Sandhurst, Woolwich and the Staff Colleges, 1856-
II. The Staff College, Camberley, 1858-
Following the report of the Yolland Commission, which had found that Military History formed an important part of officer education on the continent, the Duke of Cambridge issued a General Army Order on 9 April 1857 which made it a requirement that those holding staff positions should be ‘thoroughly acquainted’ with ‘the principles of strategy’ through a
67 Buchanan-Dunlop (ed.), Records of the Royal Military Academy, p. 132; Anon., Report on the Education of
Officers by the Director-General of Military Education, 1889, p. 4, 10; and, TNA, WO147/58, Lord Wolseley’s
Papers, Report of the Committee on the Course of Study at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, 7 May 1886.
68 Anon., Report on the Education of Officers by the Director-General of Military Education, 1889, p. 12. 69 Sandhurst, Royal Military Academy Woolwich, Tactics Exam Paper, First Class, July 1892, p. 2; and, Askers-
Douglas Committee, Evidence, p. 198.
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knowledge of ‘military history, especially as relates to the campaigns of the ancient and modern commanders’.71 This requirement was later extended and from 5 March 1859 men
promoted to the rank of Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General were expected to ‘give proof’ that they had ‘carefully studied at least four of the most memorable modern campaigns’, and could ‘explain the apparent objects of the movements, and the reasons which he suppose[d had] led to their adoption’.72
Therefore, when the ‘Senior Department’ of the Royal Military College was converted and expanded to create the Staff College in 1858, the Council of Military Education included Military History as part of its syllabus.73 The study of this subject was intended to give the student ‘an opportunity of studying deeply and thoroughly the accounts of the campaigns of great commanders, and through them the principles of military art’.74 To gain entry to the college an officer had to pass an admission exam intended to demonstrate he had some knowledge of Military History. At first, candidates were only expected to give a factual, ‘detailed account’ of a campaign which they had studied, but from 1862 campaigns were specially selected for this exam and notification was published in the army’s General Orders as well as in military periodicals.75 From this time candidates were expected to express an opinion on how effectively these operations had been waged and the exam became ‘principally directed to elicit this knowledge rather than a mere narrative of facts’.76 Since the
entrance exam was competitive, and so only the highest scoring candidates could be admitted
71 Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, p. cxliv. 72 Anon., Report of the Council of Military Education, 1860, p. 41. 73 Ibid., pp. 3, 13, 56.
74 Anon., Report of the Council of Military Education, 1865, p. 10.
75 Anon., Report on Examinations for Admission to the Staff College, 1860 (London, 1861), p. 7; Anon., Report
of the Council of Military Education, 1860, p. 56; Lord William Paulet, ‘General Order Regulations for
Examination for Admission to the Staff College in February 1870’, Broad Arrow: A Paper for the Services, 11 (16 January 1869), p. 73; and, Anon., General Orders by his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding- in-Chief (1 October, 1874), p. 1.
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to the college, great importance was placed on the study of Military History as it was allocated the second highest number of marks, with only Mathematics worth more.77
Just as at Sandhurst and Woolwich, the Staff College syllabus relied heavily on Jomini’s writing and campaigns were analysed in relation to his ‘principles of war’.78
Consequently, MacDougall’s The Theory of War, which embodied Jomini’s ideas, was used
as the set-text for the admission exam between 1864 and 1869.79 The main method of instruction was through the weekly lecture which was given on ‘the general principles which govern strategy and tactics’, with ‘the operations of one campaign described with a view to illustrate a particular branch of the general subject’.80 Until 1869 a variety of mainly
European campaigns, which had been fought between 1757 and 1866 were selected for study at the college.81 Battlefield tours were also conducted on the continent, although at this time it would appear that the work was not all that intellectually rigorous as Hamley, the first Professor of Military History, reported to Blackwood in 1861, that while they had seen the ‘battlefields to perfection’, the ‘fly fishing was spoilt by the unremitting glare of the sun’.82
Since wars fought against native peoples did not conform to Jomini’s model, this type of conflict was seen as below a staff officer, and Hamley was even opposed to sending Staff
77 Anon., First Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Present State of Military
Education and into the Training of Candidates for Commissions in the Army, 1869, p. 50; and, Anon., Report of
the Council of Military Education, 1860, p. 55.
78 Anon., Report on Examinations for Admission to the Staff College, 1862, p. 22; Anon., Report on
Examinations for Admission to the Staff College, 1863 (London, 1864), p. 25, and; Anon., Report on
Examinations for Admission to the Staff College, 1864 (London, 1865), p. 24.
79 Anon., Report on Examinations for Admission to the Staff College, 1868 (London, 1869), p. 41; and, Anon.,
General Orders by his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief (London, 15 September, 1864),
p. 1.
80 Anon., Report of the Council of Military Education, 1860, p. 57; and, Evelyn Baring, Staff College Essays
(London, 1870) p. vi.
81 C. Cooper King, Great Campaigns, edited from the lectures and Writings of the Late Major C. Adams
(London, 1877), p. vi.
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College graduates on the Ashanti expedition in 1873, commenting that ‘it is cutting bricks with a razor to send highly instructed officers into the bush to fight naked savages’.83
The notes which the students took from lectures, together with their wider reading, were used to answer questions set by the professor which, ‘at his own discretion’, he felt deserved greater analysis.84 The answers the students gave were ‘judged [by] the power
shewn to grasp and arrange the subject’ as well as ‘the judgement and acuteness shewn in commenting on the parts which admit of discussion… and the style of writing, which ought to be such as would render a detailed report from a staff officer valuable and reliable’.85 The marks assigned for these ‘memoirs’ made up half of those assigned to the subject, with the other half coming from the exams sat at the end of the year.86 Military History, along with
Mathematics, Fortification and Artillery were assigned the highest marks at the institution.87 As such, Military History held a high importance for the students, and those who achieved the highest grades were found to have ‘devoted most of [their] attention’ to the subject.88 To
assist the students with their work, the college library had a ‘large collection’ of military historical works, and even had an arrangement with the publisher Longmans, Green, and Co., so the clerk who purchased the books ‘always [got] them through Longmans’.89
At this time, strategy was understood at the Staff College in almost exclusively military terms, as Jomini had presented it, thus concerned with the manoeuvres of armies in a theatre of war. This view was not revised when the ideas of Clausewitz began to play an important part in the study of Military History at the college alongside those of Jomini,
83 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS 4304, ff. 125, Hamley to Blackwood, 23 November 1873. 84 Baring, Staff College Essays, p. vii.
85 NAM, Henry Cooper Papers, 6112-596-42, Military History Memoir entitled: ‘German Offensive Tactics in
the Campaign of 1870’, 24 October 1873.
86 Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, p. 48.
87 Anon., Report of the Council of Military Education, 1860, p. 59; and, Anon., Report of the Council of Military
Education, 1868, p. 42.
88 Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, p. 368. Evidence of Capt. E.M. Jones. 89 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS 4294 ff. 213, J.F. Maurice to John Blackwood, 13 May 1872.
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between 1866 and 1873. In fact, Clausewitz was thought to describe strategy in the same way as Jomini. Evelyn Baring, in an essay written during his time at the college in 1868, stated that ‘if any definition [of strategy and tactics] be required, that of Clausewitz seems as good as any: ‘Tactics are employed on the battlefield; strategy is the conduct of troops up to the moment of collision’.90 Since Clausewitz was understood in these terms, his ideas on the
manoeuvres of an army in a theatre of war were those which received the most attention. Thus, when Major Charles Adams, Professor of Military History between 1868 and 1874, described Clausewitz’s contribution to the study of warfare, he focused on his work regarding ‘military system, the preparation of the theatre of war, the advantage of the initiative, the moral influence of early success, the values of true selection of the objective, secrecy of purpose and extreme vigour of execution’.91
Colonel Charles Chesney, Adams’ predecessor at the college, also thought of Clausewitz’s work in the same terms and focused on the Prussian theorist’s discussion of the movement of military forces during a campaign. In October 1868, Chesney published his
Waterloo Lectures which consisted of ‘some of [his Staff] College lectures [put] together in
proper fashion’ which ‘embod[ied] the results of a study… carried on’ at the Staff College.92
The footnotes in this work demonstrate that he had read On War in a French translation, published in 1851, and had used it in his analysis of the campaign at the college.93 In an attempt to defend Wellington from Napoleon’s assertion that the British position at Waterloo was ‘badly chosen’, as the forest of Soignies could have prevented an orderly retreat,
90 Baring, Staff College Essays p. 8. This definition has a much closer relation to that given by Jomini in Art of
War in which he stated ‘Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and… Grand tactics is the art of posting
troops upon the field’, Jomini,p. 51. In contrast, Clausewitz saw tactics as ‘the use of the armed forces in the engagement’; strategy, ‘the use of engagements for the object of the war’. Howard, Paret (trans.) and Clausewitz, On War, p. 128.
91 Cooper King, Great Campaigns, p. 450.
92 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS 4230 ff. 122, Chesney to Blackwood, 1 April 1868; and, C.C. Chesney,
Waterloo Lectures (London, 1868), p. xvi.
93 Chesney, Waterloo Lectures, p. 185; quoted from: Major d’artillerie [Jean Baptiste Charles Francois] Neuens
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Chesney was particularly interested in Clausewitz’s thoughts regarding the influence woodland could have on a defensive position, and he noted that:
Clausewitz… has made the attempt in his ‘Art of War’, to treat systematically the subject of the use of forests by armies. He describes at the opening of his chapter a partially traversable wood (such as is and was that of Soignies) as the first case to be considered, and thus, after some considerations lays down his theory… [that] wooded districts cannot in any manner be used advantageously for defensive actions, except when they lie to the rear. In this case they conceal from the enemy all that passes in the defender’s rear and at the same time serve to cover and facilitate his retreat.94
While Chesney used Clausewitz’s writing to vindicate the position selected by Wellington, he also noted that the recent ‘American experience’ during the Civil War would ‘no doubt have caused [the Prussian to] greatly to modify’ his view on the role of woodland in warfare, as he felt that it had demonstrated its utility during defensive action.95
Chesney’s use of Clausewitz’s ideas influenced the final exam set by the external examiner, Major George Colley, in 1868. The Staff College students, who had evidently studied Clausewitz’s writing, were asked to ‘apply the theory of Clausewitz on the use of forests easily traversed to an army on the defensive, to the subject of Waterloo and the English position there’.96 Likewise, Clausewitz’s views regarding the defensive value of
forests were used by Baring in his 1869 Staff College essay on Napoleon’s operations in Poland during December 1806 in which he too quoted from the 1851 translation of Clausewitz.97
94 Chesney, Waterloo Lectures p. 185; and, Clausewitz, On War, ed. Howard & Paret, p. 452. 95 Chesney, Waterloo Lectures p. 185.
96 Anon., Report on Final Examinations at the Staff College, 1868 (London, 1869), p. 10; Anon., Report of the
Council of Military Education, 1868, p. 3; and, Anon., Report of the Council of Military Education, 1865, p. 125; Colley passed though the two year course at the Staff College in one year, passing out in 1862 and secured the highest marks awarded for Military History.
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Clausewitz’s views of the influence of other obstacles on the conduct of a campaign were also studied at the Staff College during this time. In the final exam set by the external examiners Colonel Lumley Graham and Captain A. Clarke in 1873, the opinion expressed in
On War regarding the role of fortresses in defensive operations formed a central part of one question.98 The students were told that, ‘Clausewitz says, “Les places fortes sont les premiers
et les plus important points d’appui de la defense”’, and were then asked in relation to the recent Franco-Prussian war to ‘consider how far the French Frontier fortresses fulfilled this attribute during the early part of the campaign’.99 The views of the Prussian regarding the
influence of rivers were also studied; in fact, Baring referred many times to his view on this topic as it had been covered in On War in his Staff College essays.100 Similarly, Clausewitz’s
writing on the relationship between attack and defence was discussed at this time. Baring’s essay on the operations in Poland in 1806 used his concept of ‘le point limite de la victoire’ to explain why Napoleon abandoned his offensive operations after the Battle of Pultusk.101 Moreover, it was Clausewitz’s notion that defensive campaigns should consist largely of offensive action which formed the basis of Baring’s analysis of this campaign.102 So often
had Baring deferred to Clausewitz’s writing in this essay that he felt the need to provide an ‘apology for quoting him so often’, even though ‘his great reputation as a military critic… gives considerable weight to all he says’.103
The critical approach to Military History outlined by Clausewitz also influenced how Chesney approached the subject. The Prussian had observed that following historical research
98 Anon., Report on Final Examinations at the Staff College, 1873 (London, 1874), p. 20.
99 This translates as ‘strongholds are the first and most important supports of the defence’ and corresponds with
the version ‘we suggest that fortresses constitute the first and foremost support of defence’ which appears in the Howard/Paret translation on p. 395.
100 Baring, Staff College Essays, pp. 129, 175, 198, 215, 216, 217.
101 Ibid., pp. 202-3. Translated as the ‘culminating point of victory’ by Howard and Paret. Clausewitz, On War,
ed. Howard & Paret, pp. 528, 566-573.
102 Baring, Staff College Essays, p. 213. ‘The defensive line in the war is not limited to parry blows, but also
includes the use of clever response’.
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there were two types of criticism which could be employed, the tracing of effects back to their causes, and the testing of the means a commander employed.104 Chesney directly borrowed from Clausewitz’s ideas on critical analysis. In the introduction to his Waterloo Lectures he outlined ‘the two chief classes of critical remarks which writers employ’.105 The first which he described corresponded with Clausewitz’s conception of critical analysis, which Chesney saw as the ‘sort of criticism… which… dissects events to find the rules which govern them [so that] an event may be traced in all its leading features, [and] its influence on the course of the campaign may be noted’. The second type of criticism which he outlined mirrored the way suggested by Clausewitz to analyse the means employed by a commander. Chesney described this as ‘deal[ing] with the characters and conduct of the men concerned… [as] the task of the historian still remains unfulfilled if he fail[s] to assign in some degree at least, the relation to the whole of the chief actors and their parts’.106
This approach to the critical analysis of Military History, particularly the testing of the means employed by a commander, directly influenced how the subject was taught and examined at the college from the late 1860s. Baring in his essay on Napoleon’s operations in Poland made sure that his criticism of the decisions made by commanders was limited to an analysis of how they acted given the information available to them at the time, as he noted: ‘Clausewitz says… Lorsque la critique veut prononcer un eloge ou un blame concernant un acte, elle ne reussira jamais qu’imparfaitement a se metre a la place de celui qui a accompli cet acte’.107 Similarly, in April 1872, Adams set a question which placed the students in the
position encountered by Marshal Bazaine in August 1870 and asked them to ‘propose any course of operations which may suggest [themselves] to you as more conducive to the
104 Clausewitz, On War, ed. Howard & Paret, p. 156. 105 Chesney, Waterloo Lectures, p. 11.
106 Ibid., p. 13.
107 Baring, Staff College Essays, p. 188. This translates as: ‘when criticism is pronounced…or blame for an act,
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interests of the country invaded… the suggestions [should be based] upon such information… as may be reasonably supposed to have been in Bazaine’s hands during the given period’.108
This style of question also appeared on both the admission and final exams. For instance, those graduating in 1870 were asked to ‘draw up a memorandum on the military situation and scheme of offensive operations, such as might have been laid before a council of war held at the Austrian Head Quarters about the 20April [1859], assuming the general position of the Allies to be known, and [that] the Austrian army [was] ready to cross the Ticino’.109
Likewise, in the 1867 admission exam, applicants were asked to ‘discuss the courses open to Napoleon after the fall of Moscow’.110
As the understanding of Clausewitz’s writing on strategy was limited to that relating to the operations of armies moving in a theatre of war, his ideas regarding the role which politics played in warfare were only imperfectly comprehended. Although there was some realisation that political considerations may impact strategy, this notion received little attention and was even directly criticised at the college. Despite his frequent use of Clausewitz’s writing, Baring in his Staff College essays was adamant that Jomini’s ‘principles of strategy’ presented ‘a strategical standard which never changes under any circumstances’.111 Thus, Baring argued that, although ‘many non-military matters’ such as
‘the moral and political part of war’ had ‘a very direct bearing and influence on… operations in the field’ during a campaign, any consideration which caused a general to conduct his operations in a manner which was not strictly in accordance with the principles of war also