Security concerns

Associated with the failures just noted, the literature on conflict resolution and humanitarian intervention underscores the importance of security in (post-) conflict settings (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 213). Some scholars advocate physical security as the paramount objective when foreign countries intervene and embark on peace-, state- and/or nation building campaigns (Etzioni, 2007: 1-2; Kaldor, 2007: 191-197; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 213). Contrariwise, other scholars question the theoretical and practical value of prioritizing security for reasons including the challenge of providing security and the associated risks of social-political manipulation of (human) security by intervening referents (defined here as individuals, groups, societies or countries) (Calhoun, 2005: 108; Kienscherf, 2011: 530-531; Rathmell, 2005: 1015-1016). Within this frame, the United States military and governing authorities (rhetorically) placed a high priority on establishing security in Iraq (Ucko, 2008: 357). However, as denoted in the previous chapter, the U.S. experienced acute challenges providing security, for a variety of reasons including the complex nature of the conflict environment and the lack of planning or resources (Hashim, 2006: 339; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 167).

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The theoretical and practical value of human security is relevant to the case of Iraq, and before examining Iraqi public opinion on the issue, we momentarily introduce the concept of human security, its history and a critique. “Human security is commonly understood as prioritising the security of people, especially their welfare, safety and well-being, rather than that of states” (Duffield, 2006: 11). While most scholars adhere to a similar conceptualization as provided in the quote (Duffield, 2006: 21; Hudson, 2005: 163; McCormack, 2008: 115;

Newman, 2001: 239), there is no consensual definition of the concept or practice (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 126). Further complicating the matter, a range of issues falls under the rubric of human security (Duffield, 2006: 23-24; King and Murray, 2002: 585-589;

Newman, 2001: 243-247; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 121). Among its many objectives include individual physical security, disease prevention, in addition to the promotion of human rights, democracy and access to education (Duffield, 2006: 23-24; King and Murray, 2002: 585-589; Newman, 2001: 243-247). By addressing these multifarious issues, intervention is estimated to protect and improve the quality of human life. Moreover, the proliferation of human security is thought to generate a spillover effect, because fulfillment of human needs reduces local frustration and violence, which in turn augments local, regional and international security (Duffield, 2006: 12; Newman, 2001: 241).

According to this conceptualization, human security is a public good.

With a basic understanding of how human security is conceptualized, it is equally edifying to examine how the international political environment has aided in the development of the concept and practice. The human security movement debuted in the mid-1990s (Duffield, 2006: 21; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 121) in response to political changes brought about by the end of the Cold War (Duffield, 2006: 12; Miklian,2014: 494; Newman, 2001:

241). The 1990s experienced an international re-orientation of attention from the fear of nuclear annihilation toward the provision of public needs (social, economic) of individuals, especially those residing in countries perceived to have weak or ineffective governments (Duffield, 2006: 12; Newman, 2001: 241). Within a few years of its introduction, the concept of human security was widely embraced by many scholars, policymakers, and institutions as a fundamental component of peacebuilding in (post) conflict zones (Duffield, 2006: 12).

In theoretical and practical terms, human security rests upon the premise that: “Those who have the capacity to extend security to people perilously lacking in security have a basic human obligation to do so” (Newman, 2001: 240). The ideology emphasized in Newman’s quote led to the development of an intervention framework outlined by a 2001 report written by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) called The

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Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Duffield, 2006: 25; Miklian,2014:499;Rotmann and others, 2013: 363). In the R2P report, the ICISS theoretically divides the international community into a dichotomy of countries that effectively provide human security to their populace and those which do so ineffectively (Duffield, 2006: 25; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 162;Rotmann and others, 2013:359). In the case of the latter group, R2P envisions external intervention by the former group to manage the assortment of issues, including poor governance, humanitarian catastrophes, disease, or civil instability, through strategies including the dispatching of aid or peacekeepers (Duffield, 2006: 25; Liotta, 2002: 483; Miklian,2014: 494-499;Rotmann and others, 2013:359).

Therefore, under the R2P framework, national sovereignty is privileged on the condition that countries uphold their responsibility to secure their inhabitants (McCormack, 2008: 122-123; Miklian, 2014: 499; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 127; Rotmann and others, 2013: 363-364). If a country is deemed in non-compliance, R2P declares the international community has a responsibility to respond to provide human security, and that the breadth of responsibility might require preemptive action in certain cases to protect human life (McCormack, 2008: 122-123; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 127; Rotmann and others, 2013:363-364). Unsurprising, the conceptualized framework generates a great deal of criticism at multiple levels since, among other reasons, the prospect of intervention is subject to exploitation by (stronger) countries which might intervene in another country’s sovereign affairs for selfish purposes while falsely claiming to be doing so to advance human security (Miklian, 2014: 499-502; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 127). Although there are many critiques, which we examine below, the framework remains operational in theory despite international disagreement over many of its concepts and practices, and few direct instances of its actual deployment (Rotmann and others, 2013:366).

In the post-9/11 environment, human security theory underwent another change. Duffield (2006: 26-27) argues that the objective of human security expanded to include “securing failed and fragile states” which were identified as threatening to international stability or potential safe havens to individuals involved in international terrorism. At the same time that weak and failing states were prioritized, interest also shifted to homeland and border security (Duffield, 2006: 32-33; Hudson, 2005: 155; Liotta, 2002: 473; McCormack, 2008: 120). In fact, many of the undercurrents in human security theory, both in terms of fragile states and homeland security, are observable in the National Security Strategy (Duffield, 2006: 26-27) and rhetoric of George W. Bush during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, as Liotta (2002: 483) cautions: “military security, most especially intervention, can – and

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often does – aggravate human security issues and can be more the cause of rather than the solution to human security dilemmas.” Liotta’s warning came to fruition in Iraq following the 2003 invasion, creating insecurity rather than security. For this reason, and others, some scholars adamantly criticize human security.

There are numerous and scathing criticisms of the human security articulated in the literature. For the sake of space, four are briefly noted. First, the concept and practice has

“universalizing tendencies” because it presupposes that individuals and groups are homogenized and have the same needs across countries and cultures (Chandler, 2008: 429;

Hudson, 2005: 157). Despite its alleged universal applicability, human security research and policy in practical terms have been predominantly concentrated in non-Western countries, partially because of the interconnection of security with economic and social development (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 123). Hence, its universal applicability in theory has been reduced to research and implementation in mainly economically less-developed regions, such as Africa or Latin America. One exception is the contemporary emphasis on homeland security into human security discourse that incorporates Western countries.

A second criticism is that implementation of human security policy requires capable and willful actors (institutions, countries, NGOs) that will responsibly realize policy (Hudson, 2005: 165). The arrangement predisposes that the more powerful countries and actors in the international community are the primary instruments for ensuring human security is provided, which elevates their authority and status vis-à-vis their weaker neighbors (Hudson, 2005:

165). Simultaneously, the theory equally assumes that actors are responsible and will respond when necessary. Yet, there are not always responsible and willful actors, as seen in contemporary Syria where the international community remained relatively aloof from the humanitarian calamity in 2013 and 2014.

Linked to the former, a third criticism of human security is that the arrangement creates a

“binary universalism (‘us versus them’)”, consisting of the developed and under-developed, the powerful and weak (Hudson, 2005: 166). The latter dichotomous arrangement raises two salient sticking points. On the one hand, Duffield (2006: 12) argues a range of problems (mainly present in under-developed countries), which have been identified by the stronger of the binary groups, is perceived as threating (to the developed) and, therefore, requires a response. Hence, the stronger set the agenda and enforce it on the weaker. On the other hand, since the stronger in this binary have the capacity and set the agenda, human security policy is perceived as neo-colonialism, or an alternative tool of exerting dominance over others (Duffield, 2006: 12; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 129). In simple terms, human

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security is a technique, which some countries can exploit to take control/advantage over others through enforcement of external norms and agendas.

The last criticism denoted here is that the arrangement has an integrated double standard that permits stronger countries to hold weaker countries accountable, while the actions of those stronger agents go unchecked (McCormack, 2008: 123). Hence, the countries that intervene to provide human security are not held to account for their actions and may not be accepted by the individuals being assisted. Failures and wrongdoing in these areas simply go unnoticed. McCormack’s criticism certainly applies to U.S. intervention in Iraq, assuming that the provision of human security was a policy driver. To overcome this and other criticisms, Brazil proposed an alternative policy dubbed “responsibility while protecting” which was rejected due to the polarization it created within the United Nations; particularly its emphasis on holding intervening countries to account for their actions (Rotmann and others, 2013: 368-369). To date, the concept and practice of human security remains controversial and inconsistently endorsed and applied by members of the international community (Rotmann and others, 2013).

Returning our attention to Iraqi public opinion of the security situation during the occupation, an examination of multiple surveys illustrates that public opinion concerning the quality of security provided by coalition troops fluctuated. In February 2004, Oxford Research International (2004: 6-7) found that sixty percent of Iraqis believed that security in their neighborhood was “good” or “very good.” Approximately three months later, sixty percent reported security as an urgent concern (Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 3). This trend continued as the security situation deteriorated. In June 2004, twenty-eight percent expressed concern about the possibility of sectarian violence escalating into civil war (Burkholder, 2004b). At approximately the same time, another poll found that sixty-nine percent of Iraqis feared for their individual and familial welfare and safety, especially if they were perceived to be collaborating with the coalition (Burkholder, 2004d). The increase no doubt compromised cooperation with the coalition.

Confidence in coalition forces also fluctuated across time and surveys. Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies (2004: 6-7) found more than three quarters of those polled expressed minimal confidence in the coalition. By November 2005, half of respondents (54.6%) expressed a complete lack of confidence in U.S. and Britain’s security forces (Oxford Research International, 2005: 13). Perito (2005: 7) suggests the lack of confidence is associated with the perception that the U.S. was either unwilling or incapable of providing security. By November 2006, Iraq Centre for Research and Strategic Studies

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(2006: 6-7, 9) found that more than three quarters of respondents felt that the security, political and economic conditions were worse than before the 2003 invasion. As violence continued to escalate, a March 2007 survey qualified that the two greatest concerns expressed by Iraqis were the general lack of security (13%) and terrorism (12%) (ABC News and others, 2008: 17). That same year, ABC News and others (2007: 6-8) qualified a general lack of confidence (82%) in U.S. and British forces. Eight out of ten respondents actually

“disapproved of the way that the United States and coalition forces have carried out their responsibilities in Iraq” (ABC News and others, 2007: 6). Hence, the magnitude of insecurity appears to parallel expressed disgruntlement toward the coalition.

Increased animosity directed at the coalition, and the degree of concern qualified, likewise parallels personal experience during the occupation. ABC News and others (2008: 34-37), for instance, quantifies the breadth of respondent exposure to violence throughout Iraq. At that time, 40% of Iraqis stated they had experienced some type of violence (a car bombing, terrorist attack, kidnapping) near their place of residence (ABC News and others, 2008: 34-37). High incidents of violence coincide with a marginal degree of confidence in coalition security forces. In fact, approximately 33% of Iraqis stated they did “not [have] much confidence” in U.S. military forces while 46% claimed they had “no confidence at all” (ABC News and others, 2008: 26). In short, sixty-one percent of Iraqis perceived the U.S. military presence worsened the security situation rather than improved it (ABC News and others, 2008: 5), sentiment that corresponds with increased incidents of violence.

The intractability and intensity of the conflict in Iraq, the dislike of the occupation, and the weakness of Iraq’s institutions produced a dilemma for Iraqis (Dobbins and others, 2009: 96-97). While many felt that U.S. presence exacerbated the security situation, and the occupation was largely perceived as unwanted, Iraqis simultaneously feared a coalition withdrawal (Dobbins and others, 2009: 96-97). This conundrum was acute since insecurity remained throughout the duration of the U.S. occupation, although incidents of violence began to diminish between 2007 and 2010. Nevertheless, it was not until mid-2010 that over seventy percent of respondents reported that security was improving (International Republican Institute, 2010: 26-27).

In conclusion, Iraqis placed a high priority on security during the occupation. However, they felt that the U.S. military was incapable or unwilling to increase security. The security situation presented a paradox, since Iraqis wanted the unpopular occupation to end, but likewise feared an early withdrawal of U.S. troops would exacerbate the security situation.

The United States continued to be held responsible for the quality and quantity of violence

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experienced in occupied Iraq between 2004 and the military drawdown in 2010 (International Republican Institute, 2010: 16-27).