Giddens‟ ST operates at a high level of abstraction (Yang 2010; Englund et al. 2011). It is not intended as a guide for empirical study, but as an ontological theory or a meta-theory28 (ibid.). Despite the difficulty in applying it to empirical testing, it has been operationalized to study
28 Meta-theory is largely the study of theory, including the development of overarching combinations of theory,
as well as the development and application of theorems for analysis that reveal underlying assumptions about theory and theorizing [Wallis, S. E. (2010). "Toward a science of metatheory." Integral Review 6(3): 73-120]. A meta-theory is a set of interlocking rules, principles, or a story (narrative), that both describes and prescribes what is acceptable and unacceptable as theory - the means of conceptual exploration - in a scientific discipline. The prevailing meta-theory might prescribe that change of form (transformational change) is, or is not, a legitimate way of understanding developmental change [Overton, W. F. (1990). Metatheory and methodology in developmental psychology].
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organizations, institutions and systems (DeSanctis and Poole 1994). Jones (1999) develops four ways of using the theory: reconstructing it to accommodate a topic, applying it as an analytical tool, treating it as meta-theory, and using its ideas to inform research. This chapter borrows the ST29 as meta-theory, using its ideas to inform the research. There is no attempt here to explain ST in detail, and only its main features are sketched (i.e. it is revealed, as secondary literature constitutes a good interpretive guide).
ST is concerned with understanding the relationship between the actions of knowledgeable human actors and social structures in the production, reproduction, and regulation of social systems (see Giddens 1976; 1979; 1984; 1987). Giddens‟ ST thus distinguishes between systems and structure. Systems involve visible practices that are reproduced through time and space by the actions of human agents, while structure refers to structuring properties that connect (bind) those social practices with systems (Giddens 1984; Macintosh and Scapens 1990). Systems, thus, are not the same as structures; rather, systems have structures that include rules and resources, which are abstract codes or templates continuously reproduced through social interaction (Giddens 1984). In turn, reproduction of structures is viewed as both enabling and constraining (conditions) of human action or agency, the outcome of which is unintended consequences (Giddens 1979; Granlund 2003). This reflects the notion of the duality of structure through which structure is recursively organized as a set of rules and resources (Giddens 1984; Macintosh and Scapens 1990).
For Giddens the duality of structure denotes the “essential recursivness of social life, as constituted in social practices: structure is both medium and outcome of the reproduction of practices”; they recursively organize (1979:69). His emphasis thus is on structuration as an on-going process instead of structure as a static property of social systems (Orlikowski and Robey 1991). Through the duality of structure, ST binds structure to agency, which is the intentional actions of self-conscious individuals to reflexively monitor their own and others‟
29
Giddens (1984:2-3) affirms that the basic domain of ST is
“Neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of societal totality, but social practices ordered across space and time. Human social activities, like some self-reproducing items in nature, are recursive”. In ST, “a hermeneutic starting-point is accepted in so far as it is acknowledged that the description of human activities demands a familiarity with the forms of life expressed in those activities”. “It is the specifically reflexive form of the knowledgeability of human agents that is most deeply involved in the recursive ordering of social practices. Continuity of practices presumes reflexivity,
but reflexivity in turn is possible only because of the continuity of practices that makes themdistinctively
„the same‟ across space and time. „Reflexivity‟ hence should be understood not merely as 'self- consciousness' but as the monitored character of the ongoing flow of social life”.
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actions in social settings (Macintosh and Scapens 1991; Macintosh 1994), also known as the reflexive monitoring of conduct or action (Giddens 1979). Giddens suggests that structure and agency are a mutually constitutive duality. Thus, social systems are not the product of either structure or agency, but of both. Social structure is not sovereign of agency, nor is agency sovereign of structure. Rather, human agents draw on social structures in their actions, and simultaneously these actions serve to produce and reproduce social structure (Giddens 1984; Conrad 2005).
Giddens (1984) defines the duality of agency and structure through which structure (rules and resources) is organized as properties of systems on the one hand; meanwhile systems are reproduced relations between actors or collectivities organized as regular social practices on the other. Both happen within the process of structuration, which is the conditions governing the continuity or transformation of structure, and hence the reproduction of systems. Systems encompass three structural dimensions (see Figure 3-8): signification (meaning), domination (power) and legitimation (morality) (Giddens, 1984); although separable analytically, these three dimensions are inextricably linked (Macintosh and Scapens 1990). These three structures are portrayed as rules and resources, which are correlated with the three modalities of structuration. Two of these types are rules: interpretive and normative. Interpretive rules shape structures of signification by creating meaning; in turn, normative rules shape structures of legitimation, producing a morality involving values. Finally, there are resources, which are facilitative; they can be allocative or authoritative, shaping structures of domination that produce power (ibid., and see also, Oliveira 2010). As a result, “The concept of structuration involves that of the duality of structure, which relates to the fundamentally recursive characteristic of social life, and expresses the mutual dependence of structure and agency” (Giddens 1979:69).
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(Adapted from Giddens, 1984:29)
Giddens seeks to prove that both realms - social action (agency) and social structure - can coexist. He supposes that all human interaction is inextricably composed of structures of meaning, power and moral framework, and that any interaction can be analyzed in terms of them. He shows three „modalities‟ that link the realm of action and the realm of social structure: interpretive schemes, resources, and norms. Interpretive schemes are standardized, shared stocks of knowledge that humans draw on to interpret behavior and events, hence achieving meaningful interaction. Resources are the means through which intentions are realized, goals are accomplished, and power is exercised. Norms are the rules governing sanctioned or appropriate conduct and they define the legitimacy of interaction within a setting of moral order. These three modalities specify how the institutional properties of social systems mediate deliberate human action (agency) and how human action constitutes social structure. The relation between the realms of social structure and human action is referred to as the recursive nature of the “process of structuration” (Giddens 1979; Orlikowski and Robey 1991).
ST thus permits elimination of the artificial partitioning of research attention between macro and micro levels of analysis, because the process of structuration manages at multiple levels of analysis: the organization, organizational field, and social system (Orlikowski and Robey 1991). By explaining how individual action and interaction shape shared meanings of social structure, Giddens exceeds the „unit of analysis‟ crisis suggested by Pfeffer (1982), Rousseau (1985) and others. Rather than requiring analysis at either the organizational level or
Signification Power Legitimation Domination Communication Sanction Institutional Realm (Structure) Modalities of Structuration Realm of Action (Agency) Interpretive Scheme (Rules) Facility (Resources) (Rules) Norms (rules) (Rules) Figure (3-8) Giddens' Structuration Process
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organizational field level (see also, Glick 1988; James et al. 1988), ST provides notions for effectively bridging multiple levels of analysis, thus conducting a more holistic social theory (Hartman 1988; Markus and Robey 1988; Orlikowski and Robey 1991).
In MA literature, management accounting systems represent three types of modalities of structuration, while they can be viewed as interpretive schemes (interpretive rules), embody organizational norms (normative rules), and comprise authoritative and allocative resources (coercive recourses) (Macintosh and Scapens 1990; Macintosh 1994; 1995). Related to domination, the dialectic of control refers to how the less powerful manage resources in order to exercise control over the more powerful (Giddens 1984). However, Giddens‟ ST was used as a meta-theory, and its high levels of abstraction made its use in empirical accounting research difficult, even doubtful (Coad and Herbert 2009; Oliveira 2010). As we discussed in the previous chapter, ST has influenced an important stream of MA research and inspired institutional theory, largely via the seminal work of Macintosh and Scapens (1990; 1991), Macintosh (1994) and Scapens and Macintosh (1996). Accordingly, some MA researchers have adopted the ideas of ST to develop new a institutional framework, to help them to understand MAC, by integrating some insights of ST with institutional theory (see, DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Barley and Tolbert 1997; Burns and Scapens 2000; Dillard et al. 2004). The following sections explain this integration in more detail and provide a comprehensive institutional framework for understanding MAC.