2. Paul’s Ideological Climate
2.1. Patterns of Reciprocity in Seneca’s De Beneficiis
2.1.2. Seneca’s Two-Level, Philosophical Framework: Paradox as a Solution
Although many have criticised Seneca’s ‘high-minded nonsense,’122 perceiving De
Beneficiis to be an amalgamation of loosely connected philosophical musings,123 Brad Inwood124
118. Seneca mentions three kinds of ingrates: (i) one who denies that he received a benefit, when, in fact, he has received one; (ii) one who pretends that he has not received one; and (iii) one who fails to return a benefit (Ben. 3.1.3; cf. 7.26.1-7.27.3).
119. Ben. 3.1.3. 120. Ben. 3.1.4.
121. Likening philosophy to an art concerned with the cure or therapy of the soul is a recurrent theme in the work of Epicurean and Stoic thinkers (cf. Galen PHP 5.2.23; Cicero Tusc. 3.6; Epictetus Diatr. 1.15.2). Among Stoics specifically, Martha Nussbaum explains, ‘Philosophy’s medical function is understood as, above all, that of toning up the soul—developing its muscles, assisting it to use its own capabilities more effectively’ (The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994], 317).
122. Ramsey MacMullen, ‘Personal Power in the Roman Empire,’ AJPh 107 (1986): 512–24 at 521.
123. A criticism that reaches as far back as Caligula’s description of Seneca’s literary works as ‘sand without lime’ (Suetonius Cal. 38).
68 and Miriam Griffin125 have uncovered a two-level mode of paradoxical discourse.126 One level promotes the social ideal,127 while the other acknowledges the social reality. To give one example of this pedagogical strategy, Seneca writes, ‘For, in the case of the benefit, this is a binding rule for the two who are concerned—the one should immediately forget [oblivisci] that it was given, the other should never forget that it was received.’128 By the time you reach Book VII, however, he clarifies what he really means. ‘Yet it is a mistake to suppose that, when we say that the person who has given a benefit ought to forget [oblivisci], we would rob him of all memory [memoriam] of his act, especially if it was a very honourable one.’ This sounds
contradictory, but here is the key. ‘We overstate some rules in order that in the end they may reach their true value [quaedam praecipimus ultra modum, ut ad verum et suum redeant]. . . . Hyperbole never expects to attain all that it ventures, but asserts the incredible in order to arrive at the credible [sed incredibilia adfirmat, ut ad credibilia perveniat].’129 Otherwise stated,
125. Griffin calls it ‘the pedagogical technique of hyperbole’ (‘De Beneficiis and Roman Society,’ JRS 93 [2003]: 92–113 at 94).
126. Paradoxical, of course, not in the sense of involving illogical oddities but in the sense of being at odds with the common opinion, for, from a Stoic perspective, paradoxes were simply true (cf. Inwood, ‘Politics and Paradox,’ 74 n40).
127. Although Griffin contends that Seneca’s (and Cicero’s) ideals appear in the more theoretical writings of Pliny and others, suggesting that the ideals of the former could actually be considered the ‘social ideal’ (‘De Beneficiis,’ 102–06).
128. Ben. 2.10.4.
129. Ben. 7.22.1-7.23.2. On Seneca’s pedagogical use of hyperbole, see Inwood, ‘Politics and Paradox,’ 90–92; Griffin, ‘De Beneficiis,’ 94.
Seneca sets the bar of morality obscenely high so that his readers will reach an attainable goal and so perpetuate the fundamental practice of reciprocal exchange.
This philosophical tactic is made possible by the fact that ‘there are two levels of
activity in any social exchange, the material and the intentional.’130 As Seneca claims, ‘Goodwill we have repaid with goodwill; for the object we still owe an object [Voluntati voluntate satis fecimus; rei rem debemus]. And so, although we say that he who receives a benefit gladly has repaid it, we nevertheless also bid him return some gift similar to the one he received.’131 In this way, paradox has the practical purpose of healing fractured gift-exchange relationships by encouraging givers to give freely despite the possibility of no return and receivers to endure the burden of indebtedness with confidence and dignity.132 As Inwood explains, ‘the
metaphysically bound ethics of pure intention can actually strengthen social and political ties in the real world.’133
While space prevents a full explanation of how Seneca’s two-level philosophical framework resolves all the relational tensions noted above, we will focus on two issues with direct relevance to Paul’s vision of gift-giving relationships: self-interest and obligation. The purpose in doing so will be to lay the groundwork of subsequent chapters, where we will
130. Inwood, ‘Politics and Paradox,’ 89. 131. Ben. 2.35.1.
132. ‘Politics and Paradox,’ 92; cf. also Ben. 4.40.5. 133. ‘Politics and Paradox,’ 91.
70 challenge scholars who impose modern categories of gift onto Paul’s ancient gift-giving relationship with the Philippians and the Corinthians. What we will discover is that when it comes to the matter of gift exchange, Paul shares more in common with Seneca than with his modern interpreters. Before doing so, however, a word must be said about Seneca’s overall view of gift-giving.
2.1.2.1. The Perpetual Cycle of Grace: Giving, Receiving, and Returning
Two apt images in De Beneficiis epitomise gift-giving relationships in Seneca’s
philosophical economy: (i) the three Graces (1.3.4-5); and (ii) the ball game illustration (2.17.3- 7), both borrowed from Chrysippus.134
The three Graces — sisters who joyously dance with hands joined in a perpetual circle — represent giving, receiving, and returning, with the gift flowing through each party and always returning to the giver. If the perpetual cycle is anywhere broken, ‘the beauty of the whole is destroyed,’ since ‘it has most beauty if it is continuous and maintains an
uninterrupted succession.’135 As such, certain characteristics of the three Graces represent different aspects of giving and receiving. As Seneca explains,
Their faces are cheerful, as are ordinarily the faces of those who bestow or receive benefits. They are young because the memory of gifts ought not to grow old. They are virgins because benefits are pure and undefiled and holy in the
134. Inwood, ‘Politics and Paradox,’ 92. 135. Ben. 1.3.4.
eyes of all; and it is fitting that there should be nothing to bind or restrict them, and so the maidens wear flowing robes, and these, too, are transparent because benefits desire to be seen.136
The ball game illustration presents a similar picture. The game is comprised of a thrower (i.e., giver) and a catcher (i.e., recipient), with the ball symbolising a gift. The aim of the game is to keep the ball in the air. If it drops to the ground, the game is ruined. To prevent that from happening, the more skilled player must assess the skills (i.e., character [persona]) of the other. He/she does so by determining whether the other player is dexterous of hand, can catch long, firm throws, and immediately throw it back. Or, if the player is a novice who requires a short, gentle lob, basically guiding the ball directly into his/her hand. If skilled players do not follow this course of benefits, they prove to be the cause of ingratitude in others, insofar as their throws are impossible to catch, let alone return.137 As a result, the success of the ball game rests on cooperation (consentium), which, in turn, demands givers and receivers to adapt their performance to the skills of the other and therefore keep the ball in the air.
Proceeding from these illustrations are a few noteworthy dynamics of gift-giving relationships. For Seneca, a beneficium binds two parties together,138 creating a common bond
136. Ben. 1.3.5.
137. Ben. 2.17.5.
72 that places equal demands on both to give, receive, and return.139 The giver should then toss the gift in such a way that will engender gratitude, verbally and materially, while the catcher should always seek opportunities to show gratitude, even if not yet materially. In this sense, mutual cooperation is necessary for the beauty of reciprocal exchange to be preserved.
With the general contours of giving and receiving in De Beneficiis outlined, we can now discern whether, for Seneca, self-interest and obligation disrupt or preserve the course of gifts in social relations.
2.1.2.2. Self-Interest in Ideal Perspective
At first glance, Seneca completely eradicates all self-interest from giving. After all, the golden rule of gift exchange in De Beneficiis is that ‘the one should immediately forget [oblivisci] that it was given, the other should never forget that it was received.’140 Forgetting implies disinterestedness, which, in turn, displays virtue. For virtus does not invite ‘by the prospect of gain [lucro];’ on the contrary, she ‘is more often found in voluntary contributions. We must go to her, trampling under foot all self-interest [calcatis utilitatibus].’141 Unless a person strips him- or herself of self-interest,142 they cannot furnish a benefit, since a beneficium ‘has in view only
139. Ben. 2.18.1-2.
140. Ben. 2.10.4; cf. also 1.4.3, 5; 2.6.2. 141. Ben. 4.1.2.
the advantage of the recipient [accipientis utilitas].’143 Disinterested givers therefore imitate the gods, who give with no thought of any return (sine spe recipiendi)144 or regard for their own advantage (commodum).145 Yet those with self-interested motives emulate ‘money-lenders [feneratores],’146 placing their so-called benefits where they ‘can derive the most gain [quaestuosissime habeas].’147 And yet, Seneca exclaims, feneratores are incapable of giving benefits, for that ‘which has gain [quaestum] as its object cannot be a benefit [non est
beneficium].’148 Instead, a ‘benefit views the interest [commodum], not of ourselves, but of the one upon whom it is bestowed; otherwise, it is to ourselves that we give it.’149 Clearly, then, self-interested givers hand out loans, disinterested givers bestow benefits.
The disease of self-interest, however, plagues gift exchange on both ends, for recipients also exhibit self-interested motives. ‘Tell me,’ Seneca asks, ‘what is the motive that leads to [repayment of good services with gratitude]? Gain [Lucrum]? But he who does not scorn gain is ungrateful.’150 ‘And what is the aim of one who is grateful?,’ he inquires. ‘Is it that his gratitude
143. Ben. 4.9.1. 144. Ben. 4.9.1. 145. Ben. 4.3.2. 146. Ben. 3.15.4. 147. Ben. 4.3.3. 148. Ben. 4.13.3; cf. 3.13.2.
149. Ben. 4.13.3. If gifts were given solely with the expectation of receiving a return, Seneca reasons, ‘we should give, not to the most worthy, but to the richest, men.’ Moreover, if it were ‘only self-interest [sola nos invitaret utilitas] that moved us to help others. . .the rich and powerful and kings, who need no help from others, would not be under the least obligation to bestow them’ (Ben. 4.3.1-2).
74 may win for him more friends, more benefits? . . . He is ungrateful who in the act of repaying gratitude has an eye on a second gift—who hopes while he repays.’151
What becomes evident from these examples is that, ideally, self-interest should never attend the exchange of gifts. Only disinterested interlocutors convey the glory, honour, and virtue inherent in gift-giving. On closer inspection, though, Seneca has a specific kind of self- interest in mind — the kind that exploits others for the sake of selfish gain, indicated by the terms lucrum, utilitas, commodum, and quaestus. But as one progresses through De Beneficiis, another level of discourse slowly emerges.152
2.1.2.3. Self-Interest in Real Perspective
After stating the ideal, namely, that exploitative self-interest is inherently evil, Seneca redefines (rather than abolishes) self-interest by adding a level of reality in his paradoxical discourse. Unlike most moderns who consider any kind of self-regard to be unethical, Seneca affirms a philanthropic mode of self-interest, one which we will call, other-oriented self-interest.
This sort of other- and self-regard begins to emerge as early as Book II, when he states,
Let us never bestow benefits that can redound to our shame. Since the sum total of friendship consists in putting a friend on an equality with ourselves, consideration must be given at the same time to the interests of both [utrique simul consulendum est]. I
151. Ben. 4.20.2-3; cf. also 4.24.2.
152. Griffin envisages an educational strategy in De Beneficiis which matches the moral progress of his readership, possibly personified in Aebutius Liberalis (who Griffin argues is a real addressee). The end of Book IV marks a shift in pedagogical strategy, with Books V-VII being comparable to ‘a graduate level course in officia aimed at the advanced progressive (proficiens)’ (‘Pedagogic Strategy’ at 109-10). If this is the case, it is striking that the level of real discourse on self-interest primarily appears in Books V-VII.
shall give to him if he is in need, yet not to the extent of bringing need upon myself; I shall come to his aid if he is at the point of ruin, yet not to the extent of bringing ruin upon myself, unless by so doing I shall purchase the safety of a great man or a great cause.153
But it becomes clearer in a couple of passages at the end of Book IV and in Book V:
It is not true, therefore, that that which has also some extraneous profit [cui aliquid
extra quoque emolumenti adhaeret] closely attached to it is not something to be desired in
itself; for in most cases the things that are most beautiful are accompanied by many accessory advantages [multis et adventiciis comitata sunt dotibus], but they follow in the train of beauty while she leads the way.154
A benefit. . .possesses this commendable, this most praiseworthy, quality, that a man forgets for the time being his own interest [utilitatis interim suae oblitus est] in order that he may give help to another.155
Nevertheless, the clearest example of other-oriented self-interest appears in Book VI:
I am not so unjust as to feel under no obligation to a man who, when he was profitable to me, was also profitable to himself. For I do not require that he should consult my interests without any regard to his own; no, I also desire that a benefit given to me should be even more advantageous to the giver, provided that, when he gave it, he was considering us both, and meant to divide it between himself and me. Though he should possess the larger part of it, provided that he allowed me to share in it, provided that he considered both of us, I am, not merely unjust, I am ungrateful, if I do not rejoice that, while he has benefited me, he has also benefited himself.
non sum tam iniquus, ut ei nihil debeam, qui, cum mihi utilis esset, fuit et sibi; non enim exigo, ut mihi sine respectu sui consulat, immo etiam opto, ut beneficium mihi datum vel magis danti profuerit, dum modo id, qui dabat duos intuens dederit et inter me seque diviserit. Licet id ipse ex maiore parte possideat, si modo me in consortium admisit, si duos cogitavit, ingratus sum, non solum iniustus, nisi gaudeo hoc illi profuisse, quod proderat mihi.156
For Seneca, gleaning some form of profit (utilitas) from granting a gift is acceptable, as long as the receiver also obtains a share in the profit (si modo me in consortium admisit) and the giver, at the moment of giving, acknowledges the interests of both parties (si duos cogitavit).
153. Ben. 2.15.1.
154. Ben. 4.22.4.
155. Ben. 5.11.4-5. The term interim reminds the reader of the necessity to reciprocate a material counter-gift and, at the same time, the primitivism of demanding one (cf. 2.35.1).
76 Unlike the majority of Westerners who place every kind of self-interest under the category of ‘exploitative,’ Seneca actually draws a fine distinction here between acting for oneself and acting for oneself and another, between self-interest and self- and other-interest. Self-interested givers, who exploit others with gifts for their own advantage, certainly lack virtue. But self-interested givers, who place the interests of recipients above their own
honourable interests, actually embody virtue.157 And this other-oriented self-interest, from Seneca’s perspective, adorns rather than corrupts the gift and preserves the perpetual cycle of
reciprocal exchange forged by beneficia.
2.1.2.4. Obligation in Ancient Perspective
The presence of obligation in gift exchange does not necessitate Seneca’s two-level mode of paradoxical discourse. Like most ancient writers, he never questions its existence. This can be distilled from the three Graces or the ball game illustration, which calls for the active and necessary participation of each party. But a couple of examples make this point even clearer. ‘The giving of a benefit is a social act,’ explains Seneca, ‘it lays someone under obligation [obligat].’158 ‘To return [a gift] is to give something that you owe [debeas] to the one to whom it belongs when he wishes it.’159 And lastly, ‘I am able to place a man under obligation
157. Following ‘in the train of beauty while she leads the way’ in 4.22.4 above is a reference to being led by virtue and reason.
158. Ben. 5.11.5. 159. Ben. 7.19.2.
[obligare] only if he accepts; I am able to be freed from obligation only if I make a return [reddidi].’160 What is striking about these passages is that Seneca has no qualms about transferring legally-binding language of loans, such as debeo and obligo, to the realm of beneficia.161 To be sure, he distinguishes between the two,162 but the common characteristic in both is the social dynamic of obligation. So, while there are ‘strings attached’ to gifts, they are not ‘legal’ strings, since a person could not send someone to court for not returning a gift.163
Indeed, in Seneca’s day, many beneficiaries refused to play the social game of gift exchange, attempting to cut obligatory ties and free themselves from their indebtedness to givers. Some did so by making really quick returns,164 others by repudiating gifts
preemptively,165 and still others by praying that some harm may come upon the giver, so that the tables might be turned and they might assist them as the superior party.166 But there was a reason for this evasion of obligation, and it was due to the detestable manner in which givers
160. Ben. 7.18.2.
161. Later, however, Seneca discourages language linked to debt, preferring gratiam referre (voluntary return) over gratiam rederre (payment on demand, Ep. 81.9), though this distinction may simply be a way to express that the first phrase was more common than the second (cf. Griffin, ‘De Beneficiis,’ 99 n52).
162. For instance, a gift is incalculable (3.10.2, 15.3), selfless (5.11.4-5), engenders friendship (2.18.5), and not returning a counter-gift is not punishable by law (3.14.2). Conversely, a loan is calculable (3.10.1, 15.1-2; 4.39.2), interested in selfish gain (2.10.2, 31.2; 4.3.3, 13.3), engenders no lasting relationship (2.18.5), and non-payment of a loan is punishable by law (3.7.1-2).
163. Ben. 3.6-17. While Seneca discusses at length the possibility of making ingratitude illegal because of its frequent appearance, he ultimately concludes that such sanctions would be impractical for three reasons: it would be difficult to assess various cases of ungratefulness, giving and receiving would lose moral ground, and citizens would be discouraged from the act of gift giving.
164. Ben. 4.40.1-5. 165. Ben. 6.25.1.
78 were bestowing gifts — they gave self-interestedly. For instance, anticipating a question that may be raised by his addressee, Aebutius Liberalis, Seneca writes:
I already know what you wish to ask; there is no need for you to say anything; your countenance speaks for you. “If anyone has done us a service for his own sake [sua. .
.causa], are we,” you ask, “under any obligation to him [debetur aliquid]? For I often hear
you complain that there are some things that people bestow upon themselves, but charge them up to others.”167
Beneficiaries were fed up with receiving gifts that only served the interests of the ones who bestowed them, and so sought to be released from the ties of obligation to these self-interested benefactors. Consequently, then, Seneca’s call to embrace mutual obligation and other-oriented self-interest operate as the glue that holds ruptured social bonds of gift together and thereby secure the success of gift exchange in a very complex and fragile society.