To resolve the problem, negotiations at ministerial
level took place between Malaysia and Singapore.
11. For the Singapore position on the issue, see PDS, V o l . 25, No. 1, 25.2.66, Col. 16-50.
96o
The agreement arrived at was that the Malaysian troops could remain behind in Singapore but they
would be withdrawn when Singapore had built sufficient
troops of her own. Subsequently, the Malaysian troops
15 were withdrawn from the island.
Absence of Coordination
The idea that Malaysia-Singapore 5s defence was indivisible was therefore not related to any bilateral
agreement to defend each other. The Separation Agree
ment, particularly Article V,had not defined the rights and obligations with clarity or precision and hence ib was open to diverse interpretation to suit each other’s objective. Besides, the lack of agree ment on defence cooperation, between Malaysia and
Singapore, there was no machinery to facilitate either consultation or coordination in defence matters.
13. Tun Razak’s letter, which informed the Singapore
government of the decision to withdraw and which was revealed by Lee Kuan Yew, read in part as followss
I also understand that since the separation of
Singapore, the Government of Singapore has increased its Armed Forces for purpose of defence of Singapore. The Malaysian Government therefore feels that it is no longer necessary to maintain its army units in Singapore and I am therefore informing you that they will be withdrawn completely from Singapore by 31st December, 1967.
YDS", Vol. 26, 24.1.68, Col. 110p. £4.
97
.The Joint Defence Council established after
Separation became defunct after a few months. It
was meant to be mainly an advisory body and a forum for consul cation, out more important, it was to provide for co-operation in security between the
14
two Governments. However, it became evident that
Singapore resented the dominance of Malaysia in the
Council. She felt that the administrative structure
and the objective reflected Malaysian interests and 15
not those of Singapore. For this reason, Singapore
withdrew from the Council. After the dissolution of
the Council, ad hoc arrangements on defence and security were agreed upon but despite a series of negotiation, no new body was formed to replace i t . ^
The lack of a machinery for joint consultation or negotiation substantiated the view that Malaysia 14. The Straits Times, 18.8.65.
15. Singapore stated that the papers continued to originate from the Malaysian Ministry of Defence and other service departments, and the agenda dealt mainly with matters of interest only to
the Malaysian Government. Ibid., 1.4.66.
16. Inter-governmental meetings of defence officials and ministerial meetings, particularly between Tun Eazak and Dr. Goh Card later Lim Kim San)
were held, but nothing came out of it. See for example,
Suara Malaysia, Vol.2 ^’#.14, April 1, 1966,p.l and
9Ö.
and Singapore were formulating policies independent
of each other in defence and security matters. In
turn, the absence of coordination in their defence
build-up , equipment procurement and duplication
of services reflected separate over-all defence
policies. This incompatibility in their defence
structure and policies further created stress and strains in Malaysia-Singapore relations.
The impetus to the need for expansion in the defence forces of Malaysia and Singapore was the announcement of the British withdrawal East of Suez. There were other factors which gave rise to urgency
in both countries to build up their own defencess there was the need to build up their armed forces to
maintain internal stability5 the need for eventual
self-reliance for their defence and participation in a new regional defence arrangement.
Malaysia’s priority in defence planning was to
build up the Army and Air Force. In the development
of the Army, Malaysia?s objective was to have a highly-trained mobile force, assisted oy a large
99
.17
reserves. The Royal Malay Regiment which had
been described as the backbone of the country’s defence was expanded from seven battalions in 1963
to fourteen by the end of 1969. The other
indigenous regular forces were the Borneo Rangers, one battalion each from Sarawak and Sabah, which were raised, trained and equipped by the British
13
Government.
The essential character of the Malaysian Army was the dominance of Malays in the various units, particularly, in the Royal Malay Regiment and the
volunteer services. In any conflict, it became
apparent that the Army units would be prejudiced
17. The Straits Times, 26.11.6 5.
18. The Royal Malay Regiment established in 1933»
was open only to the Malays. They contributed
the majority of the Malaysian soldiers sent
to the Congjfo as part of the United Nation force. In late i960, it was decided that the Borneo
natives could join the Royal Malay Regiment. Following the racial riots in 1969, the Royal Malay Regiment was increased to fourteen batta
lions. The Commonwealth allies were requested
to expedite their assistance of arms and other equipment for the new battalions. The raising of the Borneo battalions was part of an agree ment concluded between Malaysia and the United Kingdom when Malaysia was formed. The Straits
100
.
iq
against the non-Malays.' y The effect of this to
Singapore could be seen in the reiteration by her that the threat to her was from communalism as well as
communism. Malaysia, on the other hand, was conscious
of the policy of Singapore to develop her defence
system based on the Israeli model. This was evident
in Singapore's introduction of the citizens' army compulsory military service and the use of Israeli
advisers. Singapore's capability was aimed to ward
off aggression for a short period before assistance 20
arrived, but the Malaysian image of Singapore, due
to her efforts to create an Israeli type defence system, was one of a state prepared for preemptive action against a potential aggressor.
What Singapore wanted was a speedy and efficient build-up of the Army without incurring heavy cost. The programme which finally emerged was a combination
19. This occurred in the major racial clash in Kuala Lumpur in May 1969» See F.V. Gagliano, Communal Violence in Malaysia 1969s The Political Aftermath,
Ohio University, Center for Internati ona 1 Studi e s ,
Papers in International Studies - Soucheast Asian Series No. 13
101