The State in Transition

According to Williams (2002:170),a state in transition is characterized by the ‘collapse and reestablishment of state structures; major shifts in the principles underlying economic management; a redefinition of the principles and values on which society operates (e.g. who is eligible for participation in political affairs); and a reorientation of relationships with the outside world, usually involving and opening of the economy and the society’.

Furthermore, as a result of the sudden collapse of the former regime, states in transition are characterized by certain weaknesses, which in turn reflect a long-term failure to develop legitimate, sustainable and effective state institutions. The weaknesses are as follows: low levels of state legitimacy; ineffective rules; weak border controls; institutions and government officials that do not represent the interest of the public, but rather serve their own interests; lack of economic and social provision for the citizens; inefficient criminal justice system, and the like (Williams, 2002). In effect, the state cannot carry out the basic functions it is supposed to, as outlined by Rotberg (2003) and Williams (2002). With regard to the ineffective institutions that states in transition are said to be suffering from, Thorsten Beck and Luc Laeven (2006) offer a political economy analysis of the problem, building on North’s (in Beck and Laeven, 2006) hypothesis: ‘institutions are not usually created to be socially efficient, but are created to serve the interests of those with bargaining power to create new rules’. With regard to institution building, states in transition have the difficult task of opening up to the outside world, both in economic and social terms (Williams, 1997); thus the difficult task of building new market-compatible institutions, as well as the process and success of reforms has varied greatly across states (Beck and Laeven, 2006). Furthermore, Beck and Laeven (2006) claim that institutional development is based on the behavior and incentives of the ruling elite during the transition period. In some states, the elite actively fosters the transition to a market economy with a broad base of participants in the political and economic life through the provision of basic property rights and rule of law. In contrast, there are those states where the elite is mostly concerned with securing property rights for themselves in the formerly state-owned enterprises, with the aim of extracting economic rents and thereby securing economic and political power in the post-transition society (Beck and Laeven, 2006).

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These two types of transition are in turn conceptualized as “catalytic transition” and “extractive transition”.

Furthermore, while institutions, both formal and informal, provide the underlying rules that govern transactions between agents in the economy, an absence of effective institutions which govern these transactions enforces the weakness of the state in transition; thus making the line between legal and illegal business transactions quite elusive (Beck and Laeven, 2006; Kregar and Petričušić, 2010).

In accordance with Beck and Laeven (2006) and Josip Kregar and Antonija Petričušić (2010), Amir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt and Shalom H. Schwartz (2007) claim that for a state in transition to surpass the difficulties it is facing and to be able to develop into a consolidated democracy, the need for three diverse types of “institutions” arises. The three institutions that they outline are: the rule of law, absence of corruption and democracy. Even though Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2007) acknowledge culturally diverse views on all three of these institutions, they claim that no matter the case study, there is no doubt that these institutions are necessary. This goes hand in hand with the World Bank’s (2007) view on what is needed for a state to develop, as well as alleviate poverty, namely good governance and anti- corruption.

In a similar fashion, Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2006) and Kim Moloney (2009) state that democratic consolidation can only be achieved through good governance, and this in turn can only be assured through: the governments’ accountability (the country’s citizens are allowed to participate in selecting their government); the governments’ effectiveness (which assures the quality of public services); regulatory quality (the government’s ability to formulate and implement sound policies); rule of law (the citizens need to confide and abide by the rules of society, in particular the police and the courts); and lastly, through the control of corruption (the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain). It appears as thoughall of the above-mentioned scholars agree on several things: efficient institutions, respect for the rule of law and democratic accountability are the prerequisites for a state to surpass the transition period and become a recognized consolidated democracy.

Moreover, Kregar and Petričušić (2010) claim that studies of transitional states show that the government apparatus is weak, and thus not capable to fight the issues at stake, such as organized crime. Weak states contain the most dangerous elements of instability and are

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therefore the most likely source of trouble. They continue by saying that all states have organized crime, but in some instances organized crime has the state, meaning that organized crime is actually in power, while the state serves as a framework of reference, but has no control. They claim that organized crime in transitional states is not just a problem of criminology and deviance; it is in fact a problem of the weak state. This leads us back to the main problem of weak states, namely weak institutions (Kregar and Petričušić, 2010).

With regard to the similarities between states in transition and weak states, one could look at Mentan’s (2004) characteristics of weak states and compare those to Williams’ (2002) characteristics of states in transition. Mentan (2004:20) claims that for a state to be defined as weak, it must have these characteristics: ‘1) lack of societal cohesion and consensus on what organizing principles should determine the contest for state power and how that power should be executed; 2) low capacity and/or low political will of state institutions to provide all citizens with minimum level of security and well-being; 3) high vulnerability to external economic and political forces; 4) low degree of popular legitimacy accorded to the holders of state power (i.e. state custodians) by portions of the citizenry; and 5) unskillful flirtations with theopolitics and secularism for purposes of political survival’.

The weaknesses that Williams (2002) argues a state in transition suffers from are very similar to the characteristics of weak states as outlined by Mentan (2004). Williams (2002) claims that a state in transition suffers from low levels of state legitimacy, thus there is a perceived lack of authority and affiliation which coincides with Mentan’s (2004) fourth point, as outlined above. Other weaknesses that Williams (2002) outlines are: the lack of provision for citizens (both economic and social); lack of control and transparency; and skewed electoral norms and patterns. This coincides with Mentan’s (2004) outline of lack of societal cohesion, as outlined in point one and low capacity and/or political will, as outlined in point two. These weaknesses that Williams (2002) outlines are called capacity gaps, which in turn lead to functional holes, thus forming what he claims to be states in transition5. Even though characteristics of weak states and states in transition are similar, and transitional states suffer from certain weaknesses, it needs to be said that not all transitional states are weak states, but can be regarded as weakened.

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