Streamlining and accountability, 1979-1997

5.3.3. Streamlining and accountability, 1979-1997

While the debate on the level of justifiable incursion of central government into local government continued, the context of on-going short-term economic shocks in 1973/5, the IMF loan in 1976, and the so-called ‘Winter of Discontent’ in 1979, resulted in growing intervention by central government. Despite these economic challenges, a Committee of Inquiry led by Frank Layfield observed how public opinion in favour of local-level decision making remained and was even growing; “An increasing number of community action groups call for greater

involvement of local citizens in the affairs of government – central and local – at the very local level” (1976, 65). Yet, despite a “unanimity of professed intention” to decentralise and an appearance of a localist consensus, centralising forces outweighed pressures towards localism, where economic crisis and austerity in public spending saw an “acceleration of the trend to centralisation” (Layfield Committee 1976, 70; see also DoE 1970; DoE 1971a). The ability of local government to raise its own revenue was particularly a concern, given that increasing the proportion of central grants would “run contrary to the Government’s objective of devolving power from central to local government” (1971b, 3). The Layfield Committee report concluded that “a durable financial system can be established only if it is founded on a political choice about the direction in which the relationship between central and local government should move” (Layfield Committee 1976, xxvi).

The beginning of the Thatcher Government saw a continuation of this theme. Despite its ‘anti-local government’ reputation70 over the course of its eleven years in power, its ‘professed intentions’ were originally to reduce central controls and well as oversee decentralisation (Stoker 2004a, 28). A White Paper published only a few months after winning the general election starts off with the following statement:

The Government has announced its determination to reduce substantially the number of bureaucratic controls over local government activities. This should give local authorities more choice and flexibility and allow them to become more efficient in their use of both money and manpower (DoE 1979b, para. 1).

The paper later adds; “Democratically elected local authorities are wholly responsible bodies who must be free to get on with the tasks entrusted to them by Parliament without constant interference in matters of detail by the Government of the day” (DoE 1979, para. 4). The White Paper outlined nearly 300 controls that the government intended to appeal (p. 1). Judging from the legacy of the Thatcher Government, it is evident that these, again, ‘professed intentions’ did not come to pass. The White Paper’s suggestions were brought into legislation through the Local Government, Planning and Land Bill, described in its first reading by Lord Bellwin: “a Bill to relax controls over local government” (HL Deb 29 November 1979, Vol. 403 c492).

True to the pattern outlined above and by the Kilbrandon Commission and the Layfield Committee, the second reading in the Commons, introduced by The Secretary of State for the Environment, Michael Heseltine, was a bit more ambivalent: “the real thrust of our removal from detailed control comes in part VIII of the Bill, where we proposed capital ceilings for local authority expenditure” (HC Deb 5 February 1980, Vol. 978 cc244-5). Through the 1980 Act, the government brought in capital ceilings for local authority expenditure: this contentious central government intervention to control spending was justified on the basis of the ‘economic circumstances of today’ and the need to challenge ‘established habits and attitudes’ (ibid.).

70 This is a well-known reputation gained from a series of public spending controls as well as legislative reform, including the Rates Act 1984, which introduced further local authority spending controls, the Housing Act 1980, which gave tenants of local authorities the right to buy their home, the Local Government Act 1985 which abolished the Greater London Council and the metropolitan county councils. This history has been widely commented on by many researchers and does not require lengthy re-iteration here (see, for example, Foster 2005;

Gamble 2009; Cochrane 1989b; Blunkett and Jackson 1987; Stoker 2004a, 41-7)

Given the contradictory rhetoric emphasising reducing controls of local authorities, I argue that this, again, demonstrates the strategic and legitimising use of ‘localism’. Here, reducing controls on local government was a means to a specific end, a compromise for the funding limits that were being brought in. As Michael Heseltine argued at a later date, “We have announced proposals to introduce ceilings on local government capital expenditure, but within those ceilings we have also announced changes that will give local government much greater flexibility as to how it uses its capital resources” (HC Deb 14 November 1979, Vol. 973 c1324).

This form of strategic localism was described by Bulpitt (1989, 69):

What the Conservative leadership appeared to want from central-local relations in this initial period was a system of separate, reciprocal autonomies. Each level of government would look after its own as far as possible; but inevitably the centre had a wider responsibility (and mandate).

With this, the Thatcher government rejected the overly normative understanding of localism which pushed for greater autonomy without clearly articulating practical implementation.

Indeed, as a White Paper later argued, while “local authorities make an essential contribution to the well-being of both private and public lives of the community”, it dismissed any radical models of local autonomy by stating “we live in a unitary and not a federal state” (DoE 1983a, para 1.1-1.2).

Yet, much of the communicative discourse during this time focused on accountability rather than local control, focusing largely on the extent to which local government was (democratically) accountable to its local tax payers (rate payers), where it was suggested that

“Only about 35% of those eligible to vote in local elections pay full rates” (DoE 1983a, para.

2.2-2.3). The Green Paper, Paying for Local Government, suggested that “… the main role of local government is to provide services in a way which properly reflects differences in local circumstances and local choice” (DoE 1986c, vii). While the Green Paper argued that “effective local accountability must be the cornerstone of successful local government”, it argued that the present finance system was reducing this accountability, which was seen to be limiting the ability of the local electorate to make “sensible choices” on the “balance between local priorities” and the “overall level of spending” (ibid.). Government emphasised at the time that the only alternative to the path of increasing central control was improving local accountability, with accountability being the preferable option since greater central control would require more central and local manpower and further dilution of local accountability, as well as greater central-local conflict (DoE 1986, 9; Ridley 1988, 14). This thinking indicated that, rather than empowering local people through devolving powers to local government, the Thatcher Government took the rhetoric one step further: they offered to empower the people directly (see also Bulpitt 1989, 72). As the then Secretary of State, Nicholas Ridley, argued:

In changing the ways in which things have been done for decades, we are predictably accused of attacking local government. I emphatically reject that charge. Certainly local government’s powers in certain respects will be limited, but they will be limited in practice not by the Government but by local people.

The style of local government will have to become much more ‘interactive’

(Ridley 1988, 34)

This was however not a holistic form of empowerment. Empowerment was offered mainly towards two groups: as already indicated, empowering the local tax payer (rate payers),71 as well as empowering the council house tenant.72 This emphasis on empowering the individual was expanded under John Major with the White Paper ‘The Citizens Charter’ (Cabinet Office 1991) which promised minimum standards, transparency, choice, and complaints systems in the delivery of a wide range of services.

In parallel, moves to ‘streamline’ local government, which had started with the abolition of the GLC and metropolitan counties in the mid-80s (DoE 1983; DoE 1991a, para. 25), continued in the 1990s as elaborated on in Table 5.2 above. Many saw the abolition as largely politically motivated, however, it had been justified on the basis of two-tiers being wasteful use of public money given the climate of austerity.73 These kinds of concerns and criticisms of the two-tier system was already voiced in by the 1974-1979 Labour Government, where it argued the sharing of powers led to “wasteful duplication, to confusion over responsibilities, and to friction between authorities” (DoE 1979a, 17). Seen from this perspective, the need for strategic, supply side interventions for growth was difficult to disentangle from more short-term fiscal concerns, particularly of public spending (this convergence is similar to the current climate of devolution).

Using similar justifications to the Thatcher Government, the Major Government revisited the question of unitary authorities (DoE 1991a), a form of restructuring that was still as contentious and unpopular as it was in the 1960s, with most areas showing little support as demonstrated by data collected from Royal Mail leaflets and MORI polling at the time (Chisholm 2000, 79).

There were also similarities in the legitimating rhetoric between the Wilson Government and the Major Government. As the 1991 Green Paper argued, unitary status would “offer the opportunity of relating the structure of local government more closely to communities with which people identify” (DoE 1991a, para. 26). The later Green Paper reiterated its commitment to local government as having an “important role to play not just in securing services but also in encouraging local participation in the political system” (DoE 1991b, 1). However, rather than repeat the mistakes of the earlier attempt at reorganisation, there were provisions for extensive consultation to ensure that local people were given a say in the structure appropriate for their area, with the intention of creating a sense of openness and ownership for the citizens affected (LGCE 1995, Ch. 7; Chisholm 2000, 27, 77). The presumption of any particular size was

71 This reasoning eventually lead to the politically disastrous ‘poll tax’ (community charge), with the government in the 1983 White Paper had originally rejected, on the basis of a flat-rate levy being inherently regressive, expensive to monitor (as a necessity to increase fairness), and democratically problematic – “a tax on the right to vote” (DoE 1983a, para. 2.9). Despite this, the idea was renewed in the 1986 Green Paper and was justified as a way of increasing local accountability (DoE 1986).

72 For example, since their 1964 election manifesto, the Conservatives ran a slogan focused on renewing democracy – not (just) in the form of a participative democracy or local democracy, but in terms of a ‘capital-owning’ / ‘home-‘capital-owning’ / ‘property-‘capital-owning’ democracy. This slogan spearheaded the policy of ‘right-to-buy’

which, in contrast to the poll tax, was hugely successful politically. Right to buy gave housing tenants the right, as well as financial incentives, to purchase their local authority-owned council home. The Conservative’s emphasis on empowering the individual through greater opportunities for economic prosperity and personal wealth (through property), greater accountability on taxes and public spending, was pertinent considering the economic situation.

The challenge of stagflation which began in 1973 continued into the 1980s: in 1980, inflation rose again to over 20 per cent in the UK, with sharp rises in unemployment which reached 11 per cent of 3 million by 1982 where it remained until 1986 (Gamble 2009, 13).

73 The government had claimed that the abolition had resulted in an annual saving of £100 million (DoE 1991, 4) and yet academic research at the time argued this claim was implausible (Chisholm 2000, 19-20).

removed, and reorganisation was targeted towards the shire counties, rather than all-encompassing (DoE 1991a). Yet, “the argument that removing one tier would improve accountability sat ill with the high degree of financial and other control over local authorities exercised by central government on the one hand, and the increased complexity of service provision that had come about in the years leading up to 1990 on the other” (Chisholm 2000, 32).

The localist rhetoric of the 1991 Green Paper and later the Local Government Commission that was set up to review the structural changes (taking over from the previous Local Government Boundary Commission) diverged little from that of the Redcliffe-Maud Report and the 1970 White Paper decades earlier: all four showed a consistently clear position on the need to expand the role and importance of town and parish councils (LGCE 1995, 85; Chisholm 2000, 76). As the earlier 1991 Green Paper argued; “operating at a very local level, parish and town councils play a useful role within communities in providing local facilities and representing local opinion. The Government believe that there may be a case for considering whether to enhance the role of parish councils, especially where a new unitary authority covers a wide area” (DoE 1991a, para. 32). The parallel review on the internal management of local authorities, composed of a joint Working Party of the three main local authority associations, the Audit Commission, and the Local Government Management Board, supported “decentralisation of the decision-making process to the lowest practical level” (Working Party 1993, 6-7). As the report later elaborates:

The community leadership role as well as the authority’s day to day operations could be further enhanced by some degree of devolution of powers to area or neighbourhood committees. In these circumstances there are opportunities for local people to determine their own priorities about the level and quality of services they receive (Working Party 1993, para. 5.39).

Again, there were similarities in the rhetoric of the 1960s in the reappearance of the concept of

‘participation in planning’, and parallel steps were also taken in several government Departments and organisations to widen the scope for greater community rights, including involvement in planning, where it was felt there was a “gulf between the support for involvement in principle and the commitment to it in specific cases” (DoE 1994, 29). For example, the Countryside Commission first piloted ‘Village Design Statements’ in 1993, which, in a similar vein to Neighbourhood Planning, were not to determine “whether development should take place”, but rather to set out “how planned development should be carried out” in order to “protect and enhance local identity” (Countryside Commission 1996, 6). The research report on ‘Community Involvement in Planning and Development Processes’

(DoE 1994), explored how such greater involvement in planning could complement the decentralist agenda of local government reform, exploring innovations such as ‘Neighbourhood Forum’ and ‘Area Committee’: “The intention to delegate power is a form of community involvement; important because it includes a structure which can apply over time and across any project which might proceed in that area” (DoE 1994, 69).74 Similarly, the Rural England

74 This debate was reflected in elements of the Conservative’s ‘Single Regeneration Budget’ which supported a bottom-up, partnership approach in urban regeneration, with the original guidance (DoE 1995) encouraging the

White Paper emphasised the importance of improving consultation and evolving powers to parish councils, and the creation of new town and parish councils (DoE/MAFF 1995, 23).

Perhaps this discourse and policy reform that emphasised local decision-making and empowerment reflected the fact that the popularity of the concept of localism did not subside.

Powers to communities, and local government more broadly, demanded a shift in approach, and the Conservatives were “forced to re-think their attitudes to local government” (Chisholm 2000, 133). Already by the mid 1980s, doubts were emerging whether growing controls on local government was politically sustainable. Survey findings in the 1985 Report on British Social Attitudes suggested as much:

Few people of any political persuasion (even committed Conservatives) supported further inroads by central government into local government affairs, whether in general or in respect to rate controls … such consistent support for local government autonomy may derive in part from the public’s general feeling that local authorities are rather more accessible than central government is (Young 1985, 149).

A shift in local government finance policy, described in the 1986 Green Paper, was propelled by the recognition that too much centralisation caused a lot of unproductive opposition. As a Government Green Paper observed at the time: “The modest success in holding back spending has been accompanied by a worsening of the relationship between central Government and even the moderate and responsible local authorities” (DoE 1986, 5). This shifting attitude in the government does indicate Young’s suggestion that “localism is an important and often overlooked component of Conservative ideology, one which a Conservative administration engaged in making inroads into local government autonomy ignores at its peril” (Young 1985, 156; see also Young 1975; Bulpitt 1989, 58). Miller’s (1988, 243-4) observation of contemporary public opinion on local government during this time is illuminating:

… the public were well informed about the limitations of local democracy in terms of both its scope and its freedom of action. At the same time, they wanted less central control and were totally opposed to appointed boards instead of elected councils. They knew that local democracy was limited, but they wanted more.

Instead of rejecting local elections as a ‘sham and a fraud’ the public were firmly attached to the limited amount of local democracy that they enjoyed, aware of the limitations, but critical of central government and central control rather than alienated from local democracy. For the public, local democracy was defective rather than fraudulent; their expectations were not high and their disappointment was not intense.

Later, the Major Government admitted that the party had taken things too far during the 1980s, in response to the Select Committee Report ‘Rebuilding Trust’:

The Government shares the Committee’s belief in the importance both of local democracy and of local government itself … The Government also shares the

involvement of the community in local area regeneration, however, the achievement of participation was varied (Rhodes, Tyler and Brennan 2007, Ch. 5).

view of the Committee that traditional relationships between central and local government broke down in the 1980s and that from that point there needed to be a rebuilding of trust between the two parties to that relationship (HM Government 1996, 3).

This sentiment eventually caught up with the party in the two elections during the 1990s. As forcefully argued by Simon Jenkins, “Contempt for localism cost the Tories dear”:

All over Britain the Tory Party’s “little platoons” packed their bags and went home. The Tories were devastated at two elections in a row. Yet they remained determinedly centralist throughout. They opposed Scottish and Welsh devolution.

They opposed elected mayors. They protected rate capping and denied local discretion. They did not give an inch. Small wonder urban Britain – and rural Britain beyond the Home Counties – ceased to regard Conservatism as part of its political culture (Jenkins 2004, 45).

This section indicates emerging historical parallels and repetitions surrounding policy making on local government: it is a legitimating discourse used periodically. While it was largely absent from much of the Thatcher Government, localism re-emerged in the 1990s as both a legitimating discourse and a material policy change, indicating that if centralisation of power is taken too far, governments’ will eventually struggle to justify it in the face of public opinion.

It also indicates differences in approach between opposition parties and newly elected governments, who seem to view decentralisation positively and are quick to offer promises to devolve power, versus established governments where this energy seems to subside.