Protests targeting ‘service delivery’ typically revolve around a series of community organised gatherings – some violent – over lack of housing, water and sanitation (Buhlungu et al. 2007; Thompson & Nleya 2010; Allan & Heese 2011; Nleya 2011; Mottiar & Bond 2011; Paret 2015). Protests are frequent in South Africa, an average of more than 8000 gatherings take place each year since the mid-2000s, according to the South African Police Service (Mottiar & Bond 2011). Based on a sample from the media, protest incidents average just over twenty per month (Mottiar & Bond 2011). The exact configuration of grievances has varied from protest to protest and community to community but invariably, issues linked to deficits in ‘service delivery’ have featured prominently (Nleya 2011).
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Since 2004, South Africa has persistently experienced weekly, monthly and yearly cycles of this familiar genre of local protests that in one account at least, amount to a rebellion of the poor (Alexander 2010; Allan & Heese 2011). This “rebellion” has been widespread and intense, reaching insurrectionary proportions in some cases. Going by mainstream terminology, the protests have been about service delivery and have been targeted at uncaring, self-serving, and corrupt leaders of municipalities. A key feature has been mass participation by a new generation of protesters, especially unemployed youth as well as school pupils and university students (Alexander 2010). Whatever else may be said about them, ‘service delivery protests’ can be seen as a means by which protesters speak and hold the state to account.
‘Service delivery’ protests have some distinct markers. For instance, protesters are confined to spaces that are geographically remote from where other citizens easily access services. The features of mobilisation of these protests bear similar spatial marks, in terms of the operations of local politics, and “the use of spatial technologies and tactics such as barricades, the myriad ways in which crowds occupy, use and manipulate spaces, and the struggles over territory” (Bozzoli 2004:9). Though the specifics of grievances sparking protest may vary, ‘service delivery protests’ are similar “in forms of contention, geographical space, organization and demographics” (Alexander & Pfaffe 2014:207).
If Alexander’s (2010) definition of the protests, as a reflection of people’s disappointments with the fruits of democracy in the post-apartheid era holds, then even the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall movements by university students in 2015 would fit under ‘service delivery protest’. But is this really the case? Alexander (2010) contends that the neoliberal policies adopted by the ANC are the root cause of the current malaise. Privatisation of local services, he alleges, opened up new possibilities for private accumulation by ‘self-seeking’ government officials. Neoliberalism has not only entrenched inequality in the country but has also engendered desperation in the populace. The latest violent protests, which most unemployed young adults from the townships take part in are an expression of that
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desperation that stems from the exclusions of neoliberal government policies (Alexander 2010).
The democratic order introduced in 1994 brought with it expectations that everyone would be listened to and their problems addressed. The expectation of a new culture of public consultation and articulation between popular needs and government action (Booysen 2009) seemed to have been the basis of the new constitution and the Bill of Rights. However, gradual realisation that democracy has only meant the rich getting richer and the poor being confined to poverty has led to the “rebellion of the masses” that Mandela seems to have predicted in 1991 and the “rebellion of the poor” that Alexander (2010) speaks of in some of his writings on service delivery protests. The cases of failure of both participation and substantive transformation that the citizens of the country experienced and continue to experience appear to have spawned protests as a ‘self-initiated’, bottom up form of participation (Booysen 2009).
The demands on the national fiscus keep growing, but the shrinking returns of the neoliberal economy are leading to competition for scarce resources. Typically, the elite get to the ‘feeding trough’ first. Only after politicians have had their fill, and corporations have shared out their profits, earnings and dividends, is the question of service delivery raised. As a result, the people only get ‘crumbs’. My sense is that the majority of South Africans are tired of the ‘crumbs’ that are thrown at them, and want an end to this systemic exclusion. Taking this ‘crumbs’ perspective may suggest that this is not just a question of ‘delivery’ or ‘services’, but one of economic and social justice. Community protests, it seems, will remain a common phenomenon in South Africa (Jain 2010) unless and until fundamental structural inequalities and economic justice are settled.
The tendency amongst many scholars of protest in South Africa is to attribute the causes of ‘service delivery protests’ to dissatisfaction with ‘service delivery’, unfulfilled promises, corruption and nepotism in local government and the fact that the voices of ordinary people are not being heard (Fobosi 2011; Nembambula 2014) .The shrinking returns of the neoliberal economy partly explain why local governments and
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municipalities in South Africa are faced with major challenges regarding ‘service delivery’ (Fobosi 2011). Service delivery issues are often mentioned in media reports as part of a blend of issues that have caused different communities to protest. However, the role of ‘service delivery’ in the generation of these protests has so far not been investigated directly (Nleya 2011).
One contrarian view is to question the whole notion of service delivery protests. In his forthcoming book, Apartheid Studies (2017, Forthcoming), Mboti argues that while the element of “protest” is quite evident, a prefix such as “service delivery” inserts a contradiction, due to the fact that the notion of protest suggests agency, while that of “delivery” suggests passivity. Thus:
The meaning of “services”, worryingly, is yet to be interrogated in any rigorous way. In the normative account of “service delivery”, the “services” are delivered from somewhere on high, presumably from government. People seemingly protest only on three grounds: because “services” are late in arrival, inadequate, or of poor quality. The inverse assumption, of course, is that if “services” come early and on time, are adequate (whatever constitutes adequate or enough), and of good quality, then South Africans would be happy and would cease protesting. It is my view that any such account that limits people’s freedom of action to three reflex actions (“late”, or “not enough” or “not good enough”), whether in isolation or in combination, is quite clearly dehumanising (Mboti 2017: 85, forthcoming)
From the establishment’s point of view, Mboti (2017, forthcoming) contends, the protesters are law-breakers engaging in wilful vandalism. The tendency is thus towards the constant criminalisation of the poor. Indeed, in most cases, some government officials dismiss the legitimacy of the protests entirely (Buhlungu et al. 2007), describing protesters as incorrigible criminals.
There is some truth to the view that protests have exacerbate the myth that poor South Africans are an ‘entitled lot who want things for free’. Little thought, however, is spared for the reverse view that the protesters are in fact attempting to protect their communities from a range of abuses by the state. The state has continuously adopted “global and internal measures whereby segments of the population are treated differently, leading to injury, violence and vulnerability” (Stewart 2014:2). As such,
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before focusing on the violence of protesters, it is important to recognise the violence of the state and of the neoliberal order.
2.7 “Service Delivery Protests”: Some Case Histories
Below I present some “case histories” of “service delivery protests” from 2004, the year generally regarded as the origin of the phenomenon, as recorded in the literature and media. The purpose of these “case histories” is merely to present an outline of the kind of story that these protests elicit. Patterns that emerge from these cases are that the protests are i) massive, ii) violent, iii) often about electricity, houses and water, sewage, corruption and jobs, and iv) targeted against mayors, councillors and local governments. Generally, the protests seem to be the culmination of frustrations that often build up over a long period of time. The explosion, however, is sudden – leading to the episodic treatment in the media. Every town or every municipality has its own particular and nuanced combination of factors leading to the eruption of protests.
Case 1
On the 5th of July 2004, violent protests erupted in Diepsloot on the periphery of
Johannesburg. About 3000 protesters marched through the streets demanding that councillors be dismissed from employment for the sub-standard services provided (Buhlungu et al. 2007). About 16 000 families, roughly 150 000 people live in these informal settlements, in backyard shacks that are assembled from metal, wood, plastics or cardboard. Many of these families lack access to basic services such as water, sewage, electricity and rubbish removal (Buhlungu et al. 2007).
Case 2
In the first week of September 2004, violent protests took place in Harrismith, in the eastern part of the Free State Province. Residents demanded that the town be withdrawn from Maluti-a-phofung Municipality (Buhlungu et al. 2007). The protesters also called for a resignation of the mayor and 5 councillors. The concerns raised during this demonstration included accusations that there had been no service delivered at all in Harrismith, that the councillors were selling RDP houses for cash, that the mayor and the councillors failed to respond to their demands and written protests, and that
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the municipality had failed to provide electricity in their area. During the same protest, one young boy was killed in a scuffle between the South African Police and the protesters (Buhlungu et al. 2007; Booysen 2007; Veriava 2014).
Case 3
Beginning from September 2004, protests took place virtually all over the country. In Ekurhukeni Metro (East Rand), residents from Harry Gwala informal settlements took to the streets of Benoni protesting against poor ‘service delivery’. On September the 11th, two houses were petrol bombed in the North West, where protesters demanded
to be listened to (Buhlungu et al. 2007). In Durban, 5000 protesters held the third march of the year demanding houses and services. In Mpumalanga, protesters demanded the resignation of the council manager following a typhoid outbreak in the area that was reported to have been caused by malnutrition. In 2005, 600 people were diagnosed with the disease and at least 4 residents were reported to have died from it. On 22 September, the Star Newspaper reported that the police were firing randomly at residents who had taken to the streets to protest against the outbreak (Buhlungu et al. 2007).
Case 4
Protests occurred in the other provinces of the country, such as Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth (P.E.) in the Eastern Cape, and in Secunda in Mpumalanga. In May 2004, protesters in P.E claimed that they felt abandoned by the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan municipality, and were tired of its false promises. On the 15th of August, in Frankfort
(Free State, Mafube Municipality), residents complained and protested over the poor treatment of disabled children, maladministration of service fees and lack of job creation (Buhlungu et al. 2007). The protests were widespread. During the 2004/2005 financial year, 5085 legal protests and 881 illegal protests had been recorded (Buhlungu et al. 2007).