Semantic memory

This section looks at semantic memory and establishes the nature and status of information in there with reference to some models oflong term memory. We then explore Quran

memorization with respect to this and ask whether the Quran text ends up as part of the memorizers’ integrated knowledge in long term semantic memory.

Semantic memory according to Tulving (1972) is:

[a] mental thesaurus, organized knowledge a person possesses about words and other verbal symbols, their meaning and referents, about relations among them, and about rules, formulas, and algorithms [rules for solving problems] for the manipulation of these symbols, concepts, and relations (p. 386).

The above definition describes semantic memory in terms of general/generic knowledge abstracted from past experiences, including the knowledge of language, without any awareness of the spatio-temporal details of events. For example, a person may remember details of an event without remembering where or when he/she had heard them.

Classic models of semantic memory (Collins and Quillian 1969; Rosch and Mervis 1975; Collins and Loftus 1975) have proposed that information in semantic memory is represented in a network of knowledge or concepts. An important issue, however, relates to the schematic versus non-schematic representation of knowledge in semantic memory. Various researchers have debated and differently interpreted the issue. Neisser (1984), for example, argued that instead of storing specific details of an event as suggested by Bahrick (1984), people retain a

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schematic representation of knowledge in long term memory. Schemata, according to Alba and Hasher (1983), represent knowledge abstracted from experiences over an extended period of time. According to Neisser, details of an event are reconstructed on the basis of schemata; in other words, specifics are reconstructed from abstracted general knowledge in memory.

However, although the details are reconstructed from the abstract representation, the impression one gets is as if they are stored in their own right. On this view, long-term memory is strongly reconstructive.

Taking the above view, it would be reasonable to ask whether the Quran memorizers are reconstructing the Quran text from something more abstract. Do they, in the first instance, make an abstract representation of the Quran from which to reconstruct the text? If they are, then can it be assumed that they have a schema for the structure of the language of the Quran, i.e. Classical Arabic, which they might have developed over a period of time? If so, they would need to have developed some sort of knowledge of the language of the Quran— sufficient to enable reconstruction from more abstract principles. This knowledge would come about from pattern recognition. What they memorize would be part of a system distilled from frequent and numerous exposures to the Quran text, rather than something freestanding and linear, or composed of disjointed bits and pieces. They would be expected to show sensitivity to pattern-recognition in Classical Arabic (see chapter 6). In other words, if asked, Quran memorizers should be able to differentiate between correct and incorrect sentences in Classical Arabic. Chapter 7 investigates this hypothesis.

Conway et al (1991), however, argued against a strongly reconstructive version of the long term knowledge advocated by Neisser (1984). They contrasted memory for conceptual knowledge with memory for specific details over a period of 12 years in the absence of any rehearsal. Three hundred and seventy three students were tested on knowledge of cognitive psychology which they had studied as one year course for their degree. Participants’ memory was tested in relation to their knowledge of proper names of researchers, concepts and conceptual relations from the taught course. Memory was tested by recognition and recall, and tests were slightly modified to cover the updated material. According to the results, information registered quick loss over the first few years, after which it reached plateau and was available at an above chance level after 12 years. However, concepts initially showed less rapid decline than names. According to Conway et al, the difference in decline for two types of knowledge over the early intervals lies mainly in the schematic nature of very long

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term memory that Neisser (1984) proposed. For example, arbitrary details, such as names do not lend themselves to being represented in a schematic representation and thus show a rapid loss; in contrast, concepts form a systematic structure in a kind of schematic representation and, therefore, show enduring retention. Bahrick (1983) showed that street names do not give themselves to schematic representation and hence suffer from quick loss. Cohen (1990) demonstrated that proper names are difficult to recall, compared to information such as occupation and possessions, because names lack semantic associations and do not get integrated into schematic structure. In sum, retention over the long term is a function of knowledge type with conceptual knowledge showing more durability as opposed to arbitrary items.

Schemata-based evidence for long term memory notwithstanding, some of Conway et al’s findings go against the strict version of the theory. For example, although memory for proper names dropped initially, it remained at above chance level throughout the retention period. According to a strong reconstructive view of schema theory as advocated by Neisser,

memory for proper names should have dropped to a chance level because names could not be abstracted into a schematic representation. Conversely, against the prediction of the schemata view, memory for conceptual relations was not well retained and demonstrated sharp

decrement initially. Conway et al concluded that in their study the initial decline in conceptual relations as opposed to the retention of names and facts over long intervals at above chance level show that “the knowledge structures formed by the students were, primarily, highly specific and detailed rather than abstract and relational” (p. 408). In their view, both the core knowledge and specific facts are retained over the long term.

If Conway et al’s view is accepted, then it can be argued that the Quran memorizers’ long term recall is possible by means of highly specific, arbitrary and detailed knowledge of the text. However, it is also possible that the memorizers might form some sort of core schematic knowledge of the Quran in long term memory to guide their recall. We will come back to this issue in chapter 5.