Section 4: Small-state utilization of soft power in track-one diplomatic

Before commencing discussions in this section, it is important to provide a working definition of what is referred to as power, from both a ‘soft-power’ lens and a ‘hard- power lens’. In his seminal work on the ‘Concept of Power in the study of

International Relations’, Holsti (1964: 179-194) argued that “students of international

politics have for years posited that the concept of power can be used as a fruitful approach in studying processes in international systems – unfortunately, there has

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The concept of soft power and its operationalization is well expounded by Nye (2001).

been little systematic examination of the concept, so that, like the balance of power, its meaning has remained ambiguous” (Holsti 1964: 179).

Goldstein (2006: 57-58) suggests that power is often described as the ability to get another actor to do what it would not otherwise have done (or not to do what it would otherwise have done). A variation of this idea is that actors are powerful to the extent that they can affect others more than others can affect them. These definitions treat power as influence. If others get their way a lot, they must be powerful. One problem with this definition is that we seldom know what a second actor would have done in the absence of the first actor’s power.

There is a danger here of circular logic: power explains influence and influence measures power. Thus, it is hard to use power to explain why international events occur (the aim of realism). A related problem is that common usage treats power as a thing rather than a process: States “have” power. These problems could be resolved if one were to view power as not influence in itself, but the ability or potential to influence others. Such potential is based on specific (tangible and intangible) characteristics or the possessions of States – such as their size, level of income, armed force, and so forth. This is power as capability. Capabilities are easier to measure than influence; and they are less circular in logic (Goldstein 2006: 57).

The above lenses of power open up the debate in considering manifestations of the same in the ‘soft-power and hard-power’ contexts. Joseph Nye (2001:353) defines ‘soft power’ as the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction, rather than by coercion, because others want what you want. Soft power works by convincing others to follow you, or getting them to agree to norms and institutions that produce the desired behaviour. Soft power can rest on the appeal of one’s ideas, or culture, or the ability to set the agenda in ways that could shape the preference of others (Nye 2001:354).

Nye further asserts that soft power and States, using this kind of capability, need to be legitimised by the conflicting parties within intermediary engagements. Legitimacy is, therefore, a soft-power reality. This soft-power ability has been shown by Kenya, for example, in past initiatives, most recently within the Somali peace process and the

Sudan peace process; and in the past, in its soft-power capabilities in its foreign policy and practice, it has seen a deliverance of peace in Uganda in the Nairobi peace process.

‘Hard power’ can be defined as the ability of an entity to do what it otherwise would not do, through threat of punishment or promise of reward. Whether by economic carrots or military sticks, the ability to coax or coerce has long been the central element of hard power (Haass 1998:2–4). Hard power is observed in the military activities that were characteristic of both the US-led UNITAF, and also in the later UNOSOM.

With the above definitions of power is the consideration of ‘soft power’ by track-one entities as utilized towards managing conflicts of the third kind. These are the soft- power intermediary approaches in peace diplomacy, and are generally utilized by small States. The importance of intermediary approaches that cater for a wider variety of other opinion holders and with a soft power orientation in a mediation process is emphasised by Mwagiru (2000b: 123). This author provides the link between track- one diplomacy and track-two diplomacy. He asserts that in the field of conflict management, track-one and track-two diplomacy intermediaries are concerned with the same ultimate outcome – a sustained, successful peace process. The difference between them lies in the procedures they adopt, the different philosophies underlying those procedures, and the processes adopted in their approaches to conflict management (Mwagiru 2000b : 123).

Mwagiru’s analogy reflects the mediation options and strategies that States with limited power capabilities adopt. States whose foreign policy emphasises the diplomacy of conflict management have to contend with the important link between the strengths of track-one and track-two co-operation. These States’ track-one diplomatic initiatives have to adopt co-operative approaches that recognise this strength.

This intermediary strategy has been adopted by small States, with the utilisation of soft-power capabilities that focus on the diplomacy of conflict management. Their foreign policies have adopted these strategies to help them navigate the complex

environment of the diplomacy of conflict management. These strategies also provide the necessary environment for third parties to take into account the strengths and opportunities displayed by other actors in a conflict situation. Actors better understood as social-cultural resources of conflict and conflict management are provided opportunities to be involved in mediation and conflict management exercises in such soft-power relationships.

Therefore, a track-one actor’s influence and success in a conflict-management process is improved and facilitated by approaches and strategies that recognise these important players in a process. As Lederach asserts, these form an important component in complementing official diplomatic processes (Lederach 1999: 3).

To provide a good basis for this point, one could consider Samuel Huntington’s contention about soft power, hard power and their roles in managing conflicts. Samuel Huntington asserts that soft power is power only when it rests on a foundation of hard power (Huntington 1996:92). One could, however, discount his claims and the assumption that soft-power-mediated processes should be nourished on hard power. Different systemic situations and scenarios could support this. As a good example, the soft power of the Vatican did not wane as the size of the Papal States diminished, as explained by Araujo and Lucal (2004:17–57).24 Another example is that of Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands, which champion popular social issues; they tend to have more influence than some other States with more powerful economic or military capabilities.

Slim (1992:206–231) was one of the few people to acknowledge that other small States, like Algeria, acted within a track-one diplomatic mode as enablers of effective mediation. Algeria successfully mediated the Iran hostage crisis.

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The two authors whose abbreviation S.J. (Society of Jesus) connotes they are Jesuit priests have given a chronology in their Vatican diplomacy and their early diplomacy treatise of the Holy See’s diplomatic engagement in international affairs, and essentially so within a changing phase of the international system. They have also served in the Vatican Diplomatic Service, and so have experience of both the world of diplomacy and priesthood. In their chapter, ‘The Holy See and the ages of Christendom, absolutism, and the nation State’, they assert that by the end of the 19th century, the security of the Papacy and its temporal possessions were at risk. Still, the Holy See with its soft-power capability continued to play important, but altered roles, in the world of flux. Its status as an international player, whose goal of peace, remained largely intact was evidenced by its activities in international diplomatic exchange, arbitration and continuing contributions to the development of legal concepts.

Mwagiru echoes Slim’s perceptions of the role of small States in mediation, and their successful utilisation of soft-power capability. Mwagiru describes an acknowledged situation in the Kenyan foreign policy establishment, where its mandarins came to realise that there was a need to re-conceptualise the country’s diplomacy, as well as its foreign policy. The automatic alternative to other foreign policy modes was the soft-power exposition of the diplomacy of conflict management.

In the world of international relations, soft power, as utilised by Kenya in the Sudan, Uganda and other conflicts, accentuates the notion that this is the appropriate role that small and poor States have undertaken as conflict managers at little financial cost to themselves (Mwagiru 2000 (a):179–180). This study, therefore, examines Kenya’s soft-power applications of intermediary roles that have facilitated the mediation processes in Somalia, both currently and in the past. Such intermediary roles seem to be more relevant in managing conflicts of a third kind, and in providing some positive inputs into post-conflict reconstruction.

Kamudhayi (2004:107–110) gives an overview of the Somali peace process, and most importantly, the 14th Somali National Reconciliation Conference. He, however, looks at the modus operandi, as perpetuated within the consolidated sub-regional organ of IGAD, under whose auspices it fell. A critical analysis of Kenya’s role as chair of the IGAD Facilitation Committee has not been dealt with, although this is understandable because his analysis is based on the procedural elements of the Somali entities themselves. This study, therefore, seeks to give an overview of Kenya’s enabling role as a mediator and as a consistent member of the IGAD Technical Committee, later renamed the Facilitation Committee, which Kenya continued to chair under its continued mandate of hosting the 14th, and no doubt most important, mediation attempt.

This study provides an analysis of the enabling collaborative efforts by Kenya in its track-one and track-two co-operation initiatives. It also explores the innovative soft- power intermediary role that Kenya consciously or unconsciously applied, and that complemented the role of other entities or actors. It also seeks to explore the correlation between track-one diplomacy in the immediate mediation process, and its

enabling role in peace building and post-conflict reconstruction. This is the enabling role of track-one entities in providing a legitimate environment for development actors, or track-two entities to work towards positive peace and transitional justice in Somalia. This, therefore, emphasises the need to critically and holistically examine development-oriented initiatives as components of peace building.