Chapter 4 Analysis of the Data
4.1 Soviet Industrialisation and Technology Transfer
Russia’s defeat in WWI resulted in the 1917 Revolutions which were followed by the Civil War. It demonstrated that Russia needed modernisation and a dramatic change of policy in order to both survive and to be able to address its current and future challenges, as seen from Lenin’s articles and speeches above. The Bolsheviks, armed with Marx’ political theory of the hegemony of the working class and inspired by the ideals of the French Revolution such as
Liberté, égalité, fraternité, were keen to modernise the former Russian Empire and change the course of global history. Meanwhile, Marx’s economic theory of productive forces, as outlined by Buzgalin, did not provide much detail on the development of technology and industry in terms of a new industrial revolution occurred in the early XX Century. Thus, the actual implementation of the Soviet industrial policy can inform the reader more than its official concept.
Once the GOELRO energy plan designed by Lenin (as seen from the decree in the previous chapter) was implemented, big industrial projects became a distinct feature of Soviet development. According to Buzgalin, in the Soviet science policy, the involvement in the projects of both the national or global importance was a driving and motivational force for scientists and other participants. The scale of the two first five-year plans continued this approach established in the implementation of the GOELRO.
In terms of the role of the exogenous technology transfer in industrialisation, both Zhukov and Paltashev outlined that in the 1920s the USSR could not have enough of qualified engineers to perform industrialisation within the time constraint dictated by the pressure of another inevitable, in Stalin’s view (as shown in section 3.2), and impending war. The constraint resulted in a sharp political struggle between two groups of the Communist Party. Nonetheless, despite a low competence of many old revolutionaries trying to resist and run industrialisation at the industrial locations, Stalin’s technocratic government could have implemented industrialisation and won in the political struggle within the VKP(b), according to Zhukov. As a result, by the end of the 1930s, polytechnisation was established as the primary approach in education, management, governance and elsewhere. As confirmed by both Zhukov and Nekrasov, the human capital in science and technology was cherished and nurtured by the system.
In this new expansionist industrial policy, the ruling group demonstrated a high level of expertise in choosing useful technology or finding correct approaches towards its adoption as confirmed by Paltashev in chapter 3 or by Sutton, as an opponent of the Soviet system (considered in the literature review). In particular, Sutton worded this as follows: ‘...there was a clear recognition of the place of technology. The machine was the Marxian engine of progress.’408 As detailed by Paltashev, the Soviets purchased plants ‘on turn-key-solutions or technology of full cycle and hired experts to launch it and teach Soviet personnel.’409 According to him, the technology transfer for the reproduction of an old product was successfully adopted by the Soviet industry, after which new products were developed and produced.
Therefore, the external input of the expertise and technology was essential for Soviet industrialisation, as confirmed in Zhukov’s and Paltashev’s interviews, on the one hand. However, the following should be taken into consideration on the other.
Firstly, technology transfer has been a widespread industrial practice implemented by all the historical actors, including the US before the USSR or South East Asian countries after the USSR, and excluding Britain that was the pioneer of industrialisation, according to Paltashev.410 In this sense, one can conclude, therefore, that the speed and results, i.e. the success of the process itself, in other words, is valuable for this analysis.
Secondly, as pointed out by Littlewood, Lonzarich, Tsironis and, in particular, Raven and Paltashev, a success of technology transfer to a large extent is determined by a preparedness of the particular recipient to accept, adopt, sustain and develop the import, otherwise, it could not last for decades. According to Raven, the recipient’s competence in S&T should be as good as that of the exporting side. Even once assimilated successfully, the horizon of the use of technology is limited to 30 years as the maximum (Paltashev). Meanwhile, as seen from the literature review, the second wave of the transfer, although not that large as that of the 1930s, which started in the 1960s was not that successful mostly due to a significant incompatibility of Soviet technology to its new Western analogues.411 Thus, the technology transfer in the industrialisation of the 1930s was successfully assimilated as well
408 Sutton I, 318.
409 Paltashev. 410 Ibid.
as largely independently developed as seen by the development of the Soviet microelectronics (Paltashev) or aviation industry (Mikoyan).412
Thirdly, overall from the very beginning, the correct technological approach towards choosing and assimilating foreign technology mentioned above and demonstrated by Soviet industrial managers would have been impossible without their deep level of the expertise in the matters of S&T, as implied by the scientists interviewed such as Raven, Lonzarich, Tsironis, Saxena, and Littlewood.
On the one hand, this expertise as confirmed by Zhukov was provided by the previous ‘Tsarist’ scientific and engineering personnel which pledged to the new Soviet power, like the first president of the Russian Academy of Sciences under the Soviet rule, Karpinsky, mentioned in section 3.2 and considered in more detail below, who became the first president of the SAS.413 On the other hand, this level of the managerial expertise derived from the knowledge obtained within the Soviet education and S&T system, as evident from the biographies of Malenkov or Kosygin, highlighted by Zhukov and Nekrasov respectively. Last but not least, the Soviet Union managed to avoid the trap of the technology transfer which was described by Lonzarich, Paltashev for this thesis, and Kapitsa. Even in 1936, the latter, in his letter to Stalin, described the Soviet Union, in terms of technology, as ‘the full colony of the West.’414 The development of the indigenous research and education became a considerable contribution to the national technological sovereignty, which allowed the USSR together with the Allies to win WWII as well as to consequently conduct independent foreign policy as a global actor in the conditions of the Cold War afterwards. This had not happened if the dependence on the technology transfer, in particular from the US which, according to Sutton, was the main contributor to Soviet industrialisation, would have remained in place.
One should mention a positive impact of war (both WWII and partially the Cold War) on the Soviet technological advance and engineering choices, as well as the organisation and efficiency of production processes.415
412 As also seen from Cooper. 413 Section 4.3.
414 Appendix M.
415 Howe, Christopher, 2019, VIVA, Chokan Laumulin’s Thesis, 2 May, Centre of Development Studies,
Thus, in evaluating any industrial transfer in general, and that of Soviet industrialisation in particular, an actual engineering capacity to absorb and develop technology is critical implying the importance of education and research.