Serle on objectivity

I do strive for objectivity in the full knowledge that it is a vain task, but the struggle is everything.

(Serle, 1973: 59)

The requirement for ‘absolute’ accuracy or objectivity, as expressed in the codes, can only refer to the interpreter’s aim, rather than to consistent performance. In dealing with human interpreters and human communication, exactness is not an achievable goal. As some have argued (e.g. Rudvin, 2002; Wallmach, 2002), the interpreter cannot be expected to be devoid of subjectivity. They ‘cannot be wholly “neutral”

any more than [they] can be wholly invisible’ (Rudvin, 2002: 223). Inter-preters will inevitably form their own opinions about the people for whom they are interpreting, about the fairness of the process, about the likely truthfulness of the utterances, about the quality of the professional

services, and so on. This is unavoidable and the codes of ethics acknowledge it:

Even if the interpreter disagrees with what is said, thinks it is wrong, a lie or even immoral, the interpreter must suspend judgment, make no comment, and interpret everything accurately.

(CCHCP) Members shall remain neutral, impartial, and objective. They will refrain from altering a message for political, religious, moral, or philo-sophical reasons, or any other biased or subjective considerations.

(AVLIC) Interpreters and translators are not responsible for what clients say or write.

(AUSIT) These statements acknowledge that interpreters will often disagree with what the speakers say for political, religious, philosophical or other reasons, or may even consider that the speakers are lying or are immoral.

These are all subjective judgements that interpreters will form when they participate in any interaction. What the codes of ethics expect of interpreters, however, is for them to be aware of and to control their subjectivity so that they do not interfere with their ability to render the utterance faithfully. If they believe their subjectivity constitutes a conflict of interest, making it impossible for them to render an accurate interpretation, then disqualification from the job is advised. In other words, ethical behaviour on the part of the interpreter implies that even if the interpreter disagrees with a statement uttered by one of the parties, the interpreter will not alter it to suit their beliefs. The ‘linguistic actor’

metaphor (Laster and Taylor, 1994) can be used here to reflect the prin-ciple of impartiality. The actor who takes on the role of a criminal will not be expected to be one in their personal life. Similarly, the interpreter who speaks for someone else is not expected to be, think or act like that person in their personal life.

As some have stated, it can be very difficult for interpreters to remain impartial under conditions of extreme emotion (Barsky, 1996; Mason, 1999; Wallmach, 2002). Community interpreters are made privy to the most intimate information affecting others, which may include such distressing accounts as domestic violence or child abuse. The truthful-ness of those accounts is unknown to the interpreter. Making a conscious effort to remain impartial can help avoid emotional involvement and

possible burn-out. As Smirnov comments: ‘Community interpreters must therefore have a proper understanding of their role and profes-sional ethics, as they will have to function in situations of unbalanced power relationships and high emotional tension’ (1997: 215). Garber also mentions that the imbalance of power in community settings has led many to prescribe the advocate role for community interpreters. He states that in Ontario this belief has mostly been abandoned as inter-preters ‘recognize that the power of the client is enhanced through his ability to speak as directly as possible to the service provider with the confidence that he understands and is understood’ (Garber, 2000: 19).

Interpreters, however, are not alone in this. Other service professions share these dilemmas.

One of the interpreters in the sample presented the issue of impar-tiality as an ethical dilemma, although he still claims to abide by the code’s requirements:

Quote 4.6

I am a committed Muslim and sometimes an issue would be raised that contradicts my beliefs and I find myself, in the process of interpreting, emphasizing it against my own beliefs.

(Respondent 5)

Another interpreter, in speaking of the guidelines found in the code states:

Quote 4.7

So far, I have never come upon a situation that I have needed to call on them and they have not been able to give me an ‘answer’ as to what to do or how to behave. I may not always ‘like’ it – but it is there. It’s then up to me whether I do the ‘right’ thing or not.

(Respondent 8)

These interpreters admit that at times it is difficult to apply the code to their practice, mostly due to pressure from their own beliefs or opinions, but they nevertheless do it. In contrast, Respondent 3, who opposes the code, deliberately goes against it ‘on a daily basis, if not hourly’. This interpreter has made a conscious decision to disregard the code, as it is of no value at all to their practice.

In speaking about the role of legal mediators, Greatbatch and Dingwall comment that:

Like other professionals, such as television interviewers, mediators may be accused of bias even though they have avoided the direct expression of opinion. Nonetheless, the maintenance of a neutralistic stance provides a first line of defence against such charges. (Great-batch and Dingwall, 1999: 274)

No one can deny that total impartiality is impossible. However, a conscious ‘neutralistic’ stance can go a long way in assuring as much impartiality as is possible to allow for an ethical performance. For Miguélez (2003) impartiality is crucial in achieving an accurate inter-pretation in community interpreting, supporting the ethical require-ments stated in the codes of ethics. The logic behind this argument is that interpreters with a personal interest in an outcome may change the utterances to facilitate that outcome, although the result of such interference may be different from the one expected, as much of the research has shown (cf. Hale, 2004). According to Rudvin, ‘One of the underlying assumptions among interpreters and service providers alike is that ‘being neutral’ equals translational equivalence’ (2002: 231), an assumption with which she disagrees. This is not explicit in the codes of ethics. Being neutral cannot equate to being faithful, as faithfulness requires much more than neutrality. Neutrality, however, can facilitate faithfulness of interpretation. A conscious attempt to remain neutral is simply one of the many aspects that can help an interpreter render a faithful interpretation.

Concept 4.3 Does forming an opinion constitute unethical