September 1961 report (note 79), pp 1-2, 4.

14 mayors (including eight SED appointees) and 19 NF chairmen were removed in the district’s five kilometre restricted zone. A further 18 RdK staff were to be removed. The reasons were:

1. Wavering attitude to the implementation of party and government decisions.

2. Little contact to the population and weakly developed class consciousness.

3. 1st degree western contacts, particularly due to Republikflucht of closest relatives.

4. Relatively high proportion of members o f former NSDAP and its organisations.

5. Immoral behaviour, sometimes repeatedly.

However, overall the Bezirk needed to replace 49 party secretaries, 24 mayors and 38 NF chairmen in border communities, but failed to supply the agreed replacement cadres to Heiligenstadt quickly.

The Heiligenstadt Kreisleitung was itself weak, giving inadequate help to local groups or even the RdK party group. Membership of the border police also made no lasting impression, as ‘due to marrying into Catholic families a large proportion of former colleagues give up their progressive attitudes and become keen churchgoers’.'®'^ Thus the party’s ‘leading role’ was not assured in various border localities.'®^ Though these problems were generally more extreme in the Eichsfeld than elsewhere, their parallels existed across the Bezirk.

Against the background of these problems, and exploiting the September 1961 elections in particular, loyalists began claiming the upper hand in local SED groups. Thus, ‘discussions were held with comrades who have recently displayed liberal behaviour’ in Sondershausen, where some leading members were called to account. Similarly, a deputy party group leader in Erfurt was officially warned about ‘defeatist behaviour’

'®^ 12 October 1961 (note 77), pp.4-5.

'®^ 17 October 1961 report (note 95), p.5, LPA, BIV/2/5-042; 10 November 1961 report (note 78), p.2.

'®'' 12 October 1961 report (note 77), pp.3, 6, 10. '®^ 5 September 1961 report (note 67), p.6.

after he neglected to persuade reluctant workers to sign a letter to Ulbricht. Pressure on members to conform became intense. For instance, a staff meeting at Langensalza district hospital in August was marred by ‘provocative’ activities. After ‘lengthy preparation’ the meeting was repeated in September by which time Dr. P., who had originally refused to sign a letter to Ulbricht, had become unusually loyal and written a personal declaration which was published in Das Volk}^ Some comrades with dissident views were returned to candidate status or removed from state p o s t s . A w a r e of members’ continuing ideological weaknesses, and that not all party groups reacted independently or correctly to political events, the leadership insisted on ‘turning party organisations’ membership meetings into forums of instruction’.^"*

However, the battle was not restricted to party members. Many offensives were waged against those who expressed dissident views. Thus a Sommerda security officer was sacked for ‘extolling’ 17 June 1953. Similarly the party exposed an Eisenach builder who incited his colleagues to call strikes as a ‘fascist element’. The builder was arrested, his workmates forced to distance themselves from him, and the strike was averted. Elsewhere, the appearance of Soviet comrades’ in key factories was a ‘significant help’ to the SED, presumably in dampening dissident discussions.""

Regular consumers of western broadcasts were also attacked, as when an Erfurt DFD group dismissed its chairwoman for reftising to dismantle her aerial."* The anti-western television campaign was particularly necessary in border areas. Here the party began dedicated, systematic campaigns after 13 August, particularly after six people escaped from Ecklingerode, all apparently influenced by western television.**^ Outwardly, the campaign was proving successful by late September. For instance, 249 of the 280 television owners near the border in Kreis Mühlhausen agreed to alter their sets.

*"" SED BL, ‘Kurzinformation Nr.48/61’, 13 September 1961, pp.2-3, 8, LPA, BIV/2/5-042. *"^ 28 August 1961 report (note 92), p.6.

108 109

SED Erfurt, ‘Verbesserung der Leitungstatigkeit...’, 23 January 1962, p p .l, 3, LPA, IV/5.01/145. 17 August 1961 report (note 62), pp.2-3.

**" 22 August 1961 report (note 65), p .l. ***8 September 1961 report (note 23), p.5. **^ 5 September 1961 report (note 67), p.6.

However, continued complaints that there was nothing political with watching sport and music on western television suggested the argument had not been won. There was also evidence that aerials for western channels were reinstalled in attics after being removed from roofs.

NVA recruitment was a major battleground during 1961. In Weimar, more than 50% of all youths between 18 and 23 signed pledges to enlist either immediately or after their studies."'^ However, the continuing prevalence o f comments such as ‘We want to live in peace and work, why do we need a National People’s Army?’ suggests that coercion rather than conviction had produced these successes. One youth sarcastically commented that the ‘freedom to join the army was exactly the same as voluntarily joining the LPG’."^ However, after 13 August the SED felt confident enough to demand ‘clear and concrete statements’ from each individual at meetings about joining the NVA. SED members not prepared to ‘defend the homeland with a weapon in the hand’ could expect intense, individual debates, and exclusion from the party if they still refused."^ The weak FDJ, many of whose functionaries refiised to enter the NVA, was also targeted. FDJ Kreisleitung members was removed in Apolda and Worbis for this weakness. However, although pressure increased (for instance, SED members debated ‘very thoroughly’ with a Trebra youth until he ‘volunteered’),"* ultimately there was no alternative to introducing compulsory conscription in 1962. Young people avoided the meetings where they were expected to enlist voluntarily, and relatively few FDJ functionaries were loyal enough to implement the campaign, particularly at local level where they often preferred to avoid difficult debates."^

27 September 1961 (note 99), pp.3-4.

RdB, ‘Einschatzung über die Durchfuhrung der konstituierenden Sitzungen der am 17.9.61 gewahlten Volksvertretungen’, 5 October 1961, ThHStAW, Vs/St 577, fols 157-8.