The Split of the CCP and the Red Army in 1935 and 1936

1.1.1 Two “Party Centers”

From the late 1920s to the early 1930s, the CCP and its Red Army established several revolutionary bases (Soviet regions) that were scattered in mountainous areas. When the Party Center began the Long March in October 1934, thousands of miles separated the two most powerful branches of the Chinese Red Army of Workers and Peasants. The First Front Army, composed of more than 100,000 troops, was located in the southeast province of Jiangxi, and was under the direct authority of the Party Center.1 _{The Fourth Front Army, consisting of some 80,000}

troops, had left its Er-yu-wan Revolutionary Base two years earlier and built a new base on the Sichuan-Shaanxi border.2 _{Zhang Guotao had led the Er-yu-wan Bureau}

of the CCP and the Er-yu-wan Revolutionary Military Committee since 1931, when the Party Center dispatched him from Shanghai to Hubei. Although Zhang’s official title changed several times, he and his supporters held firm control of the Fourth Front Army for five years.3

The Party Center and the First Front Army met the Fourth Front Army in

1 _{Junshi kexue yuan junshi lishi yanjiusuo 軍事科學院軍事歷史研究所 (Military History Institute} of PLA Military Science Academy), ed., Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhanshi 中國人民解放軍戰史

(Military history of the PLA). Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe 軍事科學出版社, 1987, p. 243. 2 _{Zhongguo gongnong hongjun disi fangmianjun zhanshi bianji weiyuanhui 中國工農紅軍第四方}

面軍戰史編輯委員會, Zhongguo gongnong hongjun disi fangmianjun zhanshi 中國工農紅軍第四方 面軍戰史 (Military history of the Fourth Front Army of the Chinese Red Army of Workers and Peasants, hereafter MHFF). Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe 解放軍出版社, 1989, p. 262.

3 _{In the Sichuan-Shaanxi base, Zhang Guotao was the Chairman of the Sichuan-Shaanxi} Revolutionary Military Committee and the Chairman of the Sichuan-Shaanxi Soviet Region. The Fourth Front Army left the Sichuan-Shaanxi Revolutionary Base in March 1935. On May 18, 1935, the above two institutions were renamed as the Northwest Special Zone Committee of the CCP and the Northwest Revolutionary Military Committee. Zhang Guotao was still the chairman of these two committees.

Maogong 懋功 in Sichuan Province in June 1935, after eight months’ of fierce fighting during the Long March. Because the First Front Army had fewer troops than did the Fourth at the time,4 _{approximately 3,700 troops were transferred to}

the First Front Army to balance its military power. Meanwhile, several cadres of the First Front Army were appointed as chiefs of staff or directors of political departments in branches of the Fourth Front Army.5 _{In early August 1935, the Red}

Army, which had more than 100,000 troops, was divided into two groups—the Right and the Left Route Army—and proceeded north along two different routes (Table 1-1).6 _{The Party Center was to march with the Right Route Army,}

commanded by Xu Xiangqian 徐向前 (1901-1990) and Chen Changhao 陳昌浩 (1906-1967), Zhang’s closest colleagues in the Fourth Front Army.7

At dawn on September 10, 1935, when the Right Route Army was stationed near Baozuo 包座, the Party Center secretly ordered the First Front Army troops in the Right Route Army—consisting of the First and Third Armies—to march northward quickly, informing neither Xu nor Chen of this.8 _{There are two extremely divergent}

interpretations of why this happened. According to the CCP’s official historiography, the Party Center persisted correctly to march northward, while Zhang insisted on retreating to the southern regions. To achieve his goal, Zhang “attempted to split and jeopardize the Party Center.” He secretly sent a cable to Chen Changhao on September 9, asking him to lead the Right Route Army southward. Ye Jianying 葉劍英 (1897-1986) read the cable accidentally and reported it to Mao immediately. To avoid conflict within the Red Army, Mao and other leaders decided to march northward in secret.9 _{According to Zhang, Mao}

took advantage of the Fourth Front Army to open a route to the north and then

4 _{The CCP’s official history books do not record of the exact size of the First Front Army when it} met the Fourth Front Army in Maogong. Many books have cited Zhou Enlai’s conversation with Zhang Guotao in Maogong that the First Front Army had 30,000 troops when they stayed in Zunyi five months before. But a number of recollections have suggested that the First Front Army had less than 10,000 troops in June 1935.

5 _{MHFF, p. 329.}

6 _{The Fourth Army and the Thirtieth Army joined together with the major force of the First Front} Army and was called the Right Route Army. The Fifth Army and the Thirty-second Army of the First Front Army combined with the other three armies of the Fourth Front Army—the Ninth Army, the Thirty-first Army and the Thirty-third Army to be known as the Left Route Army. For a full explanation of the detail of the combination that occurred, see Table 1-1.

7 _{MHFF, p. 330. See Table 1-1.} 8 _{MHFF, p. 338.}

9 _{Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi 中共中央黨史研究室, Zhongguo gongchandang lishi 中}

國共產黨歷史, 第一卷（上） (The Chinese Communist Party’s history, Volume 1, Part 1). Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe 中共黨史出版社, 2011, p. 393.

escaped secretly to save his own troops.10 _{Debate on this issue still rages in China}

today. In any case, the CCP’s authority and the Red Army were divided into two groups thereafter.

After the split between the First and Fourth Front Armies, Mao’s Party Center immediately convened a conference in Ejie 俄界 to accuse Zhang of splitting the Red Army.11 _{Zhang’s Fourth Front Army also held a conference in Zhuomudiao 卓}

木碉 to dismiss Mao, Zhou Enlai 周恩來 (1898-1976), Bo Gu 博古 (1907-1946) and Zhang Wentian 張聞天 (1900-1976) from the Central Committee and the Party, and to list them as wanted. The alternative Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Military Council were established during this conference.12

Given that there were two “Party Centers” during the following eight months, and that this thesis adopts a neutral perspective concerning power struggles within the CCP, Mao’s and Zhang’s Party Centers will be referred to as the “Shaanxi Party Center” and the “Sichuan Party Center,” respectively.13

In the CCP’s official Party History, the Shaanxi Party Center led by Mao was the sole legitimate leadership, and the Fourth Front Army’s compliance with its directives was non-negotiable. Despite reaching different conclusions, most extant publications about the relationship between Zhang and Mao are based on this premise, which prevents us from fully understanding the operation of the Red

10 _{Zhang Guotao 張國燾, Wo de huiyi 我的回憶 (My memoirs), Volume 2. Beijing: Dongfang} chubanshe 東方出版社, 2004, p. 418.

11 _{“Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu Zhang Guotao tongzhi de cuowu de jueding (Ejie huiyi) 中共中}

央關於張國燾同志的錯誤的決定（俄界會議）（1935年9月12日）” (The CCP Central Committee’s resolution on Comrade Zhang Guotao’s errors issued at the Ejie Conference on September 12, 1935). Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junshi kexue yuan 中國人民解放軍軍事科學院 (PLA Military Science Academy) and Zhongyang dang’an guan 中央檔案館 (Central Archives), eds., Hongjun Changzheng wenxian 紅軍長征·文獻 (Reference on the Red Army’s Long March, hereafter RRAL). Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe 解放軍出版社, 1995, pp. 683-684. This resolution was conveyed to the members of the Central Committee after the Ejie Conference, but was not circulated within the Party until January 1936. See “Zhongyang zhengzhiju guanyu Zhang Guotao tongzhi chengli ‘di’er zhongyang’ de jueding 中央政治局關於張國燾同志成立「第二中央」的決定（1936年1月22日）” (The CCP Politburo’s decision on the establishment of the ‘alternative Party Center’ by Comrade Zhang Guotao, on January 22, 1936), in Zhongguo gongnong hongjun disi fangmianjun zhanshi ziliao xuanbian, Changzheng shiqi 中國工農紅軍第四方面軍戰史資料選編·長征時期 (Selected materials on the history of the Fourth Front Army in the Chinese Red Army of Workers and Peasants, the Long March period, hereafter SMHF). Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe 解放軍出版社, 1992, p. 328. 12 _{“Zhang Guotao ling li ‘zhongyang’ de zuzhi jueyi 張國燾另立「中央」的組織決議（1935年10}

月5日於卓木碉）” (Zhang Guotao’s organizational resolution on establishing an alternative “Party Center”, in Zhuomudiao on the October 5, 1935), in SMHF, p. 230.

13 _{In early June 1936 the Sichuan side concealed their “Party Center” but they did not recognize the} Shaanxi side to be the legal Party Center until late September. So in this thesis, when dealing with the period from June to September 1936, the two sides are referred to as the “Shaanxi Party Center” and the “Fourth Front Army” respectively.

Army during this period. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the relationship between the Shaanxi and Sichuan sides of the CCP before discussing the Red Army’s military operations.

The Relationship between the Two Party Centers

When they divided initially, each side asserted that it was the real Party Center, and insisted that the other side should defer.14 _{In this situation, support from the}

Communist International (Comintern) would have been a decisive factor that could have legitimized the leadership of the CCP of one of the two sides. However, the Comintern had lost radio contact with the CCP for more than two years, since the Party Center left Shanghai in 1933. In November 1935, Lin Yuying 林育英 (1897-1942), one of the CCP’s representatives in the Comintern, arrived in northern Shaanxi with oral directives from Stalin, as well as a new code system to re-establish radio links between the Shaanxi Party Center and Moscow. In the following months, the Shaanxi Party Center allowed Lin to act as a mediator to solve the problem of the Party’s split. During this period, the Shaanxi Party Center took full advantage of Lin’s position as a representative from the Comintern to persuade the Sichuan Party Center to cooperate with them. However, this did not work well initially.15 _{Although Zhang Guotao and his colleagues announced that}

they would cooperate with the Comintern,16 _{they did not openly change their}

attitudes, and the two Party Centers and their armies continued to operate independently, and without any strategic cooperation.17 _{Cables between Lin and}

the Sichuan Party Center indicate that Zhang insisted at that time that both sides

14 _{The Shaanxi Party Center ordered the Sichuan Party Center to stop using the title of the “Red} Army Headquarters”. See Cable 3; Cable 5; Cable 7 (Appendix). The Sichuan Party Center insisted that the Shaanxi Party Center, the institutions and armies in Shaanxi should be referred to as the “North Bureau”, “The Shaanxi-Gansu Government” and the “Northern Route Army” respectively. See Cable 1; Cable 2.

15 _{Because the Shaanxi side used ambiguous words in cables and did not convey any specific} directives from the Comintern, Zhang Guotao was quite suspicious and wrote to Lin Yuying to ask whether he “communicated with Comintern frequently”. See Cable 10.

16 _{Cable 4.}

17 _{In March 1936, Zhang Guotao changed his strategy of controlling southern regions and planned} to go northward to build an anti-Japanese base in northwest China. Because the CCP’s official Party historiography and other popular reading materials describe the conflicts between Zhang Guotao and the legal Party Center as a divergence between “going southward” (nan xia 南下) and “going northward” (bei shang 北上), Zhang Guotao’s decision to “go northward” in March 1936 is easily to be taken as an agreement with the Shaanxi Party Center’s strategies, and even as a gesture of compliance with the Shaanxi side. For instance, The History of the Red Army’s Long March by the Central Party History Research Office holds this point of view. (Bejing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2006, p. 319.) The fact is that although both sides intended to make northwest China their revolutionary base, they did not cooperate with each other and at the time their knowledge of the other side’s intentions was limited.

be referred to simultaneously as “bureaus,” and led by the Comintern.18 _The

Shaanxi side suggested that the Party’s branches in Sichuan would be instructed directly by the CCP’s representatives in the Comintern, and that the Shaanxi Party Center, as the sole legal Party Center, would control all other branches.19 _The

tremendous differences on this fundamental issue caused Lin’s mediation efforts to stagnate for months.

The CCP leadership problem still had not been resolved by late May 1936, when the Second and the Sixth Army Corps, led by Ren Bishi 任弼時 (1904-1950) and He Long 賀龍 (1896-1969), who were completely unaware of the Party’s split, were about to meet the Fourth Front Army in Sichuan. As the most powerful force other than the First and Fourth Front Armies, their opinions on Party and army affairs could break the deadlock between the Shaanxi and Sichuan factions. Consequently, both factions felt it was urgent to decide how to define the relationship between the two corps and the Sichuan Party Center.20 _{Zhang took}

this opportunity to assess Lin’s, or the Comintern’s, attitude by inquiring whether the Shaanxi Party Center had changed its title to “The North Bureau.”21 _{One week}

later, cables from the Sichuan side claimed that both it and the Shaanxi side had stopped calling themselves “the Party Center.”22 _{At the same time, the Sichuan}

side began to call the Shaanxi side the “colleagues of the North Bureau.”23

Accessible resources provide no evidence of Lin’s reply, so the response from Sichuan can be explained in at least two alternative ways. One possibility is that the Shaanxi side compromised and agreed to the degradation of the bureaus. An almost equally reasonable explanation is that it was only wishful thinking on the part of the Sichuan side. Until more documents are released, we cannot determine which one is the most likely. In any case, at least one thing is certain from the

18 _{Cable 7.} 19 _{Cable 6.}

20 _{In July 1936, the Second Army Corps combined with the Sixth Army Corps to be the Second} Front Army. There are different interpretations on the role that the Second Front Army leaders played in this period. The Central Party History Research Office said that Zhang Guotao attempted to make the Second Front Army leaders his supporters, but was firmly refused by them. See The Chinese Communist Party’s History, Volume 1, Part 1, p. 399. Zhang Guotao’s account is that Ren Bishi wanted to be mediator and believed both sides had made some mistakes. SeeZhang Guotao, 2004, Volume 2, pp. 449-450.

21 _{Cable 10.}

22 _{“Zhang Guotao zai zhongyang zongdui huodong fenzi hui shang baogao beipo xuanbu quxiao} ‘dier zhongyang’ 張國燾在中央總隊活動分子會上報告被迫宣布取消“第二中央（” 1936年6月6日）” (Zhang Guotao was forced to announce the concealment of the “alternative Party Center” at the Central Column’s meeting, on June 6, 1936), in SMHF, pp. 533-540.

correspondence at the time—the Sichuan side did not believe that the Shaanxi side should lead them; on the contrary, it believed that it was the legitimate leadership to whom the other side should report, and from whom it should ask for advice. It was only for the sake of Party unity that the Sichuan gave up its title of Party Center and adopted a negotiation strategy regarding inner-Party affairs and military operations.24 _{In order to show its authority, each side sent cables to guide}

the other side’s work, especially regarding military arrangements, even though both sides understood clearly that these “directives” had no influence at all. Some of these cables have been released, but only those that demonstrate the authority of the Shaanxi side over the Sichuan side have been cited frequently in publications.

In summary, the relationship between the two sides was complicated and murky, and cooperation would only occur if both sides benefited from it, rather than one side complying with the other’s orders. Fortunately, the Shaanxi side’s plan to secure a connection with the Soviet Union was in the interests of both sides.

1.1.2 One Step towards Party Reunion

For three reasons, since early 1936, the Shaanxi Party Center had prioritized securing Soviet military assistance as one of its most urgent tasks. First, with their sparse populations and infertile land, the areas in northern Shaanxi that they occupied could not support the thousands of Red Army soldiers positioned there. More critically, they were short of munitions.25 _{Second, Stalin’s oral message,}

which Lin delivered to northern Shaanxi, recommended that the majority of the Red Army go to northern or northeastern China, and that he would not oppose the Red Army’s approach to the Soviet Union.26 _{Third, in negotiations with local}

warlords, the Party leadership in Shaanxi realized gradually that the strategy of

24 _{The Shaanxi camp wrote in a telegram that it “acknowledged the negotiated relationship with} Guotao”. See Cable 9. The Sichuan camp said it was unnecessary to “order” the colleagues in Shaanxi and it was acceptable to negotiate with them. See SMHF, pp. 533-540.

25 _{Cable 17.}

26 _{Cable 8. For more about the CCP’s attempts to connect with the Soviet Union, see Yang Kuisong}

楊奎松, Xi’an shibian xintan: Zhang Xueliang yu Zhonggong guanxi zhi mi 西安事變新探：張學良與 中共關係之謎 (The Xi'an Incident revisited: a study of the relationship between Zhang Xueliang and the CCP). Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe 江蘇人民出版社, 2010, pp. 13-15. According to Yang, proposals about marching to the Sino-Soviet borders had been made occasionally after the late 1920s, especially when the CCP met serious difficulties. These proposals, however, were immediately rejected because of worries about negative consequences for the Soviet Union. The main concern of the opponents was that this would place diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union and might even a pretext for the Japanese to invade Mongolia. This time, Stalin’s message turned this former politically incorrect proposal into a reasonable plan.

these warlords was to gain the Soviet Union’s support via the CCP, rather than merely to cooperate with the Chinese Communists. As a result, the task of obtaining the Soviet Union’s assistance was not only important to the Red Army’s ability to replenish its armaments, but also was the key to implement the Comintern’s order to “unite all forces which could be united.” Among these local warlords, Zhang Xueliang, the marshal of the Northeast Army (or the Manchuria Army, Dongbei jun 東北軍) and then Deputy Commander in Chief of the Northwest Anti-Communist General Headquarters, played the most important role in implementing the plan.27

There is no evidence to suggest that the Shaanxi Party Center first considered inviting the Sichuan side to join in their plan to secure assistance from the Soviet Union. Presumably, it made this decision partly due to Zhang Xueliang’s ever-changing ideas in negotiations with the Shaanxi Party Center, which convinced the Shaanxi side that if it was determined to obtain assistance, the Fourth Front Army’s participation would be necessary.

An essential reason that the Sichuan side found the Shaanxi Party Center’s invitation attractive was that the plan was related closely to the Comintern. Lin conveyed Stalin’s oral message to Zhang as early as January 1936, but Zhang did not respond positively. On July 6, 1936, the Shaanxi Party Center told their