Second period

This state of affairs abruptly changed somewhat after the Life and Coexistence Strategy announcement of the executive power, proposing a cannabis state monopoly (Jun 2012 Feb 2013). In this period, two key events were the creation of a National Coordination for Marihuana Legalisation,

in July 2012, and the formation of a top- A

G

The National Coordination for Marihuana Leg

of the coalition composed by Proderechos, AECU and Cannabis Liberalisation. Compared to the previous diagram (Figure 10), a finding worth highlighting is that after M proposal and with the topic in the media hotspot, the reformers coalition widened its network significantly. More specifically, three new types of actors can be observed: first, within the context of the generational gap of positions towards cannabis, the issue finally broke through the political system, boosted by youth

“

strongly based in the capital city Montevideo, an incipient movement could now be observed elsewhere in the country, as organisations not based in Montevideo joined the hard core activism, helping to spread support towards cannabis regulation throughout the territory. Thirdly, for the first time other relevant social actors not necessarily identified as drug policy reform activists got involved, such as the National Workers Union (PIT-CNT), and Ovejas Negras, the most important LGBT activist group in the country. From The National Coordination for Marihuana Legalisation, civil society orchestrated lobbying and mobilisation efforts aimed at keeping cannabis regulation on the political agenda, holding weekly meetings throughout the period analysed. Since they shared participation in these meetings, a link connects each actor with the other. This is understood as an indicator of a network of actors coordinating actions over time. The actors involved in the National Coordination for Marihuana Legalisation meetings appear in green, on the left of the second diagram (Figure 11).

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G N D C M

Frente Amplio members, scholars, and representatives of civil society. This group had as their main objective the outlining of a blueprint for a legal cannabis regulation framework, holding weekly

meetings throughout the period analysed. On top of WOLA and TNI, already present in the first period, I found a number of international actors progressively being incorporated into the domestic debate

M T

Manuel Guzman, and the drug policy think tanks DPA and Transform. Thus, on the right side of the second diagram, the actors that appear linked together with each other were all members of the

N D C A G

Figure 11. Network analysis second period (Jun 2012 Feb 2013)

REFERENCES

National civil society Legislative power Executive power International civil society Political parties

Proderechos and AECU were the only two social organisations found participating in both groups the bottom up Cannabis Regulation National Coordination and the top down advisory group. Therefore, they appear as nodes in the middle of the picture, connecting the system. As the diagram shows, they had an important brokerage role within the advocacy coalition, linking two political spaces otherwise disconnected. Furthermore, they guaranteed bridges for resources and information flow within the

irruption (see chapter 7) within acceptable limits, for the coalition not to fragment. As explained by a member of the main cannabis growers association (AECU):

W

which explains why we are not going to support the proposal openly, we will not publicly declare to be against it either, and become an obstacle. Our position is to try to change some

of the content in direct conversations with the ones involved and not through the mass media. Perhaps what horrifies us the most is the total improvisation over which some decisions are being made, an improvisation too close to irresponsibility N C “

(id23), personal communication).

Thus, when comparing the first with the second period diagram, a finding worth highlighting is that, confronted with the communicational turmoil opened by the executive irruption (see chapter 7) cannabis activism was far away from remaining apathetic. In fact, activist groups multiplied their coordination efforts. The lobbying and mobilisation labour of civil society was an important factor in keeping the topic on the agenda. After the involvement in the debate, activists redouble their efforts to keep the political momentum going on a track full of potholes. As explained by members of cannabis activism groups interviewed in formal and informal talks, lobbying activities were arranged to explain and disseminate the idea of cannabis regulation amongst MPs and Senators. Paid and unpaid public campaigns were set up, targeting both the general public and the people already sympathetic to the cause, to balance the controversial Executive Power supply side definition of the problem, reassuring that cannabis users and cultivation for personal use remained at centre stage. Lastly, working very closely with mainstream mass media a mass media perceived by the actors involved as the main opposition to the reform allowed actors to inject a wide range of inputs and to establish customized relations with journalists covering the topic, offering alternative views and framings to present the law proposal. Thus, as proposed by Multiple Streams Theory, civil society entrepreneurs were like surfers, ready to paddle for riding the Executive Power wave, using forces beyond their control to push cannabis reform forward (Kingdon, 1995).

To complement this, the establishment of the advisory group had the virtue of focusing lobbying and mobilisation efforts more efficiently behind a single proposal, easing coordination problems. Gathering different interests pushing for cannabis regulation around the same table allowed these actors to resolve policy design clashes before, rather than after, the parliamentary process. As shown in interviews with Latin American activists and politicians, in most countries of the continent where several law proposals to regulate cannabis were presented at the same time in parliament, there was nowhere near the same level of coordination between actors. However, as refle

representative of the Public Health Ministry, and only Frente Amplio representatives appear as members of the reformers coalition, is additional evidence of the difficulties for the National Drugs Committee and civil society to diffuse the commitment towards cannabis regulation across the state.

Proderechos N D C A

G e task of setting the blueprint for cannabis regulation; my colleagues elected Martín Collazo and myself as the representatives for this space. Thus, we could observe first-hand not only the significant lack of information about the topic, but actually the strong difficulties for the National Drugs Committee Secretary to summon people from key Ministries as Education, Public Health, Interior or Social Development to partake to the implementation. This level of apathy is meaningful, and even more so if one takes into account that representatives of these Ministries along with six others -, were theoretically obliged to assist the National Drugs Committee as formal permanent members11.

11 _{Formal permanent members of the National Drugs Committee: representatives of the national secretary}

In fact, in order to confront this lack of interest within the different ministries, the definition of governmental brokers and entrepreneurs within the Reformers advocacy coalition was of key

A -down stream

to regulate cannabis began to be led by members of the National Drugs Committee and Frente Amplio legislative members. More specifically, the lawyer and president of the National Drugs Committee, Diego Cánepa, was appointed to cover international press and relations; the sociologist and National Drugs Committee´s general secretary Julio Calzada was appointed as the main public entrepreneur at national level; and Augusto Vitale, psychologist, was the inside man brokering among all political actors working on the topic. From then on, these three actors became key pieces of the cannabis reform architecture. Once the call to regulate cannabis was made by Mujica, these members of the National Drugs Committee showed remarkably high levels of personal and professional commitment to the reform proposal. In an informal interview with a criminologist researching the topic, he suggested that these political decisions were also reflected in his mass media analysis:

I wanted to see who in the executive power was leading the cannabis regulation initiative, because for me it was not clear at all. The results of the mass media analysis do show a clear evolution: President Mujica is the first that starts speaking about this and he remains active throughout the period. The first minister that defended it was the Minister of Interior, Bonomi, but later on his appearances talking about the topic diminish and the protagonist roles within the executive power started to be taken by more technical profiles: Diego Cánepa and Julio Calzada (Scholar, personal communication, 15/09/2014)

The definition of governmental brokers and entrepreneurs was important for increasing the degree of framing cohesion. Additionally, it reflects how the debate polarised, and along with the Executive Power entrepreneurs nucleated in the National Drugs Committee, more Frente Amplio legislative entrepreneurs were involved as well: including not only Sebastian Sabini but also Julio Bango; a representative of the second most numerous group within the Frente Amplio The Socialist Party-.