Splitting a single cause of action and its effects

What is meant by splitting cause of action?

It is the act of instituting two or more suits for the same cause of action (Sec. 4, Rule 2). It is the practice of dividing one cause of action into different parts and making each part the subject of a separate

complaint (Bachrach vs. Icaringal, 68 SCRA 287).

Is splitting cause of action allowed under the Rules?

This practice is not allowed by the Rules because it breeds multiplicity of suits, clogs the court dockets, leads to vexatious litigation, operates as an instrument of harassment, and generates unnecessary expenses to the parties.

The rule is, the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other or others;

judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a bar to, or a ground for dismissal of, the others. What is the remedy on part of the defendant in this instance?

The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion to dismiss on the ground litis pendencia or res judicata.

Hence, if the first action is pending when the second action is filed, the latter may be dismissed based on litis pendencia, there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. If a final judgment had been rendered in the first action when the second action is filed, the latter may be dismissed based on res judicata, that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment.

In case of res judicata, what action should be dismissed, the first or the subsequent one?

As to which action should be dismissed would depend upon judicial discretion and the prevailing circumstances of the case.

There was foreclosure of mortgage due to the debtor’s failure to pay an obligation.

The debtor filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of foreclosure proceeding and separate complaint for damages arising out of the foreclosure proceedings is the rule against splitting a cause of action violated?

Yes. There was filing of multiple cases based on the same cause of action although with different prayers. Two remedies that arose from one wrongful act cannot be pursued in different cases.

SRBI mortgaged several parcels of land to Metrobank as security for its loan. Then SRBI and Metrobank entered into a credit line agreement with the same mortgaged properties as collateral, SRBI defaulted and Metrobank filed an action for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Subsequently, Metrobank filed an action for collection of money arising from the export bill purchases under the credit line agreement. Metrobank bought the properties at the foreclosure but the bid price was below SRBI’s obligations. SRBI moved to dismiss the action for collection on the ground that Metrobank is splitting its cause of action.

Should the motion to dismiss be granted?

Yes. Under Act 3135, the mortgage creditor in case of insufficiency of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale is entitled to claim the deficiency from the debtor. However the action filed by Metrobank was not an action to recover the deficiency but an action for collection or specific performance which was barred by the election of the remedy of foreclosure. The same should thus be dismissed without prejudice to Metrobank’s institution of an action for recovery of the deficiency.

(Suico Rattan and Buri vs. Court of Appeals, June 2006)

State the cause or causes of action in case one’s property is taken through violence.

There are actually two rights violated, a.) right to possession and 2.) right to use, however, there is one wrong committed. Hence, the owner can file only one complaint praying for two remedies; recovery of possession and damages.

P sued D for specific performance of a contract. The court decided in favor of D and dismissed P’s complaint. After the dismissal had become final, P sued D to have the same contract reformed to make it conform to their true intent and to recover upon the reformed contract. Is the second action barred by res judicata?

Yes. P only had one cause of action on the contract, whether as written or as reformed, which he could have stated in the alternative pursuant to Rule 8, Section 2. P thus split a single cause of action.

State the rule in case of breach of contract with several stipulations.

General Rule: A contract embraces only one case of action amd may biolated only once even if it contains several stipulations.

Exception: If the stipulations are to be performed at different times, there will be as many causes of actions as there are violations. But all the obligations which have matured at the time of the suit must be integrated as one case of action in one complaint and those include would be barred.

Exception to the exception: When failure to comply with one or several stipulations in continuing contract constitutes a total breach, a single cause of action for damages arises from such contract.

P and D entered into a contract whereby D will supply P from month to month with gas tar at her price of P65 per ton. The contract was to run for 10 years, starting from 1919. D began delivering but in 1920

“flatly refuse d to make any deliveries under the contract”. In 1923, P brought an action for damages against D. P was awarded damages up to 1923. The judgment became final and executor. Later P brought an action to recover damages from 1923 up to 1929. D filed a motion to dismiss the suit on the ground of res judicata. Should the motion to dismiss be granted?

YES. P in bringing the second suit had split his cause of action. As a general rule, a contract to do several things at several time sis divisible and judgment for a single breach of a continuing contract to do several things at several times is divisible and a judgment for a single breach of continuing contract is not a bar to a suit for subsequent breach. Where however the obligor manifests refusal to perform not only one prostration but all the other prestations, the contract is entire and the breach is total” and constitutes only one cause of action. (Blossom and Co. V. Manila Gas Corp. 55 Phil. 226) P in 1923 could thus bring an action for damages up to 1929 under the principle of anticipatory breach since D in 1920 had made a flat or outright refusal to make any delivery under the contract.

What is the principle of

“anticipatory breach”?

It is the principle wherein in a divisible contract or one contemplating divisible prestations over a period of time and there is a breach of one prestation, the oblige may bring a suit not only for the current prestation but even for the future prestations if it is clear that the obligor can no longer perform the future prestations.

In the foregoing problem, concerning the gas tar contract, what if D in 1920 failed to make further deliveries but without any flat or outright refusal to make any delivery under the contract.

Should the motion to dismiss by D be granted?

NO. Since the principle of participatory breach does not come into play.

Hence, its single breach of the divisible obligation is a separate and distinct cause of action.

Plaintiff ordered 2 units frequency converter/inverter from Defendant to delivered within 8 to 10 weeks from the opening of the letter of credit or until 19 November 1997. On 1 November 1997 Defendant in formed Plaintiff that it was having problems with its supplier regarding the delivery of the units, that it was looking for another supplier, and that at that moment there was no clear message when normal production would resume. Due to this information, the Plaintiff surmised that defendant would not be able to deliver the units on time and hence the Plaintiff cancelled the order. Plaintiff filed an action for damages against the Defendant averring that foregoing facts. The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action. Should the motion to dismiss be granted?

Yes. When plaintiff sued Defendant for damages, the latter had not violated any right of Plaintiff from which a cause of action had arisen.

Plaintiff only surmised that Defendant would not be able to deliver the units on time and based on this apprehension, it cancelled the order.

The principle of anticipatory breach laid down in the textbook case of Blossom and Co. v. Manila Gas Corp, is not applicable here for the same only applies to a divisible contract where the obligor had manifested his refusal to comply with future periodic obligations. Here the obligation

was single and indivisible to deliver two units of frequency converter/inverter.

Juan filed an action for quieting of title and to be declared the owner of the land. The RTC decides in favor of the defendant Pedro. But previously, defendant succeeded in dispossessing Juan of the Property from 1970 to 1978. Juan elevated the case to the CA and decides in his favor. Juan filed a second case to collect the income of the land from 1970 to 1978. Is the second case violates the rule on splitting cause of action?

Yes, the petitioner was splitting his cause of action when he filed the second case for both and first and the second cases involve the same cause of action. The petitioner would draw a distinction between the land in dispute in the first case and the income from that land being claimed in the second case. But that is splitting hairs to split a cause of action. The subject matter is essentially the same in both cases as the income is only a consequence of accessory of the disputed property. It cannot be said that there are two causes of action calling for two separate cases. The claim for the income from the land was incidental to, and should have been raised by Petitioner in his earlier claim form ownership of the land by filing a supplemental complaint. (Bayang v.

Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 91)

P filed with the RTC an accion reivendicatoria over parcel of rice land against D, alleging that the same was sold to him by the rightful owner S and praying that the same was sold to him by the rightful owner S and praying that he (P) be declared the owner of the land and that D deliver possession to him. D filed an answer in which he also counterclaimed for moral and exemplary damages for the unwarranted filing of the suit by P.

During the pendency of the case, P dispossessed D of the subject land and proceeded to harvest the rice. Judgment was rendered by the RTC dismissing P’s suit. The judgment became final. P delivered possession back to D. D then filed an action before the RTC against P seeking to recover the value of the rice harvested by P. P filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. Should the motion to dismiss b granted?

NO. The claim for recovery of the harvested rice need not be set up in the first case as such claim is not compulsory having been acquired by D after serving his answer. Hence the claim is not barred even if not set up in the first case. Being not a compulsory counterclaim, it can be a subject of separate complaint.