Structural Cause Approach

The structural cause approach provides three major arguments about the link between terrorist organizations and political parties. First, institutional barriers, such as regime types and electoral systems, create grievances in some democracies for individuals who belong to marginalized political organizations; these grievances cause them to ally with or create militant wings that engage in terrorist activities (Crenshaw 1981, 384). Second, leftist leaning parties are more susceptible to overtures by terrorist organizations (Ross 1993, 323). Third, the literature suggests that military interventions and/or domestic conflicts can influence the formation of terrorist groups (Li 2005; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003).

Terrorists in democratic polities tend to be elitists. In fact, they claim to know better than the masses what is best for them (Laqueur 1999, 91). In such cases, orchestrated acts of terror represent the displeasure of a fragment of the elite towards a political system who may take it upon themselves to act on the behalf of a majority whom they believe are unaware of their plight or unwilling to express dissent (Crenshaw 1981, 396). There appears to be great levels of elite discontentment within certain types of electoral systems.

Huber and Powell (1994) and Li (2005) argue that majoritarian systems create single-party majority governments, which ignore the interest of minority groups. In contrast, the proportional system produces cabinets and legislatures that often represent the interest of most citizens. In her analysis of the impact of democratic systems on the onset of civil wars, Reynal-Querol (2002) found that proportional systems have a lower probability of group discontent and

rebellion than majoritarian systems. In short, regimes with electoral systems that restrict access to power and the airing of grievances create dissatisfaction. Crenshaw (1981) contends that in situations where paths to legal expression of opposition are blocked, but where the regime’s repression is inefficient, terrorism is doubly likely, as permissive and direct causes coincide.

The type of electoral system, more so than any other permissive factor, is seen as important to how alliances between political parties and terrorist organizations occur (Abrahams 2006; Braithwaite and Li 2005; Hamilton, 1978). More generally, the inherent characteristics of democratic polities are thought to facilitate alliances between political parties and terrorist organizations Ross (1993) provides several reasons why this phenomenon occurs. He suggests that:

The legacy of a colonial or semi-colonial past that has not been adequately resolved […], nationalist, separatist, and ethnic conflicts that cannot easily be resolved (e.g. Basques in Spain) […], guarantees of fundamental civil liberties promoting freedom of movement, access to media, and the free expression of unrest and dissent thereby accommodating diverse political values and demands […] the proliferation of narrow based social issues; and the existence of police forces which are generally law-abiding (p. 322).

Thus, when political parties consider using violence within a democracy, they are usually cognizant that democracies have institutionalized guarantees and methods of political expression.

Moreover, dissenters may express their policy preferences by seeking redress and accommodation (Ross 1993, 322; Chenoweth 2010). Intuitively, groups harboring grievances should be less likely to resort to terrorist violence in expressing their discontent where freedom

of expression is encouraged (Chenoweth 2010). However, checks and balances that are supposed to serve as a normative reminder to disgruntled groups that there are alternatives to terror often lead groups to seek other means such as violence to meet their organization objectives (Ross 1993, 322).

Finally, the structural literature argues that military activities influence levels of terrorism. Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003, 18) note that where there is a crisis of disintegration such as when a country deteriorates into civil war, a turn to terror by political parties increases.

They suggest during civil wars, leaders of major political parties representing their respective community “play the roles of warlords.” In various cases, political parties utilize not only militias created by their own party, but also employ other militias to carry out terrorist attacks, assassinations and bombings (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003, 18). In contrast, Li (2005, 287) contends that military conflict involvement reduces the number of terrorist incidents in the country. He argues that while external military conflict creates grievances and opportunities for terrorists it often leads to tightened domestic security measures, raising the cost of terrorist activities (Li 2005, 287).

While the structural theory provides evidence of a close relationship between political parties and terrorist organizations, the theory does not offer a complete discourse on how the political ideology of a ruling regime influences political parties’ associations with terrorism. As a theory, structural cause fails to identify sufficient common features that explain a turn to terror by political parties across polities. Importantly, it ignores the role played by rightwing government ideology. At best, it only provides institutional explanations such as electoral types, conflict (external and internal) and that most political organizations that become or create terror groups have a leftist ideology.

An important issue that is seldom discussed within structural literature is the role the Cold War era had on political parties and their decisions to turn to terror. The structural cause theory argument on terrorism encompasses ideas based, in part, on Cold War rivalry in the international system. However, as a general approach to understanding political parties and terrorist organizations, Cold War influences on the formation of terrorist organization by political parties have largely gone untested.

Cold War politics and rivalries appears to have had immediate effects on the dynamics of political parties and terrorist organizations, which could explain the higher ratio of leftist parties turning to terrorist activities during the 1960s to early 1990s and a corresponding hard-line approach by right-wing governments. As other studies have shown, especially as it relates to democratic peace,⁶

The global landscape within which these struggles occurred [had] been conditioned by the impact of US-Soviet relations. Because the superpowers have

the Cold War profoundly affected the political structure of several societies.

Anecdotal evidence provided by Weinberg (1991) and Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003) suggests the creation of terrorist organizations by political parties reached its zenith during the period from 1960 to the late 1980s, a period when many new democracies were being created and during the height of the Cold War. It is conceivable that Cold War rivalry between the super powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, helped embolden groups in various states with political ambition to adopt terrorist tactics as a mechanism to achieve their goals (Long 1990).

According to O’Brien (1996), it became customary during the Cold War in places such as Latin and Central America for groups with political ambition and groups who opposed a ruling government to create armed groups that perpetrated terrorist acts. He suggests that

shaped the environment within which terrorists operate, the role they have played and the responses they have made (p. 322).

Cline and Alexander (1984) infer that with the support of the Soviet Union during the Cold War era, many political parties facing rigid and sometimes corrupt regimes, gradually adopted terrorism as part of their policy to achieve their goals. While there are a few scholars who appear to recognize the role of the Cold War, thus far, none has incorporated this dynamic in a quantitative study that illuminates its role in helping to explain why political parties transition into terrorist organizations.