The nuclear materials being transported not only can threaten the environment but also offer certain security risks. For example, mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel assembly, which is transported through the region, contains weapons-usable plutonium.226 Countries concerned with
223
An Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a maritime zone adjacent to the territorial sea that extends up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. EEZ was given binding international recognition by the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982.
224 WNA News Briefing 04.03, January 20, 2004. 225
“Statement by CARICOM Heads of Government on the Shipment of Nuclear Waste Through the Caribbean Sea.” Press release July 17, 1999.
226
“Shipment of US-Origin Plutonium Set to Depart France on Eve of Presidential Transition.” Nuclear Control Institute. Washington, D. C. January 19, 2001. p.1.
nuclear proliferation naturally find this type of transport to be a threat to national security and the environment, and this type of transport raises important security questions for Caribbean countries: Why does Japan’s need for plutonium outweigh security and environmental concerns in the Caribbean? At what point is Japan’s security threatened enough to push them into the weapons production or when could their economy compel them to sell plutonium to weapons seeking countries and increase the risk of nuclear materials hijackings in the Caribbean region? These questions have to be satisfactorily answered before OPANAL, CARICOM, or any other Caribbean political or environmental entities can establish effective policies in regard to the shipment of plutonium. In regards to Japan, the international environmental organization, Greenpeace reported in March 2002 that over twenty-six tons of plutonium, enough plutonium for about 5,000 nuclear weapons, will be stored at the Sellafield site in Japan over a ten year period.227
Since Japan has argued that it needs the plutonium for their nuclear energy program and since they do not have sufficient facilities to convert their waste into plutonium, they have had to rely on countries with the capacity to do so. In 1997, Japan’s electric industry announced a plan to convert the plutonium by a plutonium and uranium extraction method that produces MOX fuel with the goal of operating 16-18 MOX nuclear reactors by March 2011.228 To illustrate the dangers inherent in this plan, two weeks after its startup on March 31, 2006, Japan’s new reprocessing plant in Rokkasho, which stores nuclear waste, leaked radioactive water. The Rokkasho plant, which is Japan’s first to extract plutonium and uranium from spent fuel, spilled ten and a half gallons of radioactive water inside a secured area, but it had no immediate impact on the external environment.229 This radioactive water accident indicates that something similar could occur in the Caribbean with nuclear materials bound for Japan. Japan’s preparation for this event allowed for containment, but is the Caribbean region prepared in case of a nuclear transport accident within its region? Clearly, Caribbean leaders and NGOs must be as concerned about this possibility as well as with the likelihood of transport associated with the GNEP program.
As indicated, the Caribbean marine environment would be negatively compromised and tourism would suffer from accidents associated with the transport of nuclear waste through the Caribbean Sea by nations. Action is needed to protect the people and the fragile ecology of the Caribbean Sea from this highly dangerous threat to which they are now habitually exposed, as well as to safeguard the livelihood of the millions of people who depend on that unique resource for their well being. For example, not only will marine animals become contaminated, but also eutrophication can occur, whereby the radioactive wastes dissolve into the ocean and become energy rich nutrients for oxygen-depleting bacteria and plants.230 These organisms spread and generate a hypoxic environment that kills marine life. In addition, nuclear waste from the water can evaporate into the air and contaminate humans. The desire to protect ecology and the livelihood of the region is the source of a significant development agreement of a SIDS declaration (2006), which was assisted by nations within the CARICOM.231 SIDS is concerned with the threat to their economies and maritime environment should a ship transporting hazardous material encounter natural disasters or mechanical
227
“Caribbean Community Oppose Japanese Nuclear Shipments.” Greenpeace. March 12, 2002. There is no indication where the materials for Japan’s ten year program will come from.
228
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Newsletter, May 2006, n. 108. 229
“Japan Nuclear Plant Reports Leak.” ABC News on Line. April 13, 2006. In addition, a small amount of radioactive water leaked from a heat exchanger at a Mihama reactor owned by Kansai Electric Power in 2004. Nucleonics
Week, September, 23, 2004. 230
Eutrophication, the process where water bodies receive excess nutrients that stimulate excessive plant growth, is a form of pollution. For example, coral reefs are important to the Caribbean, because they are a natural resource for most of the Caribbean Islands by providing the bulk of fisheries catches and marine bio-diversity, the source of sand for the beaches on which the tourism economy is based, and protection of the shore from erosion by storm waves. See “Coral Reefs, Sewage and Water Quality Standards,” paper presented by Thomas Goreau and Katy Thacker at the Caribbean Water and Wastewater Association Conference held in Kingston, Jamaica, October, 3-7, 1994.
231 “Recent Developments in the International Law Governing Shipments of Nuclear Materials and Wastes and their Implications for SIDS” by Duncan E. J. Currie and Jon M. Van Dyke in Review of European Community and
accidents.232 Since SIDS expressed this concern at least one shipment of commercial high-grade nuclear waste from France to Japan has occurred. For example, Pacific Nuclear Transport Limited issued a press release on February 2, 2006 stating that the Pacific Sandpiper, carrying vitrified residues back to Japan, left France on February 1, 2006 and would transit to Japan via the Panama Canal route.233
Given that nuclear transport is occurring, Caribbean nations must assess what precautions are already in place to ensure that the Caribbean region will be spared an impending nuclear disaster. Typically, countries leave responsibility to shipping companies to minimize risks. For example, radioactive material is usually packaged based on the level of potential hazard of the transported material. Type B containers, used for spent fuel and HLW, have a protective shield against gamma and neutron radiation. The ships carrying spent fuel from Japan to France carried multiple ninety-four ton Type B casks and the return transports from France to Japan have contained up to twenty-eight stainless steel canisters of vitrified high-level wastes with a total weight of fourteen tons.234 Each canister is put inside a steel transport cask with a total weight of ninety-eight tons. In addition, Pacific Nuclear Transport Ltd. has five 5100 ton ships that have double hulls with impact resistance structures between the hulls as safety requirement for their capacity of up to seventeen spent fuel flasks or fourteen waste transport flasks.235
Caribbean countries, however, still need to have a program that includes actions to promote safety and prevent threats. A program that questions and tests the reliability of the shipping packages should still be a critical part of a program to promote environmental sustainability. In regards to the canisters, what assurances do Caribbean authorities have that the Type B casks can withstand a blast to the ship’s hull? The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has found the cask design to be satisfactory, but there has been at least one report from Japan that some casks have been produced to cut costs and skirt regulations. A Japanese company producing transport containers, for example, was caught manipulating data by the Science and Technology Agency. The company changed data and cut down on the boron content, which is necessary in shielding radiation in MOX canisters.236 Responding to some of these concerns, the Bahamas scheduled to get a radiation detector operated by Hutchison Whamposa, a Hong Kong company, which will enable them to detect radioactive material in shipping cargo. If this system works then all Caribbean countries should have it to prevent dangers in both legal and illegal shipments. The destructive and dramatic 2004 hurricane season in the Caribbean should lead authorities to be aggressive and ask for guarantees that none of these shipments take place during the hurricane season. While oversight of the nuclear industry is difficult, stronger policies regarding cask testing and scheduled shipments would be an excellent method in which to implement a program of safety checks and the final deployment of casks would be improved significantly. The negative impact of an accident involving nuclear materials is heightened in view of
232
Concern of SIDS about the potential dangers of radioactive materials transport on their environment, for example, was expressed during the January 10-14, 2005 at the United Nations International Meeting on Small Island Developing States in Port Louis, Mauritius. See “The Mauritius Strategy for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Acton for the Sustainable Development of Small Island States” (Port Louis, January 13, 2005) at http://.un.org/smallislands2005/pdf/sids_strategy.pdf.
233
Areva Press Release, February 2, 2006. http://www.pntl.co.uk?pntl-news/PRDisplay.as;?id=33 234
Uranium Information Center. October 15, 2006. http://.uic.com.au/nip.htm#Radioactive%20Wastes 235
“Appraisal for the United Kingdom of the Safety of the Transport of Radioactive Material.” International Atomic Energy Agency. Vienna 2002. “Terrorism at Sea-The Potential Threat.” Captain Dr. Peter Heathcote, Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Suva, Fiji. October 2001. Pp. 2-3. See paper at www.aiex.com. According to reports, the last of twelve shipments of vitrified high level waste departing from France to Japan was supposed to be in 2007. A total of 1310 canisters with 700 tons of vitrified high level waste was shipped under thisprogram. “Japanese Waste
and MOX Shipments from Europe.” Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper 23, August 2007.
http://www.uic.com.au/nip23.htm. 236
“Caribbean Currents.” United States Environmental Protection Agency and United Nations Environmental
the fact that, according to Jon Van Dyke, the equipment needed to salvage radioactive materials has not been developed and that recovery from some areas would be impossible.237
In addition, the potential for hijacking should be a consideration. Drug shipments and pleasure yachts are hijacked in the Caribbean, and as demands increase and the payoffs soar, high seas pirating of plutonium shipments could become a reality. The United States initially entered into a nuclear cooperation agreement with Japan in 1988 to escort shipments of plutonium with an armed escort vessel, but the United States later canceled, and countries, like Britain shipping plutonium to Japan, must supply their own armed protection.238 Certainly there can be some protection for known shipments; however, protection cannot be provided for shipments done without prior knowledge of Caribbean officials. If all shipments are known perhaps Caribbean officials could also respond with restrictive safety regulations or, even though it is not currently required, they could at a minimum provide escorts when these shipments pass near their borders with their own assets and/or with the assistance of the United States, Japan, France or Great Britain.
Some escorts could definitely assist in dealing with the potential threat of a terrorist takeover or target.239 This potential has been noted by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Greenpeace. For example, in March 2003, a Greenpeace environmentalist urged cancellation of a nuclear materials transport from a reprocessing plant in France to Japan through the Caribbean due to a heightened sense of insecurity resulting from the September 11th attacks on New York City. According to Greenpeace’s Shaun Burnie, the shipment was a potential radiological weapon that would endanger coastal nations along its route.240 In February 1998, three Greenpeace activists boarded a ship, the Pacific Swan, transporting nuclear material betweenFrance and Japan as it entered the Panama Canal to demonstrate how a terrorist could easily board a ship transporting MOX and steal the cargo or threaten to blow up the material.241 These protesters, who latched onto the mast, were removed by security personnel. The United States implemented a program in late 2006 called the Secure Freight Initiative that requires United States bound containers leaving ports in Pakistan, Honduras and Southampton, England, to pass through a radiation detection machine and an X-ray device to detect, for example, any bomb making materials that have been intentionally shielded.242 While some antiterrorist experts point out that this is not a foolproof program, Caribbean countries can base their own actions on the realization that United States ships are being tested for nuclear materials, as well as the legal transports between Japan and France. In addition, the United States has requested of fifty ports worldwide that limited checks be done on suspicious containers before they are loaded
237
Van Dyke, Jon M. “The Legal Regime Governing Sea Transport of Ultrahazardous Radioactive Materials.” Ocean
Development and International Law. 33, 2002. p. 79. 238
Op. Cit. “Shipment of US-Origin Plutonium.” P.2. This policy is exemplified by two British flagged commercial transport vessels equipped with light cannon, machine guns and carrying special police that escort one another on the voyage and a specially built Japanese coast guard plutonium escort vessel. This particular shipment was scheduled to go through the Cape of Good Hope though.
239
An excellent paper on terrorist potential is “Terrorism and the Maritime Shipment of Nuclear Material.” PDF. Ron Smith, Director of International Relations and Security Studies at the University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand. September 2006.
240
“Greenpeace warns that Nuclear Waste Shipment would Create a Floating Radiological Bomb.” Greenpeace. March 11, 2003.
241
“Greenpeace Boards Nuclear Waste Shipment as it Approaches Panama Canal.” February 6, 1998. http://archive.greenpeace.org/nuclear/transport/wasteshipment.html. This shipment entered the Caribbean Sea through the Mona Passage between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic. Statements of protest and opposition were issued by CARICOM and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
242
In announcing the Secure Freight Initiative U. S. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said that there is no weapon of mass destruction that is more formidable than a nuclear or dirty bomb. Antiterrorists analysts criticize the program because the screenings would take place only on container ships, not on ships that carry millions of tons of other cargo and that the equipment, which will be installed in only a small number of countries, is prone to triggering false alarms and is unable to se through many items that might be inside a container. “U. S. to Expand Cargo Scans to Detect Nuclear Material.” The New York Times. December 8, 2006. p. A20.
for transport to the United States.243 This Initiative does not, however, cover transports back and forth between Japan and Europe, but similar programs can be requested by Caribbean leaders. In the United States, the RAND Corporation’s Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy and Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment issued a paper, “Evaluating the Viability of 100 percent Container Inspection at America’s Ports,” which argues that quantitative analysis should be used to evaluate security initiatives.244 This paper proposes 100 percent scanning of containers entering the United States, a recommendation based on assessing the minimum attack likelihood required to justify increased inspection costs. This type of study is useful for Caribbean leaders and international organizations seeking justifications for increasing port security even though the likelihood of terrorist attack may not be as high for Caribbean ports since such an attack would not register as highly on the fear and message scale.