By the time the Roman Empire took over the dominions that Aristotle’s pupil Alexander the Great had conquered, the Hellenistic Age saw Greek culture spread throughout the Mediterranean. Hellenistic philosophy fragmented into different schools influenced by Aristotle’s model of the ‘good life’, which by now largely meant survival in a huge imperial and often corrupt system.
The decadence and corruption of the Roman Empire at the time saw in its wake a number of schools of thought emerging, but given the limitations of this study, only
85
From James Rachels, ‘The Ethics of Virtue’, Elements of Moral Philosophy, pp.159-179, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1978, in Steven M. Cahn and Peter Markie, 2002, pp.693-704.
86
James Rachels, ‘The Ethics of Virtue’, p.703
87
Ibid, p.704
88
One of the most recent contributions to such a revival is Kwame Anthony Appiah’s 2009 Experiments in Ethics,
acknowledged at the outset as an influence on this thesis. Appiah is Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor of Philosophy and the Center for Human Values at Princeton University. His work discusses the relation between empirical moral psychology and philosophical ethics, presenting valuable insights for both.
two will be mentioned below, Epicureanism and Stoicism, since each of these philosophies also offer some of the principles that can still guide us to a good life in our times.
Epicurean principles of the good life
Let no one when young delay to study philosophy, nor when he is old grow weary of his study. For no one can come too early or too late to secure the health of his soul…We must then meditate on the things that make our happiness, seeing that when that is with us we have all, but when it is absent we do all to win it.
[…] The things which I used unceasingly to commend to you, these do and practice, considering them to be the first principles of the good life.89
Such are the terms in which the Athenian philosopher Epicurus (341-271 BC) addresses Menoeceus at the beginning of his Letter. In the ethical theory that he developed, Epicurus explains that happiness or personal contentment can only be achieved in tranquillity and peace of mind - notably not by engaging with the world and being a worthy citizen, as previous notions had taught.90
This ethical stance involved ridding ourselves of unnecessary desires, achieving self- sufficiency, and not fearing death. Before the inevitable spread of Christianity, by the fourth century BC, Epicurus had integrated atomist metaphysics into a philosophy of life according to which pleasure is the only good, pain the only evil, and fear of death a needless source of human distress. Among the ‘first principles of the good life’ that Epicurus wished to communicate to his disciples was the belief ‘that god is a being immortal and blessed’, but he also made clear that an understanding of God did not involve assigning ‘anything alien to his immortality or ill-suited to his blessedness.’ He also wished his followers to have a clear understanding of death, in a passage which, in our secular times, sounds uncannily modern in its familiarity:
[B]ecome accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is
89
From Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus: The Extant Remains, translated by Cyril Bailey (1926), in Steven M. Cahan and Peter Markie, 2002, p.184
90
Dave Robinson and Judy Groves, in Introducing Philosophy, Richard Appignanesi, ed., 1999, Allen & Unwin Pty. Ltd., St. Leonards, NSW, pp.36-9
nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality. For there is nothing terrible in life for the man who has truly comprehended that there is nothing terrible in not living. So that the man speaks but idly who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when it comes, but because it is painful in anticipation. […] So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more.91
The problem, Epicurus claimed, is not death, but the fear of death. Once we had a clear understanding of the four matters: God, death, pleasure and suffering, which are the roots of all our fears and desires, Epicurus believed that the truth of this
understanding would free us and give us peace of mind.
The pursuit of pleasure, a notion that Epicureans are so readily associated with, had as a goal securing ‘the health of one’s soul.’ This kind of pleasure was not based on self- indulgence, although Epicurus did not dismiss physical pleasure and well being. Pleasure in this view is ‘the beginning and end of the blessed life’; it is the ‘standard’ against which goods are to be judged:
For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good.92
Epicurus believed that because of ‘its natural kinship to us’ pleasure is good, and he rated intellectual pleasure as highly as physical pleasure. Both kinds of pleasures have to be measured relatively to one another, and judged accordingly. This is not an easy task, he recognised, since ‘the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and
conversely, the bad as good.’ 93 He also stressed that only ‘natural and necessary’ desires should be indulged, but mostly in moderation, and we know that the simple- living Epicurean communities that gathered around him occasionally held banquets too.94
91
From Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus, in Steven M. Cahan and Peter Markie, 2002, pp.184-5
92
Ibid, p. 185
93
Ibid
94
I draw on A.C. Grayling, 2004, What is Good?, for a better understanding of Epicurus and his philosophy, as well as that of the Stoics, whom I discuss in the next section.
Epicurus, like Aristotle, regards prudence as ‘the beginning and the greatest good’, for ‘from prudence spring all the other virtues, and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honourably and justly.’ He too believes that the virtues are ‘by nature’ bound up with the pleasant life, and that such a life is inseparable from them. Good and evil are not given by chance to man for the framing of a blessed life, but rather ‘opportunities for great good and great evil are afforded by it.’ It thus follows, in a claim reminiscent of Socrates, that it is ‘better to be
unfortunate in reasonable action than to prosper in unreason.’95
There are two other social values, related to pleasure, to which Epicurus attached great importance in his philosophy: justice and friendship. For Epicurus, living pleasantly means living not only prudently and honourably, but also justly, even though his view of justice is rather instrumental. Its value resides in the fact that it serves the best interests of everyone’s pleasure, as a form of contract between members of a community to ensure that they do not harm or disadvantage one another. Nevertheless, he certainly gives justice a prominent place in his leading doctrines, with pronouncements such as the following:
XXXI. The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage to restrain men from harming one another and save them from being harmed.
XXXIII. Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another in any place whatever and at any time it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed.96
In the ‘pledge of mutual advantage’ that Epicurus believes is constitutive of justice, each individual stands to gain from such an arrangement, and therefore it contributes to the pleasure of each.97 On the other hand, Epicurus does seem to qualify the requirements for justice to work within a legal framework, and we perceive in his formulations something like an awareness of the relevance of the particular social and cultural context in which laws are framed, as he cautions that these laws should only be sanctioned if they are ‘of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens’; that is, only when and for as long as they serve this function.
95
From Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus, p.186
96
From Epicurus’ Leading Doctrines, in Steven M. Cahn and Peter Markie, 2002, p.188
Friendship, however, is a different matter. It is not merely an instrumental good, but has intrinsic value as one of the supreme pleasures. It figures as such in Epicurus’ doctrines:
XXVII. Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, far the greatest is the possession of friendship.
XXVIII. That same conviction which has given us confidence that there is nothing terrible that lasts for ever or even for long, has also seen the protection of friendship most fully completed in the limited evils of this life.98
Friendship enables us to lead fulfilling and complete lives. Its pleasures derive not only from what friends can do for each other and give to each other, but in
disinterested and altruistic actions. There is clearly a tension between the egoism that lies at the basis of Epicureanism, the importance of friendship and the pleasure of altruism, which later Epicureans seem to have debated extensively.99
Perhaps the most important contribution of Epicureanism was in the end the
recognition of the will’s freedom, which is central to ethics. Epicurus recognised that the universe is governed by natural laws, reasoning that since these laws are causal, it is a problem to explain how human beings can truly be moral agents, acting from free will according to choices and decisions of their own - and not causally determined by previous states of the universe. He dealt with the problem by asserting that humans have free will. It might even have been part of Epicurus’ view, Grayling speculates, that the mind is governed by its own causality with laws separate to those governing the natural world, but if he did hold such a view, it ‘remains a matter of scholarly interpretation.’100
Epicureanism remained influential in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. The poets Horace and Virgil were reputedly influenced by Epicurean teachings, as was Marcus Aurelius, who established four professorships of philosophy in Rome, one for Epicureanism. Later, the attacks on the ‘largely atheistic and naturalistic outlook of
98
From Epicurus’ Leading Doctrines, p.188
99
To their credit, Grayling informs us, ‘none attempted to resolve it by jettisoning the idea that friendship is among the highest of goods.’ A.C. Grayling,, 2004, What is Good?, pp.47-8
Epicureanism by Christians’, as Grayling observes, kept the doctrine alive in the Western mind, becoming once more of interest to intelligent speculation in the
Renaissance.101 It was the somewhat degenerate popular forms of Epicureanism, with its attitudes and practices caricatured as a crude form of hedonism however, that became associated with the doctrine down to our days. The dominant school of thought before Christianity, Stoicism, would have a better fate.
Stoicism and self-possession
You must be one man, good or bad; you must develop either your Governing Principle, or your outward endowments; you must study either your inner man, or outward things – in a word, you must choose between the position of a philosopher and that of a mere outsider.102
The above exhortation is characteristic of Stoic philosophy, which began early in the fourth century BC, when Zeno of Citium came to Athens to teach at a place under a porch, or stoa, from which came its name. Zeno wrote a number of treatises, but except for fragments in later writings, these works have been lost. Roman Stoicism belongs to a much later era, to the first and second centuries CE, with such leading figures as Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.103
The Stoics were all inheritors of ideas developed in the classical period that preceded them. Socrates’ rationality, self-mastery and the tireless search for truth had also inspired the Cynics, who were another important source of influence on Stoicism. It seems that the Cynics advocacy of cosmopolitanism, life in accordance with nature, and the supreme value of ‘autarchy’, understood as individual self-government, was a major influence in the development of Stoic ethics.104
Stoics like Cicero and Seneca shared the ideal of global citizenship and equality, and placed their faith only in reason in order to lead the good life. Grayling, as do Martin and Barresi, claims that the ethical concerns of the Stoics arise from their view of the universe as ‘a single orderly system, existing in ever-returning cycles as a rational
101
Ibid
102
From ‘Epictetus: The Discourses and Manual, ‘Enchiridion’, translated by P.E. Matheson (1917). In Steven M. Cahn and Peter Markie, 2002, p.195
103
Vernon J. Bourke, 1968/2008, History of Ethics, p.57
organisation of the four elements by logos, or reason.’ The logos, variously called ‘creative power,’ ‘soul of the world,’ or ‘reason,’ is thus a principle of organisation of things. Crucial in this doctrine was the belief that just as the soul or mind is the principle of individual life, so this pervasive life force - identified with the elements of air and fire and encapsulated in the term pneuma, or ‘breath’ - constitutes the soul of the universe, and ‘the souls of all living things.’105
In this endless cycle of repetition, the soul of an individual man is a part, ‘a spark,’ Grayling calls it, of the world soul. Because the soul of the universe is benevolent, all human beings share equally in the responsibilities of membership in the universal community, especially in the responsibility of attuning one’s life and character to the logos, ‘serenely indifferent to the vagaries of external events’ as Martin and Barresi remark. In this philosophy, the Platonic cardinal virtues of intelligence, courage, justice and self-mastery are implied, and involve a species of knowledge. To interpret the Stoic doctrine from another standpoint, the idea of self-possession is linked to that of responsibility for oneself, and this is in turn linked to responsibility to the human community.
Some of these ideas are evident in Epictetus’ Enchiridion, which begins:
Of all existing things some are in our power, and others are not in our power. In our power are thought, impulse, will to get and will to avoid, and, in a word, everything which is our own doing. Things not in our power include the body, property, reputation, office, and, in a word, everything which is not our own doing. Things in our power are by nature free, unhindered, untrammelled; things not in our power are weak, servile, subject to hindrance, dependent on others.106
Epictetus was a Roman slave who defended the moral theory of Stoicism, according to which the good life can be achieved by adjusting one’s desires to the way of the world rather than trying to adjust the world to satisfy one’s desires. As in the teachings that preceded them, the Stoics also placed high value on honour and self- respect. In the Stoics’ naturalistic view of human life, it is one’s beliefs and one’s judgement of what befalls each of us that bring about happiness or unhappiness. One
105
A.C. Grayling, 2004, p.52 and Raymond Martin and John Barresi, 2006, p.25
106
From Epictetus: The Discourses and Manual, ‘Enchiridion’, translated by P.E. Matheson (1917). In Steven M. Cahn and Peter Markie, 2002, p.189
should therefore not be disappointed or feel sadness for not being in control of things that are beyond one’s power to control:
It is silly to want your children and your wife and your friends to live for ever, for that means that you want what is not in your control to be in your control, and what is not your own to be yours. […] But if you want not to be disappointed in your will to get, you can attain to that.
Exercise yourself then in what lies in your power. Each man’s master is the man who has authority over what he wishes or does not wish, to secure the one or to take away the other. Let him then who wishes to be free not wish for anything or avoid anything that depends on others; or else he is bound to be a slave.107
The importance of Stoicism in later conceptions of the self would emerge again at the end of the seventeenth century, as one of John Locke’s most important
preoccupations, and in the thought of William James. The Stoics anticipated an idea that would be central to Locke’s view, namely that humans are both ‘lumps of matter’ and also ‘persons’ and that these two ascriptions of identity can be determined
differently. A great deal of what the term ‘stoic’ originally meant has also survived in our modern understanding of this word. The Stoic belief in the unique property, or ‘essence’ of each individual that remained unchanged throughout life can well have led to what we think of as a modern, relational view of personal identity.108
Roman Stoicism: from souls to unique selves
In the heyday of Greek democracy, the harmony of the polis relied on the
relationships of the individuals within it. These relationships were mainly defined in terms of rights and obligations, that is, in social and legal roles. As the decline of the Greek city-states was followed by a period of pessimism and these relationships waned, Cynics and Stoics in particular emphasised ‘inner resources for adaptation to the general malaise.’109 This gave rise to a new emphasis on individualism, in which