Some reflections on democracy and security

Nearly three decades ago, Petit (1987) sketched a social democratic theory of the State, defining social democracy as a ‘philosophy for policymaking’ (p. 543), a political movement. Social democracy questions and challenges the destructive excesses of capitalist societies, and their systemic inequalities. Instead, it proposes the ideal of the public or common good, organised around the principles of equality, solidarity and social justice (Loader and Sparks 2015, 16), including promoting the well-being and safety of the most vulnerable in society. In line with this, this thesis draws on and supports Robert Reiner’s (2010, 2011) proposal for a social democratic criminology that acknowledges that there is no peace without justice. Alongside other critical criminologists (Bowling et al. 2016, Currie 1991/2013, Jones, Newburn, and Smith 1996, 1994, Loader and Sparks 2015, Reiner 2010), I take the values and the philosophy of social democracy as critically important in crime control, public security and policing theory. This is not to say that the notions of democracy, security or even democratic policing are not contested. It is not the place here to detail all that is disputed in this debate, some of which is discussed elsewhere (Harkin 2015, Jones, Newburn, and Smith 1994, 37-48), but a few points are in order to clarify the viewpoint and argument of this thesis.

First, as Petit points out, democratic theories share one important element, that is, that the ‘social ideal of equal respect for all persons ought to be central to the organisation of society’ (1987, 538). There are caveats to this ideal. A key difference for example between the liberal democratic and the social democratic points of view is the focus on the individual or the State. For social democrats, it is inconceivable to imagine ‘all individuals as equal partners in the organisation of social and political life’ (ibid, 542). The social democrat perspective is grounded in the historical condition within which the State is a reality. It does not ask what equally valued individuals should require of institutions and of the State if they are to enjoy equal respect (ibid). Instead, the social democrat considers ‘what the state should do in the world as it is now in order to promote this ideal’ (ibid).

The second point to be acknowledged is that public services are affected by the incorporation or rejection of democratic ideals. As Jones, Newburn, and Smith (1994, 1) put it, ‘the protection of liberty, social and economic opportunities, and the ability of individuals to shape and develop their lives are crucially affected by a range of public services. The police are arguably the central public service in a modern state’. Policing is ambiguous and has the potential to affect different social groups in unequal ways, especially the most marginalised, often exacerbating inequalities by bringing the most disadvantaged into contact with the criminal justice system as suspects and perpetrators rather than as victims (Bowling et al. 2016, Loader 1996).

Selective targeting and discretionary practices of stop-and-search can disproportionately affect arrests, convictions and incarceration (Bowling et al. 2016, 140). The police and penal institutions mediate identity and status since their acts and omissions have the power to distinctively constitute people as part of the polity or define their place within hierarchical social structures (Loader and Sparks 2015, 38).

For these reasons, improving policing as a public service requires the adoption of fundamental democratic values (Bowling et al. 2016, 151). Since the police are supposed to protect essential freedoms, and monopolise the legitimate use of force, it is important to consider ‘democratic policing’, in some proposed definition, as

‘preferable to other arrangements’ (Jones, Newburn, and Smith 1994, 3) such as militarised policing (Huggins 1998). Democratic policing is the proposal that policing as a public service should follow democratic principles. In summary, as Jones, Newburn and Smith (1994, 44) outline, these criteria relate to:

1) Equity, that is, fair distribution of service and law enforcement.

2) Effective and efficient delivery of service.

3) Responsiveness, that is, the choice of policing methods and allocation of resources. Policing needs to be responsive to some expression of the public’s wishes. However, it must be emphasised that this principle must be balanced against the ideals of justice and equity so that the will of the majority is not favoured if it is discriminatory. As the authors argue, ‘it would be undemocratic for the police to adopt a highly discriminatory

policy of law enforcement, even if a local majority favoured such a policy’

(ibid, 47).

4) Distribution of power, that is, the power to decide which policing policies are adopted needs to be distributed.

5) Information needs to be published on funding, expenditure, activities and outputs.

6) Redress, which means that it should be possible for a representative body to dismiss unlawful, incompetent or corrupt officers or those who abuse their power.

7) Participation, that is, as far as possible, citizens should take part in discussions of policing policy with police managers. This last criterion, as the authors outline, is less of a priority than equity because of the difficulties in getting people together to discuss policy-making. The right not to participate is central to contemporary democracy as ‘it is not the case that every literate or sane person expects or wishes to actively participate in public policy-making’ (ibid, 45).

The final point to clarify is that in spite of the inevitable task of social control with the threat or potential use of coercive force, the police’s role is secondary in maintaining order and security (Bowling et al. 2016, Reiner 2011). That is to say that the police are not single-handedly able to control crime and promote order, neither is policing all about law enforcement. ‘The police are, in fact, an all-purpose emergency service charged with responding to a wide range of different urgent social problems’

(Bowling et al. 2016, 129). As Bowling at al note, much of the police function is, and should be related to peacekeeping and deploying dialogue, for instance mediating conflict, looking for missing people, persuading suicidal people not to jump off a ledge, dealing with accidents, escorting drunks and asking young people not to disturb the elderly (ibid, 131).

While radical Marxists perceive the police as repressive agents of the State, protecting the class interests of elites (Cohen 1979/1997, Storch 1976), this approach

can also be perceived as deterministic and structurally fatalistic in that it does not recognise important and positive peacekeeping aspects of public security institutions.

Indeed, the police can act as repressive agents of the State, protectors of classed interests to the disadvantage of the weakest. But the police can also be understood as a public service, which is needed by all social classes (Lea and Young 1993). Class and social justice are absolutely important in this debate, hence my proposal of a social democratic approach, foregrounding a ‘general’ order rather than the privilege of ‘particular’ classes or forms of order that privilege certain interests over public interests. The police as a public service can be understood as a necessary ‘all-purpose emergency service’ (Bowling et al. 2016, 129), which can be achieved with ‘good communication skills and the personal and institutional authority vested in the police uniform’ (ibid, 131) as well as the power to use force, with limits and when absolutely necessary.