1 Shaikh Hamad.

On the question of the control of Bahrain's Customs by Britain, the Government of India observed that such a measure "should secure an effective check on the trade in arms". If Meade was authorised to recognise Shaikh Hamad as successor to the Shaikhship, the Government of India thought that the Resident "might, perhaps, simultaneously

inform the present Shaikh, in general terms, that we should welcome some improved arrangement in respect to the customs". The authorities in India had, deliberately or otherwise, overlooked Meade's recommendation that recognition of Hamad's succession should only be given in return for control of the Customs. They would be prepared to lend Shaikh

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Isa the services of a qualified officer to manage his Customs, and Meade might be able at the same time to "devise some more suitable arrangement than that now in force for the discharge of local political duties in Bahrain". However, it was considered that Meade's suggestion for the appointment to Bahrain of a Political Officer of higher rank than

1 Govt, of India, F.D., to Sec. of State for India, 27 October 1898, No. 19^» L/P & S/7/108, register No. 10V+.

Agha Muhammad Rahim was too vague for the Government of India to base

• •

any recommendation on it and Meade had been asked to report again on

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this question. This move clearly reflects the lack of any real interest, at this time, on the part of the Government of India in a forward policy in the Gulf.

The attitude of the India Office was quite different. Sir William Lee-Warner, the Secretary of the Political & Secret

Department, noted, in November 1898, that, in view of the commercial and strategic importance of Bahrain, it would be wise "to tighten our hold on the place". The arrangement by which a local trader was given "a few rupees" to represent British interests in the Shaikhdom had, not

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surprisingly, proved obnoxious to Shaikh Isa and others in Bahrain. Lee-Wamer clearly favoured Meade*s proposal for a change in the existing form of British representation. It was true that, in the past,

Bahrain had been recognised by Britain as having an independent Government. Even so, in Lee-Wamer*s view, "we must mean independent of all Governments except our own, because we have two treaties of 1861 and 1880 ... which are of a protective character". Further, Lee-Wamer observed, the 1880 agreement had actually omitted

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reference to Bahrain's independence.

Even so, no action could be taken in pursuance of Lee-Warner's suggestion until the further report, which the Government of India had asked Meade to make, had been received. Therefore, the India Office,

1 Ibid.

2 Minute by W. Lee-Warner, n.d. but some time in November 189 8, L/P & S/7/108, register No. 10Vf.

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in December 1898, merely secured the approval of the Foreign Office

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to the recognition of Hamad,

Meade soon pressed for instructions about the recognition issue. The matter had become urgent because the Resident intended visiting Bahrain personally in the near future, Meade added that it would probably be desirable, if Shaikh Hamad was recognised, "to declare our

m

protectorate over Bahrein, and thus put an end to all pretensions on the part of other powers” . Shaikh Isa ought to fly the British flag and "it should be formally notified that Bahrein is under our

2 protection"•

There was nothing essentially new about this pressure from Meade for Bahrain to be brought into a position of greater dependence on Britain, It came, however, just at the moment when the Government of India received a new head. On 6 January 1899* Lord Elgin had been replaced by Lord Curzon as Viceroy of India, Curzon was an unashamed

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imperialist. His great ambition in life was to safeguard the

British Empire and, especially, British rule in India which he regarded as the cornerstone of Britain's imperial greatness. Curzon's view of the defence of India was cast in terms of the seige. He regarded India's position as "like a fortress with the vast moat of the sea on two of her faces, and with mountains for her walls on the remainder".

1 India Office to Foreign Office, 2k November 1 89 8; Foreign Office to India Office, 9 December 1 8 9 8; Sec. of State for India to Viceroy, 16 December 1898, Secret No, 44, L/P & S/7/108, register No. 1044.

2 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 10 January 1899* No. 2, R/15/V315, pp. 137-38.

3 Curzon to Lord George Hamilton, Sec. of State for India, 9 July 1903» Curzon papers, F.111/162, quoted in David Dilks, Curzon in India (London, 1970), I, 237.

Beyond those walls extended "a glacis’1, Curzon's strategy in respect of which was described in the following terms:

We do not want to occupy it, but we also cannot afford to see it occupied by our foes. We are quite content to let it remain in the hands of our allies and friends, but if rivalry and unfriendly influences creep up to it and lodge themselves right under our walls, we are compelled to intervene, because a danger would thereby grow up that might one day menace our security.^

For Curzon, there was no more important part of this 'glacis*, which he considered vital to the defence of India, than Persia and the Gulf. Already, before he became Viceroy, he had built up a reputation as an expert on Persian and Gulf affairs. In 1892 he had published his classic Persia and the Persian Question. Moreover, Curzon had a great sense of personal mission with regard to the Gulf. In a letter of 8 January 1900, he had told St. John Brodrick, who was then occupying Curzon's old post of Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that he, Curzon, "who had worked for 10 years to get my countrymen to

understand the question and its importance" had been "fated to be" Viceroy of India, "the very place where I have the opportunity to save

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