The short timescale within which Keystone had to make changes

This chapter has argued that Keystone was in a crisis and that it is important to describe the components of that crisis. The components of the crisis discussed so far have been described as political and economic. However, a further contributing factor to the crisis has to be acknowledged - the pressure of the constraints of limited time. A key date was the Ofsted inspection of late 2003. This was the date to which all preparation was geared because Ofsted would be evaluating the LEA’s strategy. On the other hand the key report produced by the consultants, Clarion (2002), was produced only in 2002. Between these two dates, that is within a time frame of but a few months, the LEA conducted two major consultations both of which will be described later.

What is important for this argument is that those consultations were respectively with the headteachers of all schools and with all parents of children who had Statements of SEN. Bearing in mind that the LEA had close to 100 schools and had issued over a thousand Statements, meaning over a thousand parents had to be consulted, it is possible to understand the scale of the LEA’s tasks which had to be conducted in such a short time. My view is that the problem of time constraints can be overlooked as an explanatory factor in how the LEA responded. It is possible to analyse the LEA’s response

in terms of how it tried to balance and resolve the competing and

contradictory pressures of its financial and policy imperatives. But that would be to overlook the effect of ‘adhocery’ (Ball 1994). In other words even if the LEA wanted to resolve some of the contradictory pressure on it, if it ran out of time those contradictions would remain.

4.9 Conclusion

This chapter has set the scene for the chapters which deal with the data I gathered. In this chapter I have argued that in order to understand the way that Keystone dealt with the relationship between SEN and inclusion during the time of the study, it is necessary to acknowledge that Keystone was responding to a crisis. Furthermore, in order to understand Keystone’s response to its crisis it is necessary to understand the make-up of the crisis itself.

The chapter has shown that Keystone’s crisis consisted of multiple and overlapping dimensions. But in broad terms the chapter has demonstrated that there were two key strands of the crisis which have to be seen both as distinct and overlapping: a political strand and an economic strand. The

political strand centred around the impending Ofsted inspection, the economic strand related to the LEA’s acknowledged financial difficulties with its budget overall.

However, Ofsted itself, passing judgement on the LEA’s SEN policy, in turn placed a heavy emphasis on the financial problems relating specifically to SEN, claiming that the LEA had not yet been successful as regards the ‘distribution of resources’ for SEN. So the problem relating to the LEA’s

‘distribution of resources’ for SEN provision had two sources – an overarching source in that the LEA as a whole had been given a poor financial settlement by government, and a particular source, namely that the LEA’s record on balancing its SEN budget was historically weak. Whether it was so weak will be discussed in a later chapter.

The pressure to promote inclusion was mentioned as a contributing factor to the crisis within SEN. While the financial problems relating to the ‘distribution of resources’ for SEN no doubt had to be resolved, the LEA was also under pressure to at the same time ‘promote inclusion’.

Another important function of this chapter was to introduce the concept of the SEN ‘time bomb’. It was argued that the use of this term raised the possibility of reducing budgets for SEN. This in turn would mean that some, if not all, children with SEN would ‘lose’. The analysis which follows, in the body of the thesis, will evaluate to which extent Keystone was in fact experiencing a SEN ‘time bomb’. The analysis will also contribute to theory-making by critically evaluating the usefulness of the term SEN ‘time bomb’ in the light of the experience of Keystone.

In the following chapters I will argue that Keystone’s perceived economic crisis became the vehicle for the reallocation of political priorities. Pupils with Statements and within the overall category of SEN were going to be

Appendix

Key Information about SEN Provision in Keystone, 2002/3

According to Keystone, DfES estimates were that 22% of school pupils in England were identified with SEN and just over 3% had a Statement. The total number of pupils in Keystone was 53,746.

3.07% of the total number of pupils in Keystone had Statements. The actual number of pupils who had Statements of SEN was 1650.

Of these, 1186 (66%) were in mainstream schools (including special units). But 1016 (62% of the total number who had Statements) were in mainstream schools (excluding special units).

Expenditure on SEN

Category Sum Percentage

SEN/AEN £9,817,000 34% Statement Top-ups £3,943,000 14% Special Schools £4,859,000 17% Mainstream Units £1,798,000 6% Statement Out-borough £8,392,000 29% Total £28,809,000

Special Schools (background information)

Type of SEN Primary/Secondary Number of pupils

Severe Primary 79

Moderate Primary 85

Severe Secondary 60

Specialist provision in Mainstream Schools (background information)

Autistic Primary 12 Language and Comm Primary 12 Speech and Language Primary 18 Speech and Language Secondary 12 Physical Primary 11 Physical Secondary 14

Hearing Primary 20

Hearing Secondary 14 Specific Learing Difficulties Secondary 25 Emotional and Behavioural Secondary 32

Total 170

All the information here is based on:

Special Educational Needs Inclusion Strategy

Consultation on Policy and Provision For Pupils with Special Educational Needs in Keystone (2013)