Foucault distinguishes his mode of analysis through defining its object, the statement, as an entity c is tln c t from unities such as the sentence and the proposition. He begins this endeavour by positing at the most general level the existence of enunciations, or emlttances of a group of signs which have spatio-temporal In d iv id u a lity . These are unrepeatable events for although the sa.Te grcup of signs may be emitted on several occasions and In several d iffe re n t contexts, they are not equivalent verbal performances as th e ir spatio-temporal co
ordinates are unique. The Individual act that reveals the enunciation as a specific act of language is the formulation.
The formulation fixes tha group of signs in its spatial and temporal s p e c ific ity and describes i t In relation to an author.
The next level upon which verbal performances or enunciations may be described Is that of the sentence and proposition.
These are units obeying the laws of grammar and of logic respectively. Here the Individualizing co-ordinates that specify the moment of the enunciation and its m ateriality are of l i t t l e Import, and the main focus Is upon the obedience of the group of signs to the system of laws that regulate gramma
tic a l and logical formulation. These u n its, recognized and accepted as sentences or propositions, are repeatable forms for the uniqueness of th e ir moments of emergence are not taken Into account. Foucault posits a fourth level upon which the enunciation may be described; the level of the statement. The
statement Is the modality of existence of a group of signs which emphasizes the types of relations existing between the group of signs and a domain of objects, of a subject as opposed to the author of a formulation, its relations to other verbal perfor
mances and its m ate ria lity .
The statement d iffers most rad ic a l!) from the sentence and pro
position as these la tte r are analyzed as units, whereas the
statement Is conceived as a verbal performance which Is the s ite of operation of the enunclatlve function. In this regard, Foucault's use of the word has two simultaneous senses: the predominant sense Is that of the mathematical function, a variable which exists In relation to other variables 1n terms of which I t is expressed or oo which Its value depends; whilst the secondary sense 1s that o* an Implied a c tiv ity . The
sentence and proposition are analyzed as s ta tic e n title s which exist In d iffe re n tly to the spatio-temporal emergence of the
group of signs which are scrutinized according to th e ir adherence to the laws of logic and grammar. However, the analysis of the statement accounts fo r Its relations to objects, subjects, other verbal performances and Its material support. The group of
signs as a statement Is operational and dynamic In these relation
ships. The statement-functlon cuts v e rtic a lly through the levels of the enunciation, formulation and the sentential and preposi
tional le v e l, and Is both anterior to these levels of description, yet operative upon them. A sentence may be a statement, yet they ' are not equivalent, for the statement may Incorporate elements
which are foreign to this unit such as an algebraic formula.
Likewise, the proposition and the statement d iffe r although a group of signs may f u l f i l l the c r ite r ia of both, for a proposition
"No one heard" found in a novel is equivalent to the proposition
" I t Is true that no one heard" found In the transcript of a court case. These two are not the same statements, however, because the statement is susceptible to m aterial, temporal and spatial differences. In this way the statement is a more specific concept when a group of signs are analyzed h is to ric a lly . Foucault places
the statement anterior to the level of the sentence and the pro
position because of this historical or spatio-temporal focus and claims that the statement as a function, descrlbable only In and through Its relations to a domain of objects, the subject, other verbal performances and Its material support, determine whether a group of signs f u l f i l l the c rite ria that define a sentence and a proposition, whether the enunciation obeys the laws of grammar
Since the statement Is not a u n it. I t cannot be described Inde
pendently of Its actual practice and operation as an enunclatlve function. Again, i t is distinguishable from the sentence and
proposition as its relation to what i t states Is not superlmposable upon the sentence's relation to Its truth-value or Its refe re n t.
The statement Is related to a referen tial which exists as a domain of possible objects that may be designated and described 1n the statement, and the relations between those objects that the state
ment may forge. (AK p .91) The level of this relation between the statement and its m 'r e n t l a l Is that of the enunclatlve level as opposed to the grammatical and logical levels, and i t is here that the artic u la tio n of objects and th e ir relations produced In the statement define the p o s s ib ilitie s of a meaningful sentence or a tru th fu l proposition. The enunclatlve level is anterior to the grammatical and logical levels for a description of the statement
in Its relation to Its refe re n tia l does not entail the search for meaning or v e rific a tio n , but describes how a meaningful sentence or v e rifia b le proposition Is enunciated by analyzing the dispersion of possible objects and th e ir relations which admit the existence of these units.
The statement is distinguishable on the basis of its specific relatio n to a subject. The subject d iffe rs from the originating author whose relation to his enunciation is one of production.
The subject's relation to the statement is not external as is the author's to his enunciation, but rather that of "an empty function" (AK p .93) which does not refer to an individual, but a space which is f ille d by any individual when the statement is formulated. The individual thus does not remain in a constant relation to a series of statements formulated in a conversation, a novel or even a mathematical tre a tis e , but is in a variable relation according to what position i t is necessary for him to occupy i f he is to be the subject of that statement. Hence the
place of the subject of a statement may be f ille d by d iffe re n t Individuals whereas there Is only one author of a formulation.
The s p e c ific ity of the level of the statement and the a b ility to describe 1 t, Is demarcated by this description of the subject-functlon:
" I f a proposition, a sentence, a group of signs can be called 'statem ent', I t Is not therefore because, one day, someone happened to speak them or put them Into some concrete form of w riting ; i t is because the position of the subject can be assigned. To describe a formulation qua statement joes not consist in analyzing the relations between the author and what he says . . . , but 1n determining what position can ar.d inust be occupied by any individual i f he is to be the subject of i t . " (AK p .95-96)
Together with the referen tial and the subject-function, the statement is describable in relation to an associated domain or enunciative fie ld within which i t is related to other state
ments. Just as the statement is anterior to the sentence and the proposition, so the enunciative f ie ld Is anterior to the context of sentences or propositions. The condition of possi
b i l i t y of the context as the contextual relations that operate upon sentences in a novel as d istin ct fr r ^ those in a scientific tre a tis e may only be revealed against the background of a more general relatio n between the formulations, which Foucault posits as an entire verbal network which shares the modality of existence of the statement. Thus, unlike the sentence or proposition which may be recognized as such although its appearnace is regarded as autonomous and independent, the statement may only be described by being situated among others which i t borders or presupposes.
Foucault c la rifie s this nexus of the vertical relation between statement and sentence and horizontal relation of statement to enunciative fie ld :
" I f one can speak of a statement, i t is because a
sentence (a proposition) figures at a d e fin ite point, with a specific position, in an enunciative network that extends beyond i t . " 'AK p .99)
The statement's d e fin itiv e relation to an enunciative fie ld is one instance of its material existence. One may again d is tin guish the statement from the sentence and proposition on the basis of this fourth characteristic. For a sentence or propo
s itio n to e x is t, its m ateriality necessarily refers to its
surfaces of inscription or point of utterance and the contextual variations that allow its recognition as such a u n it. A sentence appearing as a slogcn on a poster has d iffe rin g c r ite r ia of
recognition than i f i t appears in a conversation fo r the surface of inscription of the one and the utterance of the other are bound within d iffere n t contexts which delim it the acceptability of the r/oup of signs as a meaningful sentence. However, the statement is not only characterized by its m a te ria lity , but- constituted by i t . For a statement to e x is t, i t must have "a substance, a support, a place and a date". (AK p .101) Unlike the sentence inscribed on a poster and th at uttered in conversation which may or may not be accepted as the same unit of meaning, these groups of signs i f they are to be considered as statements cannot be the same as the four constitutive elements of th e ir m ateriality necessarily distinguish them.
Although this constitutive m ateriality of the statement generally precludes its reactualization in a variety of contextual instances, Foucault does admit that under s tr ic t conditions the statement can be repeated. These conditions he groups under 'the rule of
repeatable m a te ria lity '. The f i r s t of these conditions refers to the p o s s ib ilitie s of reinscription and transcription. In this case, a group of signs occurring in d iffe re n t editions of the same book may be treated as the same statement, as the changes that occur in the positions of the signs are neutralized by the general element of the bock, by which is meant the status i t has as an
object within the nexus of In s titu tio n a l and economic relations.
The second type of rep etition that Is permitted Is that which occurs within a certain domain of statements In which the statement which Is repeated maintains a set of relations to the other statements with which I t appears. The affirmations that the world Is round, for example, remain the same statement I f Its use and reinvestment, its p o s s ib ilitie s of v e rific a tio n and the fie ld of experience to which i t refers are equivalent.
Hence the statement Is repeatable within a fie ld of s ta b iliz a tio n , In which I t enters equivalent networks of relations and where i t obeys the same rules of application. However this fie ld of s tab iliza tio n also delim its the threshold beyond which a new statement is to be recognized, as i t Is then positioned In a new network; the relations 1t participated in with other statements and the rules of application i t obeys being no longer equivalent to those of Its predecessor. Lastly, the statement may be repeated In a particu lar fie ld of use. The most obvious example of what Is meant here Is the translation of a sentence from one language to another. The ards and the syntax change, but the information content of both remains the same, as does the use to which they are put. Hence, although two d iffe re n t sentences may e x is t. I f they are treated as a statement, 1t is constant and therefore repeatable.
To conclude, the statement,although its threshold of existence Is the existence of signs. Is more than a mere series of traces or sounds, more than an object produced, manipulated and trans
formed by speakers. Rather I t Is an operative fie ld in which a set of relations which are the conditions of the group of signs functioning are made apparent. These relations are constitutive of the statement: Its relation to what i t states Is one binding
I t to a domain of objects governed by a principle of d iffe re n tia tion: Its subject as an empty function sets Into motion another set of relations that delim it the p o ssib ilities who may speak and what position must be occupied i f an Individual is to be the
subject of the formulation; the statement exists only In relation to others and is situated by these relations In an enunclative f ie ld , and fin a lly Its m ateriality - Its status, p o s s ib ilitie s of transcription within a network and its p o ssib ility of reuse -
secures I t in a specific s ite In relation to In stitu tio n a l supports.