a dominant effect on the policy, allowing for Policy Makers to have very little control over the implementation of the policy. It is hypothesized by the bottom-uppers that if the street-level bureaucrats are not given enough discretion to adapt the policy to prevailing conditions on the ground, the policy is likely to fall short of policy expectations (Matland, 1995; Palumbo, Maynard-Moody and Wright, 1984). It is further argued that what drives the actors which include goals, strategies and
actors must be understood for implementation to have a chance o f succeeding (Matland, 1995). The mitigating factors in the actions o f street-level bureaucrats must be understood to predict the policies outcome (Weatherly and Lipsky, 1977). Hjem (1982) argues that the policies created by the Policy Makers rarely meet local demands. He argues that for implementation to have even a semblance of policy objectives, it must be adapted by the street-level to meet local needs (Hjem, 1982).
The bottom-up perspective, then moves on to evaluate the coping methods developed by the street-level bureaucrats in the execution o f the roles. The bottom-up school of thought argues that the street-level bureaucrats have to develop means of coping with their work in order to deliver their service and achieve stated policy objectives (Taylor and Kelly, 2006;
Lipsky, 1980). This perspective allows for the evaluation of the difficulties encountered by the street-level bureaucrats. It also expands on the importance of the street-level bureaucrats within the environment which they are being implemented (Hanf, 1982). Winter (2002), regards the street-level bureaucrats as the most important actors within the policy process, going as far as to say that policies are just paper without the street-level bureaucrats to implement them (Winter, 2002). The discretion afforded to the street-level bureaucrats dictates how they perform their role. The End Users targeted by policy seldom read or (in some instances) have access to the policies implemented and usually leam all they know about the policy from the street-level bureaucrats (Winter, 2002; Lipsky, 1980).
Three crucial elements of discretion have been identified by the bottom-uppers;
1) Rule discretion: This discretion has boundaries within statue, resource or institutional constraints. These rules give the street-level bureaucrat a clear focus on what is
required from the Policy Makers either in statute or rules and regulations. The amount of rules available within the policy being implemented will dictate the amount of discretion available to the street-level bureaucrats. The method of testing and interpreting of the rules however by the street-level bureaucrats will also influence the amount o f discretion available to them (Taylor and Kelly, 2006).
2) Value discretion: This is usually determined by the individual street-level bureaucrats’
idea of equity, fairness and justice. These notions can be constrained by with professional or organisational code of ethics such as those affected by doctors (Hippocratic Oath). Discretion is left to the professional as they are generally expected to make value judgements based on their training knowledge and experience within their professions (Lipsky, 1980).
3) Task discretion: This is usually prescribed by the organization in regards to individual client cases. This type of discretion has a higher level of managerial monitoring especially when there are strict targets to be met by the street-level bureaucrats.
However, the street-level bureaucrats can still operate with some level of discretion in order to accomplish their tasks (Lipsky, 1980).
Lipsky (1980) identifies three key issues which allow the street-level bureaucrats discretion within their roles.
1) Understanding client needs and using their discretion within available policy to meet those needs.
2) Increase in managerial approach due to service decentralization.
3) Self monitoring professionals who may work in isolation from others. The motivation o f the professionals which could be self serving i.e. professional advancement. This encourages the street-level bureaucrats to use their discretion to interpret the policy to suit their needs.
There is a need however, to mitigate the amount of discretion afforded to street-level bureaucrats and make them more accountable for their actions (Taylor and Kelly, 2006;
Winter, 2006).
2.7. Bottom-up critiques
A major criticism of the bottom-up school of thought is that there is little accountability. Especially within democratic systems where sovereigns are accountable to the voters. It is argued that allowing control over implementation to reside with the street-level bureaucrats, then control is taken away from the voting electorate who would hold (all things being equal) the elected representative to account over implementation decisions. This control is severely limited if implementation resides with the street-level bureaucrats (Matland, 1995; Sabatier, 1986). As most street-level bureaucrats are public servants and not elected officials, and some have the option of discretion when interacting with clients, a measure o f control is required to keep the street-level bureaucrats within the boundaries of their mandate (Linder and Peters, 1987).
The street-level bureaucrats should be allowed greater discretion in situations where their goals and objectives are the sarnie as or in-line with those put forward by the Policy Makers. When the goals and objectives of the Policy Makers are not in sync, reduced flexibility should be given to the street-level bureaucrats as the differences in goals and objectives could lead to a poorer performance o f the policy than intended by the Policy Makers (March and Simon, 1958; Maitland, 1995). This is because the street-level bureaucrats if given too much discretion could address their own goals and agendas at the expense of policy goals and objectives (Matland, 1995; Kendal, 2006).
The second critique of the bottom-up school of thought is the amount of weight given to the amount of local independence the street-level bureaucrats have. A heavy reliance in some studies is given to the perceptions of the street-level bureaucrats; with little emphasis on external factors not registered by the street-level bureaucrats as these are not factored into their arguments (Sabatier, 1986; Matland, 1995). Policy Makers rarely intervene in specific cases; they can structure the goals and objectives of the policy to cover the general needs of the target population (Matland, 1995; Sabatier, 1996). Sabatier, (1986) argues that the structure given to the policy allows gives the End Users the ability to challenge (or not) policies which affect them.
A third critique of the bottom-up perspective is that some authors exclude policy goals and objectives as a valid evaluation measure (Winter, 2003). The analysis o f these authors such as Elmore (1982) departs from the overall problem that policy was created to intervene such as youth unemployment and focuses more on the tasks of the street-level bureaucrat such as getting specific youths into work (Winter, 2003; 2006). The methodology employed by the bottom-up school o f thought can be quite cumbersome and confusing as
some authors attempt to map all the actors which may have cause to interact with the street- level bureaucrats involved in the implementation of a specific policy. For instance, in the study of youth unemployment, examining schools and training facilities, business which offer internships, social organizations in charge of children, ethnic minority organizations (Hjem and Hull, 1982). The analysis can become quite cumbersome as the author attempts to cross organizational borders in an attempt to create a more holistic view of the study (Winter 2003).
Fourthly, bottom-uppers assume that the street-level bureaucrats have the ability to always frustrate the Policy Makers (Sabatier, 1986). They are quick to judge only the centres direct influence over the street-level bureaucrats with little regard for the centres indirect influence over the institutions o f the street-level bureaucrats (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982). For instance, Policy Makers or the centre usually control resource allocations to the bottom (street-level bureaucrats and their institutions) and this can be used to frustrate the bottom into towing centre lines (Sabatier, 1986; Bardach, 1977).
Top-down proponents, generally criticize the ability of the street-level bureaucrats to influence the decisions made by Policy Makers. The bottom-up arguments limits the centres ability to influence institutional operations (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982). The bottom-up school of thought neglect how implementing agencies are selected and how resources which are used in the implementation process are allocated (Sabatier, 1986). This it is argued, gives the Policy Makers more control over the street-level bureaucrats than the bottom-up school of thought allow within their arguments (Sabatier, 1986; 1993).
The bottom-up school of thought reduces the importance of adequate legislation in the implementation of policy (Sabatier, 1986). While the bottom-up school of thought put forward that legislation can be used by the street-level bureaucrats to implement policy, they do not query how or why the legislation was created (Sabatier, 1993; Bardach, 1977).
The bottom-up school of thought usually fail to give a holistic view of the entire policy process as they mainly focus on the results of certain street-level bureaucrats and their networks. This limits it application with policies which are instigated at the centre and cover more than one area of jurisdiction or local area (Caimey, 2009).
Finally, some bottom-up theories commences from the actions and the insights of the street-level bureaucrats, there is a very strong possibility that the factors which affect the conduct will be missed by the bottom-up school of thought. The ability to identify participant networks within the policy needs to be linked to the causal theory surrounding the policy and the actions of the street-level bureaucrats (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Sabatier, 1986).