Security Concerns on Cross-Strait Relations

In this section, I discuss similarity as a major category of national interest, and why similarity brings peace for cross-Strait relations. Realists argue that two types of states in the international system clearly explain states’ basic security concerns. This typology characterizes states as either status quo or revisionist, with these definitions basing their interests on international security and then deriving conflict expectation

from this dichotomy.1 _{I apply realists’ definitions and investigate the results of se-}

curity similarity through the discussion of maintaining the status-quo scenario. As Taiwan transitioned to democracy, advocacy for Taiwan independence became more vocal. Conversely, China views de jure independence for Taiwan as unacceptable, and warns Taiwan repeatedly that a declaration of independence will leave China no choice but to attack Taiwan. China even passed an anti-secession law to show its determination against any move by Taiwan in that direction. Therefore, the evidence above shows that de jure independence may lead to an unavoidable war.

On the island, public opinion on political association between Taiwan and China is much more complicated: some advocate Taiwan independence; some believe that Taiwan and the mainland should be reunified sooner or later; and there are others (often a majority or close to a majority in the polls) who feel that the status quo (or de facto independence) which is neither de jure independence nor unification, may be the best option for Taiwan under the current circumstances.

1_{Morgenthau called them imperialistic and status-quo powers (Morgenthau 1967, 20). Schweller}

(1998) defines national interests by positing several types of states based on the degree to which they desire to change or preserve the status quo and their military capability to do so. Moravcsik (1997) also offers a similar dichotomy on these two types of states, including revisionist or status- quo states. The clear dichotomy can also be seen in realist literature. As Schweller (1998, 20) points out “. . . [Classical] Realists invariably distinguished between two types of states: Morgenthau called them imperialistic and status-quo powers; Kissinger referred to revolutionary and status- quo states; Carr distinguished satisfied from dissatisfied powers; Johannes Mattern, among other geopoliticians, divided the world into ‘have’ and ‘have-nots,’ Wolfers referred to status quo and revisionist states; and Aaron saw eternal opposition between the forces of revision and conservation.” From the definitions above, we are able to discover states’ security interests played an influential role in realists’ literature.

Strictly speaking, both unification and independence represent change from the status quo. However, as far as China is concerned, unification is a desirable goal and it will definitely not take military action against Taiwan if the latter so desires. It is de jure independence that will prompt China to take drastic actions against the island. However, previous Chinese leaders could not adopt any provocative or active movement to reunite Taiwan, since the U.S. still provides security support for Taiwan. Even though the mainland’s policy relative to Taiwan is often viewed as separate from its broader foreign-policy orientation, there is still some evidence showing preferences for restraint and the status quo are beginning to shape cross-Strait relations. Chi- nese leader, Hu Jintao, realized that the chance of unification between China and Taiwan was slim during his term, and he downplayed the traditional strategy toward cross-Strait relations while increasing the maintenance of status quo and economic co- operation with Taiwan. Cross-Strait economic relations have by and large developed on the basis of “economics first, politics later” since May 2008. Hu Jintao’s proposal after the “Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement” (ECFA) is the willingness to sign the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) with Taipei and seek ways to link cross-Strait common development with Asia-Pacific economic

integration.2 _{In general, as long as Taiwan does not force China to use coercive}

power by declaring independence, leaders in Beijing prefer a more peaceful strategy that leaves open the possibility of unification at some indefinite point in the future (Chu 2004). The major security preference for the current cross-Strait relations still stays on the track of status quo.

In order to examine the argument of security similarity on peace, I analyze two major cases. The first case is the 1995-96 Taiwan missile crisis, and the second one is President Ma Ying-jeou’s mainland policy and how he attempts to manipulate

2_{Please see Xinhua News Agency, “Six Proposals Offered for Cross-Strait Rela-}

tions,” China Daily, December 31, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008 −

a more pro-status quo mainland policy. The Taiwan missile crisis offers a negative case showing that opposite interests on security concerns may initiate an imminent militarized dispute, while the second case about Ma’s mainland policy examines the positive effect from security similarity on peace.

The Taiwan missile crisis started with President Lee’s visit to Cornell University in June 1995. China was irritated by the Clinton administration’s decision to grant a visa to Lee as well as Lee’s speech at Cornell. But China was also concerned about the first presidential election in Taiwan, which was scheduled for March of the following year. China was suspicious of Lee’s real intention on the independence-unification issue, and was worried about the prospect of Lee’s reelection.

Under the pressure of hawkish elements in the Chinese party-state, including, in particular, the People’s Liberation Army, Chinese leader Jiang Zemin decided to take tough actions. Thus, in July, China announced that it would test its surface-to- surface missile program, and it indeed fired missiles targeted at an area less than one hundred miles from Taiwan’s coast. In additional, China also amassed large numbers of troops in Fujian province right across the Taiwan Strait from Taiwan. China’s goal was to assert its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to show its determination. The 1995 Taiwan missile crisis clearly informs us once China and Taiwan shift away from a mutual consensus on the maintenance of the status quo, there is a huge probability that both sides may engage in a serious militarized dispute. Both China and Taiwan have clearly recognized this issue, and it is the reason during the presiden- tial election campaign during 2007-2008, the KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou proposed a “modus vivendi” approach to cross-Strait relations. This approach included “mu- tual non-denial” and the “three-no’s,” including no unification, no independence, and no use of force. The “three-no’s” policy could be viewed as the principle choice for maintaining the status quo for both sides because as long as Taiwan does not declare a de jure independence, any use of force by China against Taiwan will be viewed as

unnecessary and unjust. Beijing has already recognized how mutual consensus on the security preferences, and encourages both sides to go back to the normal track of cross-Strait relations. 29 29 30 27 29 29 28 27 27 26 25 24 24 23 23 23 23 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Diplomatic Allies

Figure 5.1: Number of Countries Recognizing ROC

One of the successful achievements from President Ma is his foreign policy on a “diplomatic truce,” which represents a symbol of peaceful development across the Strait. It has been a diplomatic task for the Taiwanese government to expand its in- ternational space, especially in former president Lee Tung-hui and Chen Shui-bians’ eras. During Lee and Chen’s administration, the Taiwanese government used in- creasing the number of diplomatic allies to represent a successful foreign policy (see Figure 5.1). However, after President Ma was elected in 2008, China has become the single most significant factor determining the number of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies.

Several of Taiwan’s allies attempted to establish diplomatic relationship with China since May 2008, yet China refused establishing relations with Taiwan’s allies. In the meantime, Taiwan turned down at least one of China’s diplomatic allies in Africa, which requested to reestablish formal relationship with Taipei.

From the discussion above, we are able to discover an intriguing fact. President Ma’s diplomatic truce has won some positive response from Beijing, and it is clear that the truce also has benefits for China. In Figure 5.1, we can see that before May 2008, China launched several diplomatic attacks against Taiwan, and Taiwan suf- fered dramatically from this highly expensive diplomatic warfare on the maintenance of the alliance balance. However, both Beijing and Taipei use the benefits intro- duced by the security consensus to repair the dangerous dyadic relationship since May 2008. In fact, after Ma’s “modus vivendi” approach, none of the 23 states that have formal diplomatic ties with Taipei have defected to Beijing. China even rejected pleas from Panama and Paraguay to establish diplomatic relationships with Beijing in order to honor this special moment of good feelings across the Taiwan Strait. In short, President’s Ma’s diplomatic truce, combined with a stable mainland policy, has successfully eased the tensions between China and Taiwan. The new flexible and pragmatic foreign policy, which differs entirely from the aggressive approach of the previous two presidents, has allowed President Ma to rebuild mutual trust and a stable relationship with Mainland China.