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Small-and-medium Sized Enterprises

Chapter 3 Entrusted Loans and SOEs Lending Activities

3.3 Model Framework

3.3.4 Small-and-medium Sized Enterprises

Before turning to the optimization problem in the SME sector, one needs to be clear that the key difference between SMEs and SOEs is the financial condition. SOEs can borrow funds at a risk-free rate, while SMEs cannot. SMEs need to pay an extra risk premium to offset the potential loss in case of a default. Hence, the purpose of this sector is to first determine the risk premium for a specific loan contract and solve the maximization problem. SMEs are permitted to keep the retained profit once they fulfil the interest payment to SOEs. Therefore, the expected return of a surviving SME from the capital investment can be defined as,

𝐸 {∫ πœ”π‘–π‘…π‘‘+1𝐾 𝑄𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑑𝐹(πœ”)

∞ πœ”Μ…

βˆ’[1 βˆ’ 𝐹(πœ”Μ…π‘–)]πœ”Μ…π‘– 𝑅𝑑+1𝐾 𝑄𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸} (17)

The expectation operator 𝐸 indicates the expected return on investment, 𝑅𝑑+1𝐾 . The first part in equation (17) implies the total return from the investment and the second part is the interest payment on the loans with the non-default probability 1 βˆ’ 𝐹(πœ”Μ…π‘–). The above equation can be simplified as,

[1 βˆ’ 𝛀(πœ”Μ…π‘–)]𝑅𝑑+1𝐾 𝑄𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 (18) Where 𝛀(πœ”Μ…π‘–) = ∫ πœ”π‘–π‘‘πΉ(πœ”) ∞ πœ”Μ… + 𝐺(πœ”Μ…π‘–) (19)

95 And 𝐺(πœ”Μ…π‘–) = ∫ πœ”π‘–π‘‘πΉ(πœ”) πœ”Μ… 0 (20)

Rearranging the SOE entrusted lenders’ participation constraint (15),

∫ πœ”π‘–π‘‘πΉ(πœ”) ∞ πœ”Μ… + (1 βˆ’ πœ‡) ∫ πœ”π‘–π‘‘πΉ(πœ”) πœ”Μ… 0 =𝑅𝑑+1 𝐿 𝑅𝑑+1𝐾 𝐡𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 𝑄𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 (21)

Combining with the notation in equation (19) and (20), the constraint can then be written as, 𝛀(πœ”Μ…) βˆ’ πœ‡πΊ(πœ”Μ…) =𝑅𝑑+1 𝐿 𝑅𝑑+1𝐾 𝐡𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 𝑄𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 (22)

Where 𝛀(πœ”Μ…) βˆ’ πœ‡πΊ(πœ”Μ…) represents the net share of profits going to the SLB. The optimization problem is then to maximise the objective function (18) of the SME, 𝑖, subject to the participation constraint of the SOE entrusted lenders (22), and the Lagrangian is, β„’ = [1 βˆ’ 𝛀(πœ”Μ…π‘–)]𝑅𝑑+1𝐾 𝑄𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 + πœ†π‘‘π‘†π‘€πΈ[𝛀(πœ”Μ… )βˆ’ πœ‡πΊ(πœ”Μ… )βˆ’ 𝑅𝑑+1𝐿 𝑅𝑑+1𝐾 𝐡𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 𝑄𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 ] (23)

Simplifying the notation by denoting 𝑠𝑑 = 𝑅𝑑+1𝐾

𝑅𝑑+1𝐿 , and ℡𝑑 =

𝑄𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸

𝐡𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 . The F.O.Cs with respect to πœ”Μ…π‘–, ℡𝑑 and πœ†π‘‘π‘†π‘€πΈ are,

βˆ‚πœ”Μ…π‘–: 𝛀′(πœ”Μ…π‘–)=πœ†π‘‘π‘†π‘€πΈ[𝛀′(πœ”Μ… )βˆ’ πœ‡πΊβ€²(πœ”Μ… )] (24)

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βˆ‚πœ†π‘‘π‘†π‘€πΈ: [𝛀(πœ”Μ… )βˆ’ πœ‡πΊ(πœ”Μ… )]𝑠𝑑℡𝑑= β„΅π‘‘βˆ’ 1 (26)

Rearranging equation (26), we can obtain a critical link between capital expenditure and financial conditions, which indicates the risk premium, denoted as 𝑠𝑑, of the non- affiliated loan contract,

𝑠𝑑= 𝐸𝑑(𝑅𝑑+1 𝐾 𝑅𝑑+1𝐿 ) =

1 βˆ’ 𝑁𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑/𝑄𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸

𝛀(πœ”Μ…) βˆ’ πœ‡πΊ(πœ”Μ…) (27)

Equation (27) indicates the relationship between risk premium and the net worth (or retained earnings) of an SME, 𝑖, in period 𝑑. The risk premium is defined as the spread between the expected return on capital, 𝑅𝑑+1𝐾 , and the risk-free rate, 𝑅

𝑑+1𝐿 . The risk premium 𝑠𝑑 is greater than 1 and it is clearly seen that the higher the net worth, 𝑁𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑, the lower the risk premium the SME needs to pay with ceteris paribus laws. 1 βˆ’ 𝑁𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑/𝑄𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 indicates the firm’s leverage ratio. Intuitively, firms with more retained earnings tend to have lower default probability as they can use more internal finance instead of external funds, or equivalently, firms with less probability of default can take on debt with a lower cost of funds.

I then need to determine the net worth accumulation of the SMEs. In each period, SMEs face a survival ratio23 , 𝛾

, therefore (1 βˆ’ 𝛾) SMEs exit the market. Let 𝑉𝑑 be

equity in period 𝑑, then the aggregate net worth in period 𝑑 + 1, 𝑁𝑒𝑑𝑑+1 is given by,

23

This assumption is to rule out the case that one SME may accumulate net worth sufficiently in the future and never require borrowing from the financial intermediary. Empirically, it is well accepted that substantial number of start-ups firms end in failure and this is a common situation globally, for example, Hall and Woodward (2010) investigate the extreme cross-sectional dispersion in entrepreneurs’ payoffs.

97 𝑁𝑒𝑑𝑑+1= γ𝑉𝑑 (28) with 𝑉𝑑 = 𝑅𝑑𝐾𝑄 π‘‘βˆ’1𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸 βˆ’ [𝑅𝑑𝐿+ πœ‡ ∫ πœ”π‘…π‘‘πΎπ‘„π‘‘βˆ’1𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑑𝐹(πœ”) πœ”Μ… 0 𝐡𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸 ] 𝐡𝑑 𝑆𝑀𝐸 (29)

where γ𝑉𝑑 is the equity held by entrepreneurs at 𝑑 βˆ’ 1 who are still in business at 𝑑.

Entrepreneurial equity 𝑉𝑑 equals gross earnings of capital investment, 𝑅𝑑𝐾𝑄

π‘‘βˆ’1𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸, on holdings of equity from 𝑑 βˆ’ 1 to 𝑑, less repayment of borrowings (repayment of the loans, 𝑅𝑑𝐿𝐡𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸 plus the risk premium). The ratio of defaults costs to quantity borrowed reflects the premium for external finance,

πœ‡ ∫ πœ”π‘…π‘‘πΎπ‘„π‘‘βˆ’1𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑑𝐹(πœ”) πœ”Μ…

0

π‘„π‘‘βˆ’1𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸 βˆ’ 𝑁𝑒𝑑𝑑

(30)

After determining the risk premium and net worth of SMEs, I then turn to the production phase, SMEs borrow money from SOEs entrusted lenders and purchase capital in period 𝑑 for use in the following period 𝑑 + 1. Capital and hired labour are used to produce intermediate goods, π‘Œπ‘–,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸, which follows a Cobb-Douglas function,

π‘Œπ‘–,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 = 𝐴𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸(𝐾𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸)𝛼1(𝑁𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸)(1βˆ’π›Ό1) (31)

where 𝐴𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 is an exogenous TFP shock in the SME’s sector. 𝐾𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 is the amount of

capital purchased by the SME in period 𝑑, 𝑁𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 is the labour demand, and 𝛼

1 is the

income share of capital. SMEs maximise profit by selling intermediate goods to the final goods producers, paying the wage and interests on the loans. At the end of each period, they sell back undepreciated capital to the capital goods producers. The profit

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function of the SME, 𝑖, is

πœ‹π‘–,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 = 𝑃𝑑+1𝑀,𝑆𝑀𝐸 𝑋𝑑+1𝑃𝑑+1𝑀 π‘Œπ‘–,𝑑+1 𝑆𝑀𝐸 βˆ’ 𝑀𝑑+1𝑁𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 βˆ’ 𝑅𝑑+1𝐾 𝐡𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝑄𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸(1 βˆ’ 𝛿𝑆𝑀𝐸)𝐾𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 (32)

Recalling that 𝐡𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 = 𝑄𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑑+1π‘†π‘€πΈβˆ’ 𝑁𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑+1 (the amount the SME borrows depends on

the value of the capital investment minus the net worth they have). 𝑋𝑑+1 is the relative price of intermediate goods which is between the aggregate wholesale price 𝑃𝑑+1𝑀 and the nominal price for the final good 𝑃𝑑+1.

𝑃𝑑+1𝑀,𝑆𝑀𝐸

𝑃𝑑+1𝑀 is the relative wholesale price of

goods produced in the SME sector which is between the sectoral wholesale price and the aggregate wholesale price. 𝑀𝑑+1 is the real wage. Assuming SMEs need to sell the undepreciated capital back to the capital goods producers at the end of the period

𝑑 + 1, hence, they need to purchase new capital for the production in the subsequent

period.

Taking the F.O. Cs with respect to 𝐾𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 and 𝑁𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸, we obtain,

βˆ‚πΎπ‘–,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸: 𝐸𝑑(𝑅𝑑+1𝐾 )= 𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝑄𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸(1 βˆ’ 𝛿𝑆𝑀𝐸) 𝑄𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸 (33) βˆ‚π‘π‘–,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸: 𝑀𝑑+1= (1 βˆ’ 𝛼1) 𝑃𝑑+1𝑀,𝑆𝑀𝐸 𝑋𝑑+1𝑃𝑑+1𝑀 π‘Œπ‘–,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 𝑁𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 (34)

Where 𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸represents the marginal product of capital in the SMEs’ sector, which is equal to 𝛼1 𝑃𝑑+1𝑀,𝑆𝑀𝐸

𝑋𝑑+1𝑃𝑑+1𝑀

π‘Œπ‘–,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸 𝐾𝑖,𝑑+1𝑆𝑀𝐸. 𝛿

𝑆𝑀𝐸 is the capital depreciation rate. Equation (33) states

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the return on capital investment. Equation (34) states the marginal product of labour in the SMEs’ sector.