As a final argumentative point before moving into a discussion of prescriptions for the future, it is worth briefly exploring the issue of good and bad research in regard to whether Private Forest Landowner (PFL) research is actually scientific, as the previous paragraph clearly suggests that it is not21. If it is not social science, then what is it? To do this, a brief recap of the ‘Theorising Science’ section of Chapter 1 will
21
As already discussed, this thesis sits within an ontology (critical realism) that pulls natural and social science into a philosophical frame that coherently deals with both together. That said, when dealing with the PFL literature in regarding how re- searchers and readers might understand science, it needs to be assumed that PFL research resides within the broad remit of the social sciences and that the social sciences are able to be discussed as being scientific. This statement is an assump- tion which is based on a literature largely left out of this thesis, mainly as it is an enormous literature and is strongly contested. It is not prudent to enter this literature as an exercise in discourse and synthesis in a short work like this, so in this thesis science has been defined and not explored as a concept itself.
be undertaken and then the current findings will be reflected against that. Further, Gerring (2001) will be used to define what good social science is22. This will all lead to a description of PFL research as failing to provide real understanding and essentially being politics by other means, most notably in support of the forestry milieu23.
Theorising science
If the argument of this thesis holds: that PFL research is evidenced by one dominant research rationality, an irrational rationality underlined by problematic or failed epistemological-practice interlinks and an unfa- vourable ideology in the NIPF problem, then as a generalisation most of the PFL research is not scientific and fails as social science. Clearly, it is treated as scientific by researchers from within the milieu and one suspects by many readers and that means I must now resolve this ten- sion.
In Chapter 1, I used Duran (1998) and Longino (2002) to (very cau- tiously) state what science is. In part, science is:
• undertaken by men and women who form a social group (commu- nity);
• it is undertaken (in some moment of time) as a complex nexus of social, cognitive and material practices;
• the practice (itself a form of knowledge) produces knowledge;
• knowledge is a status defined by the social group (of men and women) under particular conditions which include:
o having an embodied or artefactual form;
o recognised as having logical, evidential and social interactions in its formulation and justification;
o involving some kind of data evident to the social group;
22
Note: Gerring’s (2001) argument is underlined by a form of pragmatism and conse- quentialism (see the postscript in Gerring 2001).
23
An issue this thesis has not explored are the results depicted in each of the 31 cases (excepting YR87), as such an analysis was not required to secure the asser- tion. Therefore the issue of failure in producing understanding is then an inference from the results given in Chapter 3 and 4 regarding the general failure to be scien- tific, the evidenced problems with methodologies across the cases and the re- stricted ways in which landowners and nature are contextualised.
Chapter 5: Linking the epistemic and normative in a research rationality
o the data has to be arrived at through reasoning buttressed by critical scrutiny across the social group/community and in light of the communities goals;
o critical scrutiny involves having legitimate avenues of criticism, uptake of criticism, public standards and relative equality of intel- lectual authority.
o Its rationality is in part determined by:
having theorisations available which reflect diverse points of view;
choices are made via critical dialogue; and,
consensus is reached without coercion.
These issues were mostly engaged with in this thesis through the idea of the epistemic and of two normative states; one intimately involved in the epistemic and that tends to come with the epistemic and another separate to the epistemic but which becomes entwined with it as a sci- entific practice unfolds.
Where PFL research fails as a social science
This thesis has charted the formation and reporting on epistemic and both kinds of normative states across 32 case examples as part of an investigation into PFL research as social science. Taking this into ac- count, the question can now be answered as to whether PFL research, broadly speaking, is scientific. This will be done through reflecting the outlined model of science in the previous sub-section against the out- comes put forward in the thesis to this point.
The form the primary answer takes will be presented initially as a set of sub-questions and answers.
• QUESTION: is there a definable social group/community?
o ANSWER: yes, PFL researchers broadly constitute a definable sub-group or community in the forestry milieu, as viewed through the general practice of citing each other. Not all cases do though (see Chapter 1, pp. 17-18), so there is likely to be more than one community at work.
• QUESTION: what embodied or artefactual form does the knowledge take?
o ANSWER: in this case textual.
• QUESTION: do PFL researchers appear to practice a science to pro- duce knowledge?
o ANSWER: yes, the literature conforms to a form and product that is recognisable as a type of scientific knowledge.
• QUESTION: is the knowledge recognised through logical, evidential and social processes in its formulation and justification?
o ANSWER: yes, and most of Chapter 3 herein dealt with various components of such.
• QUESTION: what is the data recognised by the group?
o ANSWER: notably that constructed around the variable (as a measure of landowners self-reporting).
• QUESTION: is there critical scrutiny of the logical, evidential and so- cial processes utilised in its formulation and justification?
o ANSWER: largely, no. There are evident problems with method- ologies deployed, practices undertaken and the overt co- ordination of the understanding of social life via the NIPF prob- lem (as detailed in Chapter 3 and 4).
• QUESTION: is there diversity in potential theorisations?
o ANSWER: by and large, no. Again, Chapter 3 dealt with this lack of theoretical diversity and the further lack of critical reflection at- tendant to that.
So in summary, PFL research largely fails as a (social) science due to: 1) the fostering of an environment, stemming from a lack of critical
scrutiny, in which methodological errors are normalised alongside the containment of research topics within the scope of the NIPF problem; and,
2) there being little evidence in the case literature of either diverse theorisations or the potential for such as tested through critical dia- logue.
Chapter 5: Linking the epistemic and normative in a research rationality
Much of the argument to this point deals with the epistemic and social group/community failure to foster diversity and critique. For the trickier question of good or bad research and/or science it is worth turning to Gerring (2001). We can enter Gerring’s (2001) formulation via the ques- tion of discussing social science as being partly defined by its method- ology.
PFL research as overtly politics by other means
To be as brief as possible, the essential argument comes down to this (after Gerring 2001):
1. a good social science has at least some aspects of the following methodological conditions amongst concepts, propositions and re- search design elements: coherence, operationalization, validity, field utility, resonance, contextual range, parsimony, analytic/empirical utility, specification, accuracy, precision, breadth, depth, innovation, intelligibility and relevance (this is not the full listing and has been truncated for the sake of expediency: see Gerring 2001 for the rest). Aspects of a number of these classifications have been touched on in Chapter 3, although direct explanations have been provided for only a few, such as utility. What is perhaps most important to take from this is less definitions around the terms, but instead the general meaning that these conditions demark social science from, for in- stance, politics, law or journalism;
2. a good social science exists, “…to help citizens and policymakers better understand the world, with an eye to changing that world...[and in this]…it is more important to ask the question of so- cial science’s purpose, in a serious and conscientious way than to provide a specific answer…[and further in relation to being] relevant to present-day problems and concerns” (Gerring 2001: 247-249 - italics are in original text: note that these statements have some similarity to the critical realist emancipatory elements that were dis- cussed in Chapter 1);
3. therefore, use the methodology which will produce an appropriate outcome regarding point 2 above and use the selected methodology
as best dictated by the community of peers who developed, sup- ported or extended it as largely defined by elements given in point 1 above;
4. the securing of point 1, 2 and 3 above is the securing (by and large) of a good social science; and,
5. PFL research broadly violates point 1, 2, 3 and therefore 4 above. That is, there is scant attention payed in PFL research to methodo- logical issues in a broad sense - an outcome of which is the domi- nance of sample survey research and adherence to overtly mechanistic and abstracted models of data collection/analysis; fur- ther, there are common and widespread violations of methodological framings evident; and, specific answers are sought to only a few core questions which are constantly put forward (like how to get more landowners to manage) over asking what relevance the sci- ence has to landowners (and forests) when there is considerable evidence that points to the sheer diversity and complexity of land- owner lives. The summation: PFL research in general does not con- stitute a social science, broadly speaking.
The relevance argument deployed above should not be mistaken as stating that good social science is only good if it is directly relevant to policy or similar debates amongst the citizenry. Rather, that relevance comes from reflection on whether the proposed work would be some- thing citizens/policymakers would likely care about. On this basis and as part of a failure, an overwhelming amount of PFL research is fo- cused on just one set of fairly specific landowner cares (those closely allied to the concerns of the forestry milieu).
What then is PFL research? As noted above, to its practitioners, writers and readers it is likely to be treated as a science (with all the problematic ramifications that this portends), but I argue that after re- moving the dysfunctional epistemic elements it is for all intents and purposes an unfavourable ideology that should not be allowed to pass for science. It should instead be treated as a form of politics that uncriti- cally supports and reinforces the social good (discussed in Chapter 4) inherent to the forestry milieu, a social good that remains wedded to
Chapter 5: Linking the epistemic and normative in a research rationality
capital and the state and largely non-responsive to civil society as a whole.In this, understanding is crippled and the chances of developing a more mature and meaningful social science are delayed if not signifi- cantly reduced for the foreseeable future.
Exceptions to the norm: PFL research that is scientific
There are three probable although partial exceptions to the criticism in the previous sub-section.
1. The literature case of Karppinen (1998), Values and objectives of non-industrial private forest owners in Finland. It is an exception be- cause of all the literature accessed it alone managed to be consis- tently strong in conceptual, theoretical and research design elements. Further, it also investigates landowners worldviews (via values) as a process of potential change in landowners behaviour – a question that could be considered to deal with a consequence of modernity. Its partiality stems from not breaking the mould in terms of research methodology chosen (broadly, survey research), al- though this is a minor quibble.
2. The literature cases of Bliss and Martin (1989); Bliss (1992); Bourke and Luloff (1994); Egan and Jones (1993); Egan, et al., (1995). As noted, these cases all attempted methodological reform. Partiality, as noted in Chapter 4, stems from serious questions as to whether the authors actually understood the broader methodological consid- erations they were engaged with, as some confusion regarding methodological issues was found in their works.
3. Outside of the literature cases and drawing from the wider PFL lit- erature is Luloff (1995), Regaining vitality in the forestry profession: A sociologist’s perspective (the interest here is that this is the same Luloff of Bourke and Luloff (1994) as well as Egan, Jones, Luloff and Finley (1995), two of the literature cases investigated). It is a critique of the forestry milieu largely impelled from within the area of NIPF research and educational reform. Luloff (1995) makes the comment that:
[f]orestry’s biggest challenges come from society; unfortunately, far too many [forestry] professionals are not listening to peo- ple…[they]…must accept the premise that the traditional ap- proach to training foresters needs to be broadened to include courses in communications, philosophy, sociology, psychology, and economics. Such training will provide a strong foundation for the creation of independent thinkers – people who provide an- swers that are reasoned and reflect more than standard myths (p. 9).
That this argument is a microcosm of the argument put forward here is not surprising as I drew on it as part of the process of forming up this thesis, but what is surprising, and in terms of its partiality, is that in that article there is no considered engagement with the concerns of forestry (social) science at the level of methodology. Admittedly, it is a powerful argument without this element and Luloff brings up good points regardless, but this issue of methodology is the central rationale of forestry social science and that it is missing seems to me to likely further underline the critique here that the dominant irra- tional rationality, at least with its troubled epistemic elements, re- mains in place even in this exemplary case of reflection and care. In that these examples above provide real grounds for meaningful un- derstanding of landowners and researchers in a reflexive sense, they also provide grounds for hope. It is to this hope that we now turn in pro- viding a broad set of prescriptions for increasing the diversity of PFL re- search, an early starting point for recovery, reform and ethical reflection on the state of PFL research.