Stage 1: Preparing the data for analysis

authority in Libya were mutually contradictory. In the first instance, the AU through is Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ramtane Lamamra vehemently rejected the National Transition Council as a legitimate government for Libya. The rejection came as an outcome of an emergency meeting of the AU‘s Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The fifteen member emergency committee meeting was divided almost in half. Rather than accepting the National Transition Council, the AU opted for an inclusive transitional government in Libya; establishment of a constitutional and legislative framework for democratic transformation of Libya; organization of election and National reconciliation process. In its 291^st meeting of AU Peace and Security Council, the AU official failed to recognize the National Transition Council (NTC) in Libya. It indicated that it would only grant recognition when all-inclusive transition government was established. AU‘s position was based on its conviction that only a negotiated and all-inclusive transitional government could, as of that time, soothe Libyan political situation. The council strongly reaffirmed that AU was still solidly behind Libyan people and called all concerned parties in Libya to come together and negotiate a peaceful process for democracy in Libya.

The leader of AU delegation to Libya, President Zuma Jaccob of South Africa also said that the AU would not recognise the NTC as long as fighting continued in Libya. Zuma claimed that since there was fighting; the Union

could not recognise the NTC because the picture of what would be the outcome was not certain. According to him that position was AU‘s usual stand in places where there were fighting between different groups.

It is clear here that AU‘s change of opinion was not spontaneous but a slow process and an outcome of continuous recognition of the NTC by more members of international community and the NTC‘s improving victory over Gaddafi forces.The AU was therefore, left with no option than to follow suit.

This gradual nature of the AU‘s change in opinion is demonstrated first by an outright rejection of the NTC, followed by conditions for acceptance and finally acceptance of the council as the legitimate authority in Libya.

When it was dawned on the AU that the NATO-backed NTC had become victorious against Muammar Gaddafi, and following combined pressure within and outside Africa the Union finally recognised the government of the National Transition Council. According to AU statement, the union was encouraged by the assurances made by the NTC to the Chairman of the AU Commission, Jean Ping on its strategic commitment to the African continent to give priority to national unity and bring together all Libyan stakeholders, without any exception, to rebuild the country; and a commitment to protect all foreigners within Libya including African migrant workers (Patel, 2011).

5.4.3 AU’s Rejection of Foreign Intervention in Libya: The African Union was not hesitant to make its position on foreign intervention in Libya clearly known to the world. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) expressed solidarity with Libyans and rejected foreign military intervention in any form.

The decision was informed by AU‘s suspicion of members of NATO and their underlying motives beyond ‗Responsibility to Protect‘ civilian population in

Libya. The AU did not consider external force controlled externally as a legitimate means of enthroning democratic culture and institutions in Libya. It therefore preferred the Libyan people to initiate an inclusive process of political reform guided by their genuine aspiration and elimination of the causes of the crisis. The African Union has an objective to protect African continent from foreign domination, particularly of the western capitalist states like the USA, United Kingdom, France and their allies. Besides, continuous intervention from foreign powers will render the union irrelevant and question its effectiveness and importance in the establishment and consolidation of democratic culture in African.

Deriving from the above premise therefore, it became clear that AU‘s approach to the Libyan Crisis differed in instrument and methodology with western approach; a difference rooted in mutual suspicions. The AU suspected that NATO had more interests in Libya beyond Responsibility to Protect (R2P), particularly, a forceful removal of Muammar Gaddafi from office to ease their penetration of Libyan economy, politics and environmental strategy. The union did not consider such possibility desirable for peaceful and enduring democratic culture in Libya. NATO‘s subsequent expansion of its target to include Gaddafi‘s compound in Tripoli, fuelled such fears in Africa of hidden neo-colonial agenda. On the other hand, NATO believed that a peaceful resolution of the crisis by the AU would directly or indirectly make a place for Muammar Gaddafi‘s continuous relevance in Libyan politics. This is a situation unacceptable to NATO and this explains why NATO did not consider it necessary to involve the African Union in its intervention process in Libya.

Though, AU‘s rejection of foreign military intervention might have soured AU-NATO relationship or possible cooperation, we need to consider the rationale behind the use of NATO as a platform for intervention. Why did United Nations

fail to organise such intervention on its own platform? Why did NATO members or members of the UN not render military support to AU to enable it stand between Muammar Gaddafi‘s and the NTC‘s forces for AU‘s diplomatic process to be concluded. The outcome of NATO intervention justifies AU‘s suspicion because heavy bombardment of military installation in Libya and murder of Col. Gaddafi have not entrenched democratic culture or restored peace in Libya.

Another important issue that affect AU‘s rejection of foreign military intervention in Libya was the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 by the three African representatives in the UN namely Nigeria, South Africa and Gabon. Approved in New York on 17March 2011, the Resolution empowered members of the UN to use ‗necessary measure‘ to intervene in Libya. The three African members voted in favour of foreign intervention against their early decision in AU on the matter and without being in control of the implementation. Their voting behaviour was seen as a betrayal to AU and African people as a whole and it gave credence to foreign intervention and opportunity to those who saw it as a means for achieving their ulterior or underlying motives in Libya. However, it is important to note the fact that at the time of the voting many Libyans were dying without protection and the three African countries did not know that the intervention would take such high scale of reckless bombardment of Libya. Again, Ping (2011) maintains that the three African representatives in the United Nations did not betray AU but voted based on the need to save Libyans and believing that the intervention was actually to protect civilians and nothing more.

5.4.4 Condemnation of NATO’s Bombardment of Libya:In addition to