Chapter 2. Truth Commissions: Definition and Justification
1.2 Speech situations during Truth Commission implementation
My own definition of a TC requires different sorts of speech situations: (i) for giving and knowing testimonies, (ii) for getting core facts straight about certain criminal acts and (ii) for suggesting remedies. These moments are not completely separate; there is an interwoven relation among them. This classification is just an exercise to identify and respect the purpose of each dialogical encounter and the validity of each of the claims. For instance, during the phase of giving testimony, such testimonies must not be challenged by cross-examination as they are considered truthful narratives. Conversely, in the moments for getting facts right about criminal acts, victims’ testimonies should be weighed as part of the full body of evidence, as these testimonies seek to become part of the body of true evidence. To define these three speech situations, I follow Kirk Simpson´s stages of truth recovery process and define them in Habermasian terms.
For Habermas, in a speech situation actors take turns playing the communicative roles of speaker, addressee, and bystander. A situation denotes a segment of a “life-world” that has been delimited in terms of a specific theme. A
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theme arises in connection with the interests and objectives of actors (Habermas, 1990, p. 134). A competent speaker has the choice between (i) a cognitive; (ii) an interactive; or (iii) an expressive mode of language use. Three different types of speech acts correspond to each of these three language uses: (i) constative acts; (ii) regulative acts; and (iii) representative acts. Thus, the speaker has a choice among three basic attitudes, each entailing a different perspective on the world (Habermas, 1990, p. 136). For instance, a constative (fact-stating) speech act attempts to (i) represent the external world; (ii) establish a communicative relation with a listening audience (and thus relates to a social world); and/or (iii) express an inner world (an intention to communicate a belief) (Philosophy, 2007) (Habermas, 1990, p. 136). This triadic structure suggests that many speech acts involve a set of tacit validity claims, thus, a speech act, in order to be acceptable, must satisfy the demands connected with three basic validity claims: truth, rightness and/or sincerity.
In sum, first, an objective (constative) speech act, using cognitive language can be considered “true” when it accurately refers to existing objects, or accurately represents actual states of affairs. The speaker makes reference to something in the objective world, so it implies a formal concept of the world (as the sum total of existing states of affairs). Secondly, a normative (regulative) speech act is considered to be correct (right) whenever it fits within a complex array of competing social values and norms. Speech acts serve not only to represent states and events in the objective world; they serve to produce interpersonal relationships as well. In this case, the speaker makes reference to something in the social world of legitimately ordered interactions. Thirdly, evaluative (representative) speech acts are considered to be truthful when sincere communicative actors make them. Speech acts serve to express lived experiences, that is, they serve the process of self-representation in which case the speaker makes reference to something in the subjective world to which he has privileged access. Thus, a speech act might fulfill one of three functions: to present the state of affairs, to maintain an interpersonal relationship, or to manifest a lived experience. (Habermas, 1990; Simpson, 2007)
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Kirk Simpson, analyzing the Northern Ireland case, examines what a model for Habermasian truth recovery might actually look like in practice, and how it could be implemented. An appropriate security apparatus for dialogues must be afforded in order that victims and perpetrators are provided with a “safe and secure space”. It must be protected from the potential intrusion of vigilantes; or from the potentially malign influence of those political groups who might seek to disrupt the process for selfish political reasons (Simpson, 2007). This envisaged Habermasian model of truth recovery would be mediated by Truth Recovery Panels. These Panels would be comprised of independent experts on conflict resolution and would be invited to visit localities where there was a clear demand from individuals and communities for truth and reconciliation (Simpson, 2007).
The dialogic exchange itself would be ‘tripartite’ in composition. Stage One would involve uninterrupted storytelling by victims, thereby providing victims with a much-needed platform from which to narrate their experiences. At Stage Two, victims would discuss their story and their experience with the Truth Recovery Panel, who would be empowered to ask victims relevant questions. These stages would be integral to the process of providing communicative dialogical capacity building and creating an atmosphere of trust. Stage Three of the process would involve victims in direct dialogue with perpetrators, a dialogic exchange that would be mediated and controlled by the Truth Recovery Panel (Simpson, 2007).
Table 1. Stage for Dialogic exchange: Kirl Simpson.
Purpose Stage I Uninterrupted storytelling by the victim
Stage II Truth Recovery Panel would be empowered to ask victims relevant questions
Stage III Direct dialogue with perpetrators, mediated and controlled by the Truth Recovery Panel
For Simpson, the social world and the subjective world are particularly relevant to processes of truth recovery (Simpson, 2007). For my own definition of a
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TC, all three different validity claims are equally relevant: factual truth (true or false); normative rightness (right or wrong); and sincerity (sincere or insincere). Together they help to deal with the tension between the TC’s objective of establishing factual information and the objective of giving priority to experiential and subjective voices, in other words, identifying general patterns of violence and listening to particular narratives of suffering.
During speech instances for giving and knowing testimonies, victims are the speakers, a commissioner addresses the speech situation, and non-victims are bystanders. The purpose of this moment is to express a lived experience of suffering, resistance and/or resilience. This speech act does not necessarily aspire to be true, it is truthful because the speaker is sincere. These sorts of moments are appropriate to identify the damages as impact and to understand how criminal acts affect the victim´s life course.
Speech situations for “getting core facts straight about certain criminal acts” change the communicative roles: victims, ex-perpetrators and witnesses are the speakers, and the commissioner is the addressee. Bystanders are people who have not been touched directly by those criminal acts but live in a society that is affected by them. The purpose of this stage is to gain information or confirm knowledge of particular events, to reconstruct the materiality of the criminal act, to give an accurate description of the criminal act as it happened in the past and therefore, to judge them as morally wrong. In this case, the validity claim is truth.
During moments for suggesting remedies the communicative roles remain the same. The entire society, which aspires to establish a new beginning, is the speaker; the commissioner is the addressee; and there is no bystander (everyone interested should be able to participate). The aim is to recover the ability to resolve conflicts peacefully, to resolve the past and dream of the future with dialogue (Simpson, 2007). In these instances the broader the participation, the better. Victims can participate as citizens with suggestions and recommendations; non-
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victims’ groups might materialize their will to restore the victim’s dignity, ex- perpetrators might ask for forgiveness. The goal is for participants in communicative actions to reach an understanding in order to carry out their plans on a consensual basis with some jointly defined actions.
Table 2. My own speech situation (motivated by one of the three Habermasian functions of communication). Speech situation Speaker A d d re s s e
e Bystander Relation to the world language Mode of use Class of speech act Validity claim Giving and knowing testimonies Victims C o mmi ssi o n e rs
Non-victims Subjective Expressive Representative Honesty
Getting facts right about certain criminal acts Victims, ex- perpetrators and witnesses Members of society not affected directly by the criminal act as such.
Objective Cognitive Constative Truthfulness
Suggesting remedies Society, which aspires to establish a new beginning
NA Normative Interactive Regulative Rightfulness
In sum, my speech situations clarify the purpose of each dialogical encounter and its validity claims: (i) “giving and knowing testimonies”, seek to allow the manifestation of a sincere lived experience (personal or narrative truth); (ii) “getting core facts straight about certain criminal acts” seeks to represent the state of affairs, and consequently it can be considered “true” when it accurately refers to existing objects (factual or forensic truth) and, (iii) “suggesting remedies” aim to carry out correct plans on a consensual basis, assuming that those remedies are right insofar they serve to reinforce interpersonal relationships (social truth and healing and restorative truth).