G.R. NO. 179382, JANUARY 14, 2013. J. PERLAS- BERNABE.
Facts:
Spouses Mamaril are jeepney operators since 1971. They park their 6 passenger jeepneys every night at the Boy Scout (BSP) compound for a fee of P300.00 per month for each unit. The AIB Security Agency, Inc (AIB) was the contracting agency responsible for the security and protection of the compound and its properties. On May 26, 1995 in the evening, all jeepneys were parked inside th BSP compound. The following morning, one vehicle was missing and was never recovered. The security guards namely, Gaddi and
Peña, of AIB who were incharged when the embezzlement was committed said that a male person who looked familiar to them took the vehicle out of the compound. The spouses filed a complaint for damages before the RTC against BSP, AIB and security guards Peña and Gaddi for gross negligence.
The court rendered judgment in favor of the spouses Mamaril and defendants were ordered to pay jointly and severally the cost of the vehicle including the damages. On June 11, 2002, the RTC modified its decision reducing the cost of the stolen vehicle. Only BSP appealed before the CA. The CA affirmed the findings of the lower court, but, absolving BSP from any liability. It also deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as the amount of the accessories of the lost jeepney. Spouses filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, however, the motion was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the BSP is jointly and severally liable for gross negligence along with AIB and security guards Peña and Gaddi.
Ruling:
No. Article 1311 of the Civil Code states that contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. It is undisputed that Sps.
Mamaril are not parties to the Guard Service Contract between the BSP and AIB. Neither did the subject agreement contain any stipulation pour autrui that a third party may demand fulfillment of the either parties’ obligation, provided that the requisites are complied with. However, in this case no stipulations pour autrui was provided. Thus, under the principle of relativity of contracts, they cannot validly claim any rights or favor under the said agreement.
The court also declared that what was between BSP and spouses Mamaril is a contract of lease. Article 1643 of the Civil Code held that the act of parking a vehicle in a garage, upon payment of a fixed amount, is a lease. As a lessor, Article 1664 of the same Code states that "the lessor is not obliged to answer for a mere act of trespass which a third person may cause on the use of the thing leased; but the lessee shall have a direct action against the intruder." Here, BSP was not remiss in its obligation to provide Sps. Mamaril a suitable parking space for their jeepneys as it even hired security guards to secure the premises; hence, it should not be held liable for the loss suffered by Sps. Mamaril. As to the contract of lease and its management, the parking fee of P300.00 per month or P10.00 a day for each unit is too minimal an amount to even create an inference that BSP undertook to be an insurer of the safety of plaintiff’s vehicles. The awards of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees were properly disallowed by the CA for lack of factual and legal bases.
Professional Services Inc., Petitioner, vs. NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 127590 February 2, 2010 Facts:
Enrique Agana told his wife Natividad Agana to look for their neighbour, Dr. Ampil, a surgeon staff member of Medical City General Hospital, a prominent and known hospital, owned and operated by Professional Services Incorporated (PSI). Natividad Agana underwent medical surgery in said Hospital.
The attendant doctors were Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. Natividad suffered from injury due to two (2) gauzes left inside her body during the operation. Despite the report of the (2) two missing gauzes, PSI did not initiate an investigation.
This case consolidated three (3) other cases previously decided and became final and executory.
Hence, this case is limited only to the second motion for reconsideration filed by the PSI in an attempt absolve itself from liability.
Issue:
Whether or not PSI is liable for tort?
Ruling:
Yes. PSI is liable. Firstly, under the principle of Ostensible Agency, according to the Court, ample evidence that the hospital held out to the patient that the doctor was its agent. Present are the two factors that determine apparent authority: first, the hospital's implied manifestation to the patient which led the latter to conclude that the doctor was the hospital's agent; and second, the patient’s reliance upon the conduct of the hospital and the doctor, consistent with ordinary care and prudence the decision made by Enrique for [his wife] Natividad to consult Dr. Ampil was significantly influenced by the impression that Dr. Ampil was a staff member of Medical City General Hospital, and that said hospital was well known and prominent. Enrique looked upon Dr. Ampil not as independent of but as integrally related to Medical City.
The Supreme Court also held that the hospital’s “consent for hospital care” - required to be signed prior to the surgery - affirmed that the surgeon was of the hospital.
Secondly, under the principle of Corporate Negligence, which was self-imposed liability because of the statements made by the PSI which constituted judicial admission in its Motion for Reconsideration. Its statements revealed that it had the power to review or cause the review of what may have irregularly transpired within its walls strictly for the purpose of determining whether some form of negligence may have attended any procedure done inside its premises, with the ultimate end of protecting its patients.
The Court also noted the hospital admitted “the standards of its corporate conduct under the circumstances of this case, specifically: (a) that it had a corporate duty to Natividad even after her operation to ensure her safety as a patient; (b) that its corporate duty was not limited to having its nursing staff note or record the two missing gauzes and (c) that its corporate duty extended to determining Dr. Ampil's role in it, bringing the matter to his attention, and correcting his negligence. The Court held that the case is “not intended to set a precedent and should not serve as a basis to hold hospitals liable for every form of negligence of their doctors-consultants under any and all circumstances.”
ROGELIO NOGALES V. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER G.R. No. 142625, 19 December 2006
Facts:
Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales (Corazon), who was then 37 years old, was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada (Dr.
Estrada) beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy or as early as December 1975. Around midnight of 25 May 1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor pains prompting Corazon and Rogelio Nogales (Spouses Nogales) to see Dr. Estrada at his home. After examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada advised her immediate admission to the Capitol Medical Center (CMC). t 6:13 a.m., Corazon started to experience convulsionsAt 6:22 a.m., Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaflor, applied low forceps to extract Corazon's baby. In the process, a 1.0 x 2.5 cm. piece of cervical tissue was allegedly torn.At 6:27 a.m., Corazon began to manifest moderate vaginal bleeding which rapidly became profuse. Corazon died at 9:15 a.m. The cause of death was uhemorrhage, post partum.
Issue:
Whether or not CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada.
Ruling:
Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting uconsultantu staff. The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas.
In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the uostensibleu agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the udoctrine of apparent authorityu.
For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that:
1. the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital;
2. where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and
3. the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence. In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical staff. Through CMC's acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent authority thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada was an employee or agent of CMC.
FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES V. ESPINAS GR. No. 174156, 20 June 2012
Facts:
Espinas, while driving, was hit by another car. The other car escaped from the scene of the incident, but Espinas was able to get its plate number.
After verifying with the Land Transportation Office, Espinas learned that the owner of the other car, with plate number UCF-545 is Filcar.
After sending several letters to Filcar and to its President and General Manager Carmen Flor,demanding payment for the damages sustained by his car without response, Espinas filed a complaint for damages against Filcar
and Carmen Flor demanding the amount of P97,910.00, representing actual damages sustained by his car. Filcar argued that while it is the registered owner of the car that hit and bumped Espina’s car, the car was assigned to its Corporate Secretary Atty. Candido Flor, the husband of Carmen Flor. Filcar furtherstated that when the incident happened, the car was being driven by Atty. Flor’s personal driver,Timoteo Floresca.Filcar denied any liability to Espinas and claimed that the incident was not due to its fault or negligence since Floresca was not its employee but that of Atty. Flor. Filcar and Carmen Flor.
Issue:
Whether Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured in an accident, may be held liable for the damages caused to Espinas.
Ruling:
Yes. Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver, Floresca, and is thus vicariouslyliable under Article 2 -3 in relation with Article 2 4/ ofthe Civil Code As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission.Thus, a person will generally beheld liable only for the torts committed by himselfand not by another. The law, however, provides fore5ceptions that an employer is made vicariously liable for the tort committed by his employee. Article2 4/ ofthe Civil Code states6Article 2 4/. The obligation imposed by Article 2 -3 is demandable not only for one0s own acts oromissions, but also for those ofpersons for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers actingwithin the scope oftheir assigned tas7s, even though the former are not engaged in any business orindustry.
Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, ofthe Civil Code, an action predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligentact or omission committed by his employee.It is well settled that in case ofmotor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner ofthe motor vehicle isconsidered as the employer ofthe tortfeasor'driver, and is made primarily liable for the tort committedby the latter under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, ofthe Civil Code.Filcar is not be permitted to evade its liability for damages by conveniently passing on the blame toanother party8 in this case, its Corporate Secretary, Atty. Flor and his alleged driver, Floresca. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costsagainst petitioner Filcar Transport Services.
CZARINA T. MALVAR VS. KRAFT FOODS PHILS., INC. AND/OR BIENVENIDO BAUTISTA, KRAFT FOODS INTERNATIONAL
G.R. No. 183952. September 9, 2013
Facts:
In 1988, Kraft Foods Phils., (KRAFT) hired Czarina Malvar as its Corporate Planning Manager. She rose in the ranks and became the Vice President for Finance in the Southeast Asia region of Kraft Foods International, KFPI’s mother company. In 1999, the chairman of the board of KFPI and concurrently
the VP and Area Director for SEA, sent Malvar a memo directing her to explain why no administrative sanctions should be imposed on her for possible breach of trust and confidence and for willful violation of company rules and regulations. She was places under preventive suspension and ultimately she was served a notice of termination. Malvar, aggrieved, filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against KFPI and Bautista in the NLRC.
The Labor Arbiter found and declared her suspension and dismissal illegal and ordered her reinstatement. The judegment became final and executory however Malvar’s award was reduced. Both parties appealed the computation of the NLRC. While pending appeal, Malvar and the respondents entered into a compromise agreement wherein Malvar would be paid 40 million pesos.
Malvar moved to withdraw the case in view of the compromise agreement . But before the court could act on the motion to dismiss/withdraw, a motion for intervention to protect the Attorney's rights was filed. It appears that, to the intervenor’s surprise, Malvar unceremoniously and without any justifiable reason terminated its legal service and required it to withdraw from the case.
The intervenor indicated that Malvar’s precipitate action had baffled, shocked and even embarrassed the intervenor, because it had done everything legally possible to serve and protect her interest. It added that it could not recall any instance of conflict or misunderstanding with her, for on the contrary, she had even commended it for its dedication and devotion to her case.
Issue:
Whether or not KRAFT is jointly and severally liable to pay the intervenor Law firm?
Ruling:
The respondents would be liable if they were shown to have connived with Malvar in the execution of the compromise agreement, with the intention of depriving the intervenor of its attorney’s fees. Therefore they would be solidarily liable with her for the attorney’s fees as stipulated in the written agreement under the theory that they unfairly and unjustly interfered with the intervenors’ professional relationship with Malvar.
The respondents were complicit in Malvar's move to deprive the Intervenor of its duly earned contingent fees. At this juncture, the Court notes that the compromise agreement would have Malvar waive even the substantial stock options already awarded by the NLRC's decision, which ordered the respondents to pay to her, among others, the value of the stock options and all other bonuses she was entitled to or would have been entitled to had she not been illegally dismissed from her employment. This ruling was affirmed by the CA. But the waiver could not negate the Intervenor's right to 10% of the value of the stock options she was legally entitled to under the decisions of the NLRC and the CA, for that right was expressly stated in the written agreement between her and the Intervenor. Thus, the Intervenor should be declared entitled to recover full compensation in accordance with the written agreement because it did not assent to the waiver of the stock options, and did not waive its right to that part of its compensation.
The circumstances show that Malvar and the respondents needed an escape from greater liability towards the intervenor, and from the possible obstacle to their plan to settle to pay. Thereby, she and the respondents became joint tort-feasors who acted adversely against the interests of the Intervenor. Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tort-feasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 119121. August 14, 1998.
Facts:
A convoy of four (4) dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi city bound for Iligan city. Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of the trucks with plate no. RFT-9-6-673 driven by a certain Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of 3 persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to 17 other passengers. The heirs of the victims then filed a complaint for damages against National Power Corporation (NPC) and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO) before the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Marawi City. When defendant PHESCO filed its answer to the complaint it contended that it was not the owner of the dump truck which collided with the Toyota Tamaraw but NPC. Moreover, it asserted that it was merely a contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects. On the other hand, NPC denied any liability and countered that the driver of the dump truck was the employee of PHESCO. Trial court absolved NPC and ordered PHESCO, Inc.
and Gavino Ilumba to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs thru the Dansalan College the sum of P954,154.55 representing the actual or compensatory damages incurred by the plaintiffs; and P50,000.00 representing Attorneys fees. Dissatisfied, PHESCO appealed. CA reversed the trial courts judgment. Chagrined by the sudden turnaround, NPC filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision which was, however, denied on February 9, 1995. Hence, this petition.
Issue: