• Henning Hermes. ‘Motivating Low-Achievers – Relative Performance Feedback in School.’
Authors: Björn Bartling, Alexander Cappelen, Henning Hermes, Marit Skivenes, Bertil Tungodden
Abstract: Across the globe, the use of e-learning software is a fast- growing phenomenon, already in early educational stages. Most of these applications provide rankings or leader boards as motivational tools. However, this relative performance feedback often has negative effects on low-achievers. We suggest a new form of relative performance feedback that scores performance improvements. Using a randomized-controlled trial in primary schools, we show that relative performance feedback on performance improvements substantially increases motivation and performance in math for low-achieving pupils, without hurting high- achieving pupils. This example shows that feedback in e-learning systems could have the potential to reduce inequalities in educational settings by improving motivation and learning outcomes for low-achievers.
• Haoran He. ‘Goal setting, effort provision and performance: a field experiment in college physical training courses.’
Authors: Haoran He, Ronghai Su, Qian Weng
Abstract: Goal setting may be a low-cost, scaleable and logistically simple commitment device to help students to self-regulate their behavior, and increase their effort and consequently improve their performance. We investigate the effects of two types of goal setting (i.e., goal set at absolute and relative performance) on effort provision in training and test performance by conducting field experiments in college physical training classes. We exogenously vary whether or not a goal is set and whether or not the goal is set based on knowing one’s ability. We find that goal setting has positive effect on effort provision in training and test performance. This positive effect varies significantly across types of goal setting and across types of students in terms of their ability and various individual preferences through the channel of setting different types of goals. Policy implications are discussed.
• Yu Gao. ‘It’s So Hot in Here: Information Avoidance, Moral Wiggle Room, and High Air Conditioning Usage.’
Authors: Giovanna d’Adda, Yu Gao, Russell Golman and Massimo Tavoni
Abstract: Environmental policies based on information provision are widespread, but have often proven ineffective. One possible explanation for information’s low effectiveness is that people actively avoid it. We conduct an online field experiment on Mechanical Turk and a field experiment on households in China on air conditioning usage to test the theory of moral wiggle room, according to which people avoid information that would compel them to act morally, against the standard theory of information acquisition, and identify conditions under which each theory applies. In the experiments, we observe how exogenously imposing a feeling of moral obligation to reduce air conditioning usage and exploiting natural variation in the cost of doing so, given by outside temperature, influences subjects’ avoidance of information about their energy use impacts on the environment. Moral obligation increases information avoidance when it is hot outside, consistent with the moral wiggle room theory, but decreases it when outside temperature is low. Avoiding information positively correlates with air conditioning usage. These findings provide guidance about tailoring the use of nudges and informational tools to the decision environment.
• Shemal Doshi. ‘Fine as a Nudge: Experimental Evidence.’
Authors: Shemal Doshi and Abhijeet Chandra
Abstract: Fine can be a price but to what extent? More importantly, do fines act as nudges to provoke behavior in long run? In this study, we attempt to answer these questions. Based on the arguments made by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) who provide evidence against the deterrent hypothesis that suggests that a penalty that leaves everything else unchanged reduces the occurrence of the behavior subject to the fine. In this paper, we empirically examine the model suggested by Lin and Yang (2006) that provides a complementary explanation and qualifies but does not lose the predictive power of the deterrence hypothesis. Employing experimental approach for controlled and uncontrolled groups of graduate students, we explore as to what extent individuals perceive monetary penalty as a deterrent. We examine that the amount of fine, significance
of it’s with respect to the overall payoff, and the type of fine needs to be taken into consideration before generalizing the above hypothesis. Our empirical experimental evidence suggests that the subjects show a higher propensity to comply with the stipulated norm that “they should not avoid the rules” in a peer-influenced environment than when subjected to isolated experiments. Our results further reveal that their tendency to pay fine and get away with the situation is inversely related with the quantum of fine imposed and directly correlated with the frequency of the rule-breaking behavior. These results confirm the findings of Lin and Yang (2006) that penalty should be substantial enough to deter the individuals, rather than just fining them for the sake of penalty. Finally, we argue that the theory of “fine is a price” doesn’t just apply to a single kind of event or model. It can be observed that such trends are also followed up in many another set up too. In case of a multi-step game, we observed that people often tend to go for paying up a penalty if they are going to get the better payoff after subsequent events.