The ‘Self-transcendent I’

The ‘self-transcendent I’ is based on Simmel’s idea of self-transcendence, which encapsulates the recognition of human beings being ‘this side’, but also their longing for

‘totality’. Vandenberghe notes that Simmel “continuously hints that there is something beyond reality, something that transcends mere life, encompassing all of its moments and giving it its unity” (Vandenberghe 2010, p. 7). Vandenberghe gives a metaphysical reading of Simmel’s transcendence, which reflects Kant’s move from the transcendent to the transcendental (universal). Kant’s transcendental enacts a shift from the transcendent God to universal consciousness. For Vandenberghe, Simmel’s transcendence is immanent because it is the unity to which one’s subjective consciousness aspires.

The divine is then experienced from within, shifting the emphasis from religion to religiosity, piety and spirituality (Vandenberghe 2010, p. 7). Accordingly, Simmel’s religion is grounded in human consciousness, and authenticity is attained through the cosmic Thou, which encompasses the self and the other, as well as the absolute Thou. It is through Thou that “the subject can thus realize its unique identity and attain authenticity”

(Vandenberghe 2010, p. 21). Similarly, Podoksik suggests that Simmelian individuality needs to be reconciled with universality or, as he puts it, totality. For Podoksik,

186 individuality and totality are reconciled through a “radicalization” of qualitative individualism (Podoksik 2010, p. 139). I feel Podoksik’s and Vandenberghe’s Kantian interpretation of Simmel falls prey to essentialism. This may indeed be imputed to Simmel.

In his book on Michelangelo (1910/2003), Simmel refers to the “metaphysical sentiment”

of the universal, from which one’s own destiny flows and from which one’s life acquires meaning (1910/2003, p. 58).

Nevertheless, in both Vandenberghe’s and Podoksik’s reading, the totality of authenticity submerges the ‘I’ under an absolute ‘Thou’. I feel it is a metaphysical understanding of Simmel’s thought that should be resisted. Simmel does not seek a unity where the particular is subsumed in the universal, but a dynamic relationship of the two. I thus propose a more Hegelian approach to stress the simultaneous presence of opposites. Hegel recovers Heraclitus’ conception of reality as becoming, unfolding in actuality, which is akin to Simmel’s Lebensphilosophie. For Hegel, ‘becoming’ and knowledge happen through a dialectical process. Simmel’s opposition between Forms and Life, especially in his late philosophical phase, shares Hegel’s processual conception of actuality and knowledge. Life

‘becomes’ through Forms although it never reaches absolute Leben.

Against Romantics, Hegel argues that the absolute cannot be grasped through immediate experience (Erlebnis); rather it requires mediation, which he develops in his dialectics.

Accordingly, knowledge of reality goes through a process of “sublation” (Aufhebung) of opposites. The synthesis, or sublation (Aufhebung), of the opposites of thesis and antithesis is a process of overcoming (aufheben), which retains the opposition. The verb aufheben

187 means cancelling but also preserving, so the sublation cancels and preserves thesis and antithesis. It is not a mere union of opposites; rather the contradiction is essential to the dialectical process. The Real, understood as the Idea (Begriff), or logos, has in itself its own unfolding. This happens first by becoming ‘objective’ through alienation, which is then overcome to return to itself, not in its original state, but in a mature and developed one.

Referring to Hegel, Simmel explains that opposites come together in a higher unity, in which the sense and value of each is preserved, and so is their opposition (Simmel 1910/1996, p. 57). The absolute is multiplicity, for the opposition is not nullified. The absolute is also never detached from empirical actuality. The finite is not separate from the infinite; rather the infinite ‘becomes’ actual through the finite. Simmel is very sympathetic to this way of thinking. For Simmel, Michelangelo attains perfection and redemption of life in life itself, in moulding the absolute in finite form (1910/2003, p. 64). The overcoming of the dualism of body and mind, accomplished by Michelangelo in his statues, is not a placid perfection, but retains the conflict of opposites. In Christianity, the reconciliation of the internal contradictions of being happens in the transcendent; in contrast, for Hegel, the reconciliation is not outside things but in themselves in the process of overcoming the opposite through its higher form (Simmel 1910/1996, p. 58).

‘Being’ thus reaches itself only in the infinite path of ‘becoming’ (Simmel 1910/1996, p. 59).

The individual, for Hegel, needs to replicate the same path of unfolding to know the ‘truth’.

By philosophising, one overcomes the finitude of one’s consciousness and elevates the

‘empirical I’ to the ‘transcendental I’, to Reason and Spirit (Geist). Hegel’s view of

188 knowledge is, I believe, useful in order to appreciate Simmel’s self-transcendence and immanent transcendence. I interpret this unfolding, or becoming, of the ‘I’ as coming to know oneself in relation to the world. Immanent transcendence is thus a process of going beyond oneself to know oneself in a wider perspective.

This brief reference to Hegel is merely to stress the role of becoming rather than to tackle Hegel’s wider oeuvre. I suggest Simmel’s “immanent transcendence” ought to be understood in a dynamic sense, based on the concept of Life going beyond itself. “Life is that which at all points wants to go beyond itself, reaching out beyond itself” (Simmel, cited in Pyyhtinen 2010, p. 146). For Simmel, the individual reaches out towards an ideal authenticity that brings together not only the fragments of their own selves but also “of the universal man” (Simmel 1910 p. 379). It is a higher unity that does not dissolve the inner contradictions. It is the development of one’s individuality. I understand this as a process of identity construction by widening one’s horizon of understanding of oneself and the world around. This may have an ethical component, but it is not essential to it.

Grounding the search of authenticity on self-transcendence means that the self is not made complete by a static unity. On the contrary, “transcendence reveals itself as the immanent condition of life” (Simmel 1918/2010, p. 17). Thus, authenticity is not merely the realisation of what is distinctive of the person, the individual uniqueness, rather it captures the person’s self-transcendence. The ‘self-transcendent I’ expresses an individuality that transcends the individual. It is a search for reconciliation of the particular individual with truth, i.e. what is felt as going beyond the ‘here and now’. Truth is understood within the

189 framework of one’s tradition, which is not confined to religion, but can include philosophy, art, politics, as mentioned. It is also not necessarily ethical or applicable universally, although it may be understood thus by the agent. It captures what the actor understands as truth, which is refracted through the language, ideas and practices of tradition. It may be considered universal, but it must be grasped through culturally specific mediations and representations. Accordingly, it is a process of identity construction inscribed within one’s frames of reference.

Simmel did not use the term authenticity; rather he theorised individuality stressing identity. Authentic, from the Greek authentikós, originally meant having authority over oneself. Modern authenticity tends to be associated with the Shakespearean verse “to thine own self be true”¹², uttered by Polonius in Hamlet, which has given the word a more pronounced sense of being in accordance with one’s character (Guignon 2004). The accordance with one’s character is often understood as ethical thus betraying an understanding of authenticity as being in accordance with one’s ‘better’ self rather than oneself. Simmel has a normative approach and conceives of the development of one’s individuality as an ethical task (sittliche Aufgabe) (Pyyhtinen 2010, p. 137). The term Sittlichkeit, employed by Hegel, is the noun deriving from the adjective sittlich, which means customary, deriving from Sitte (custom). Thus, the individual law is ethical and represents Simmel’s attempt at combining individuality with a universalistic ethic. He sought to reconcile the individual with the universal in his concept of the individual law (cf.

chapter five).

12 Act 1, Scene 3, Hamlet.

190 In addition, notwithstanding the individual law being the ethical pursuit of the individual, Simmel has a relational understanding of ethics. Duty is not just abiding by ethical principles (as in Kant) but responsibility to a specific you. Morality (Sittlichkeit) is, for Simmel, of “an altruistic-social nature” (Simmel 1908/1950, p. 260). The definition of the moral is “the devotion of the ‘I’ to the ‘thou’ (in the singular or plural)” (Simmel 1908/1950, p. 260), from which flow philosophical doctrines of ethics. However, in recognition of contemporary pluralism and my understanding of ethics as agonistic, my intent is to avoid a conflation of authenticity with ethics. Thus, I propose a conception of authenticity as a process, where one’s conception of truth, however understood by the actor, is interpreted through one’s understanding of tradition, be it philosophical, artistic, or religious tradition, to name a few. Authenticity thus reflects the dynamism of Life, the continuous search for one’s knowledge of oneself and the world around in a wider perspective. This may include personal moral development; it may also bring one to an antagonistic understanding of the world and violent action.