Strategic Partnership

After successful negotiations by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, President Karimov traveled to Washington in March 2002 for the signing of a more comprehensive accord between the two countries, the Strategic Partnership Agreement. This document outlined a framework for cooperation on a range of issues including economic reforms, democratization, humanitarian assistance, and military cooperation. It began by recognizing “the importance of competent implementation of democratic and market reforms in Uzbekistan as a necessary condition for ensuring political, social, and economic stability, sustainable development, prosperity and national security” (Strategic Partnership Agreement 2002). In effect, the US agreed to remain closely involved in Uzbekistan’s security and assist in modernizing the Uzbek armed forces, while the Karimov regime promised to cooperate in US counterterrorism efforts and pursue a series of political reforms.18 Absent from the agreement was any mention of payment for basing rights or promises of remuneration for cooperation, an issue which would resurface in the following months.

During Karimov’s White House visit, President Bush expressed his appreciation for Uzbekistan’s cooperation with US-led Afghanistan operations and pressed the Uzbek president on human rights issues, according to a White House spokesman (Washington Post 13 March 2002). In Congressional testimony the previous day, Secretary of State Colin Powell had characterized Uzbekistan as a “solid coalition partner”, while insisting that human rights issues were still a point of discussion between the two countries (ibid). Earlier in the year, US Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones remarked that Washington sensed a new commitment by the Karimov regime to improving human rights in his country (RFE/RL 31 January 2002). The limited political opposition remaining in Uzbekistan also had reason to be hopeful after hearing promises of democratic reform from the Uzbek authorities as well as the liberal rhetoric from Washington. Increased US engagement in the country could bring about real change in Tashkent and according to one opposition leader Uzbeks were both “excited and apprehensive” after 2001 (Interviews Tashkent, February/March 2006).

18 _{This was clearly how the State Department interpreted the Strategic Partnership Agreement. In November 2002 Assistant}

Secretary of State Lorne Craner declared: “We are grateful for the support that Uzbekistan has provided in the war on terror. But the United States will not sacrifice its long-term commitment to protect human rights for short-term political expediency (…) The Uzbek government has (…) made a commitment to improve human rights, but we see mixed results on the ground, and there is obviously still a long way to go” (Craner 2002b).

Balancing military aid and human rights: Congressional hearings

Another Congressional hearing in 2002, this time before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee entitled “Balancing Military Assistance and Support for Human Rights in Central Asia”, directly addressed the themes discussed in this thesis. The panel of witnesses had an interesting composition: three of the five witnesses providing testimony were members of the Bush administration; the fourth was a former US ambassador to Kazakhstan and now the senior vice president of a military subcontractor, and academic Dr. Martha Brill Olcott rounded out the list.

Committee chairman Senator Robert Torricelli began by noting that “rooting out terrorism and promoting democracy and human rights are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they are probably mutually reinforcing”, explaining that undemocratic regimes marginalize and radicalize their populations, leading to terrorism and instability (Torricelli 2002). Lorne Craner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, testified to some of the reform successes in Uzbekistan, including arranging for better International Red Cross access to prisons, the registration of one human rights NGO, and the invitation extended by the Uzbek government to the United Nations human rights rapporteur on torture. Craner agreed with Senator Torricelli that military assistance and human rights “need not be a question of balance and competing interests, but can, as we’re attempting, be an issue of mutually reinforcing goals” (Craner 2002a). Assistant Secretary of Defense J.D. Crouch concurred:

All of the Central Asian countries have told us that OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom) directly addresses their security concerns, namely terrorism and religious extremism (…) narco-traffickers (…) and the transnational threat of weapons of mass destruction. And I think because our action is in a security interest, this provides us more leverage, frankly, on the human rights side than we would have if we were in a position where they were simply doing us a favor (…) Our interests are complementary (Crouch 2002).

Lynn Pascoe, Assistant Secretary of State for Central Asia, then commented that “I listened to both of you gentlemen’s [Craner and Crouch] opening statements very carefully and it occurred to me how closely we agree on this question” (Pascoe 2002). Pascoe saw “no conflict whatsoever” between American military cooperation with Central Asian countries and human rights concerns in those countries (ibid). Assistant Secretary Craner pointed out that the US had now mostly eliminated the terrorist threat in Central Asia, a rationale given by the countries in the region for having closed political systems (Craner 2002a).19 Former Ambassador William Courtney provided a comprehensive strategy for the region: increasing security assistance, maintaining a US military presence, focusing

19 _{After a small action in July 2001 against a television tower in Kyrgyzstan, the IMU threat seemed to dissipate as many of}

more attention on human rights and democracy, remembering that “US security cooperation boosts government legitimacy, which offers a source of leverage for promoting human rights and democracy”, working with allies in Europe to effect change in the region, and promoting long-term change by focusing on youth programs (Courtney 2002). All four witnesses connected to the Bush administration agreed that no balance needed to be struck between military assistance and support for human rights, as they were complementary interests.

Dr. Olcott testified last and warned that “unless the US finds some more effective means of leveraging these states, there could be some highly undesirable and even violent (and at least unscheduled) regime changes throughout the region (Olcott 2002). She warned that American human rights policy and democracy promotion strategies were “unlikely to lead to any major change in the nature of our partner regimes in Central Asia” because undemocratic regimes were “deeply rooted throughout the region” (ibid). Seemingly contradicting herself in the very next breath, Olcott then argued that the US should not abandon its human rights policy, but should instead devote even more funding to these programs, and that the US was “moving in the right direction” (ibid). Dr. Olcott’s testimony provided some pessimism to an otherwise optimistic hearing in which the witnesses from the administration reaffirmed their belief that the US was proceeding appropriately and correctly in its foreign policy. Even Olcott, despite her pessimism, had few criticisms of US policy.